Investor protection and equity markets
Coauthor(s): Andrei Shleifer.
We present a simple model of an entrepreneur going public in an environment with poor legal protection of outside shareholders. The model incorporates elements of Becker's (J. Political Econ. 106 (1968) 172) "crime and punishment" framework into a corporate
finance environment of Jensen and Meckling (J. Financial Econ. 3 (1976) 305). We examine the entrepreneur's decision and the market equilibrium. The model is consistent with a number of empirical regularities concerning the relation between investor protection and corporate finance. It also sheds light on the patterns of capital flows between rich and poor countries and on the politics of reform of investor protection.
Source: Journal of Financial Economics
Shleifer, Andrei, and Daniel Wolfenzon. "Investor protection and equity markets." Journal of Financial Economics 66 (2002): 3-27.