The Inefficiency of Refinancing: Why Prepayment Penalties Are Good for Risky Borrowers
Coauthor(s): Christopher Mayer, Alexei Tchistyi.
This paper provides a theoretical analysis of the efficiency of prepayment penalties in a dynamic competitive lending model with risky borrowers and costly default. When considering improvements in the borrower's creditworthiness as one of the reasons for refinancing mortgages, we show that refinancing penalties can be welfare improving, and that they can be particularly beneficial to riskier borrowers in the form of lower mortgage rates, reduced defaults, and increased availability of credit. Thus, a high concentration of prepayment penalties among the riskiest borrowers can be an outcome of efficient equilibrium in a mortgage market. We also provide empirical evidence
that is consistent with the key predictions of our model.
Source: Journal of Financial Economics
Mayer, Christopher, Tomasz Piskorski, and Alexei Tchistyi. "The Inefficiency of Refinancing: Why Prepayment Penalties Are Good for Risky Borrowers." Journal of Financial Economics 107, no. 3 (March 2013): 694-714.