On the escalation and de-escalation of conflictCoauthor(s): Juan Lacomba, Francisco Lagos, Frans van Winden.
We introduce three extensions of the Hirshleifer-Skaperdas conflict game to study experimentally the effects of post-conflict behavior and repeated interaction on the allocation of effort between production and appropriation. Without repeated interaction, destruction of resources by defeated players can lead to lower appropriative efforts and higher overall efficiency. With repeated interaction, appropriative efforts are considerably reduced because some groups manage to avoid fighting altogether, often after substantial initial conflict. To attain peace, players must first engage in costly signaling by making themselves vulnerable and by forgoing the possibility to appropriate the resources of defeated opponents.
The final version may be found at http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2014.03.006.
Source: Games and Economic Behavior
Lacomba, Juan, Francisco Lagos, Ernesto Reuben, and Frans van Winden. "On the escalation and de-escalation of conflict." Games and Economic Behavior (forthcoming).
Date: 7 2014