Tomasz Piskorski

Securitization and Distressed Loan Renegotiation: Evidence from the Subprime Mortgage Crisis

Coauthor(s): Amit Seru, Vikrant Vig. View Publication

Abstract:
We examine whether securitization impacts renegotiation decisions of loan servicers, focusing on their decision to foreclose a delinquent loan. Conditional on a loan becoming seriously delinquent, we find a significantly lower foreclosure rate associated with bank-held loans when compared to similar securitized loans: across various specifications and origination vintages, the foreclosure rate of delinquent bankheld loans is 3% to 7% lower in absolute terms (13% to 32% in relative terms). There is a substantial heterogeneity in these effects with large effects among borrowers with better credit quality and small effects among lower quality borrowers. A quasi-experiment that exploits a plausibly exogenous variation in securitization status of a delinquent loan confirms these results.

Source: Journal of Financial Economics
Exact Citation:
Piskorski, Tomasz, Amit Seru, and Vikrant Vig. "Securitization and Distressed Loan Renegotiation: Evidence from the Subprime Mortgage Crisis." Journal of Financial Economics 97, no. 3 (September 1, 2010): 369-397.
Volume: 97
Number: 3
Pages: 369-397
Date: 1 9 2010