Learning about Consumption Dynamics

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Abstract

This paper characterizes postwar U.S. aggregate consumption dynamics from the perspective of a Bayesian agent who is confronted with a realistic, high-dimensional macroeconomic learning problem. We find strong statistical and economic evidence that parameter and model learning were important determinants of asset prices in the U.S. postwar sample. Relative to a fixed parameters benchmark, learning generates dramatically different subjective consumption dynamics along important dimensions. Most notably, the volatility of subjective beliefs about long-run dynamics is high and, since parameter and model learning is more pronounced in recessions, counter-cyclical. Revisions in beliefs are significantly related to observed stock market returns, evidence for strong learning effects in the postwar sample. We embed the estimated subjective beliefs in a consumption-based asset pricing model and find that the inclusion of realistic parameter and model learning substantially improves the model’s ability to fit standard asset pricing moments, as well as the time-series of the price-dividend ratio, relative to benchmark models with fixed parameters.

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1 Introduction

At their core, consumption-based asset pricing theories link beliefs about macroeconomic outcomes and aggregate asset prices and returns (Lucas (1978)). Fundamentally, how do these beliefs arise? The literature is largely silent on this issue, as asset pricing models traditionally presume agents know the ‘true’ structure of economy: the model specification and the parameters. As argued by Hansen (2007), this is unrealistic.\(^1\) In reality, economic agents face problems similar to those of econometricians: they form their beliefs about parameters, states, and models via difficult, realistic and high-dimensional learning problems using available macroeconomic data. This paper evaluates the empirical relevance of this type of structural learning for asset prices in the U.S. postwar sample.

For model and parameter learning to be an important asset pricing consideration, the following conditions should hold. First, the subjective beliefs arising from a realistic learning problem should be substantially different from those arising from traditional implementations of similar models. Second, when beliefs change, so should asset prices: thus belief updates should be significantly correlated with market returns. This is a fundamental test for the empirical relevance of structural learning. Third, these beliefs, when embedded in an equilibrium asset pricing model, should help us understand the standard asset pricing puzzles: the realized high equity premium, excess return volatility, excess return predictability, and a volatile price-dividend ratio. We find strong evidence along all three dimensions, supporting the empirical relevance of structural learning.

We study rational learning using common Markov switching models of aggregate consumption growth: unrestricted 2- and 3-state models and a restricted 2-state model generating i.i.d. consumption growth. The hidden states capture business cycle fluctuations and can be labeled as expansion and recession in 2-state models, with an additional ‘depression’ state in 3-state models. Our agent does not know the parameters, states, or the specific model and uses Bayes rule to update beliefs from realized consumption data, as well as additional data such as GDP growth. We solve this high-dimensional learning problem using particle filters and use historical macroeconomic data to train the prior distributions.

Our first results characterize beliefs about parameters, states, models, and future con-

\(^{1}\) Hansen (2007) states: "In actual decision making, we may be required to learn about moving targets, to make parametric inferences, to compare model performance, or to gauge the importance of long-run components of uncertainty. As the statistical problem that agents confront in our model is made complex, rational expectations' presumed confidence in their knowledge of the probability specification becomes more tenuous. This leads me to ask: (a) how can we burden the investors with some of the specification problems that challenge the econometrician, and (b) when would doing so have important quantitative implications" (p.2).
sumption dynamics (e.g., moments) over the postwar sample. Individual parameters and model probabilities drift over time and, in particular, the agent perceives an upward drift in the expected consumption growth, a strong secular decline in the consumption growth volatility, and a decline in beliefs over large drops in consumption growth (such as the probability that consumption falls by more than 4% in a year). The agents learn about different parameters at different speeds, and there is evidence for confounding effects.\textsuperscript{2} Non-stationary beliefs should not be a surprise, they are a signature of parameter and model uncertainty as beliefs are martingales, and shocks to beliefs are therefore permanent. This is easy to see from the law of iterated expectations: e.g., for a parameter $\theta$, $E[\theta | y^t] = E[E[\theta | y^{t+1}] | y^t]$, where $y^t$ denotes available data up until time $t$.

The beliefs generated by model and parameter learning are substantially different from those generated from the models with fixed parameters estimated over the postwar sample. In the fixed parameter models, the dynamics are driven solely by beliefs about the time-varying Markov states and these shocks, by definition, are transient and do not drift over time. Both experiments—model and parameter learning and a fixed parameter implementation—capture business cycle fluctuations via state beliefs. Thus, the main difference is generated by updates in parameter and model beliefs.

As mentioned earlier, if parameter and model learning are empirically important, updates in beliefs about these dimensions of the consumption data should lead to changes in aggregate asset prices. In support of this, we find strong evidence that quarterly excess stock market returns are positively related to quarterly revisions in beliefs about expected consumption growth. In these regressions, we control for contemporaneous realized consumption growth, as well as updates in beliefs about expected consumption growth from the fixed parameter models. Realized returns are also significantly and negatively related to shocks to predictive consumption growth volatility. These results are strengthened if the agent learns from both consumption and GDP growth. This is a particularly stringent test of a macro learning story since changes in beliefs are driven completely by macroeconomic information.

Parameter and model learning are especially important for asset prices because they generate long-run consumption risks (see Bansal and Yaron (2004)). Our approach allows

\textsuperscript{2}There is significant learning about the expansion state parameters, slower learning about the recession state, and almost no learning about the disaster state, as it is rarely, if ever, visited. Standard large sample theory implies that all parameters converge at the same rate, but the realized convergence rate, intuitively, depends on the actual observed sample path. There is also strong evidence for a confounding effect: when states are unobserved, parameter learning is significantly slower, which implies that confounding leads to longer-lasting learning effects.
us to identify and quantify these long-run risks from macro data alone, and we show that with learning there is large time-variation in long-run beliefs. For example, defining long-run shocks as changes in beliefs about expected discounted consumption growth from the current time to infinity (as in shocks to the cash flow component of a Campbell-Shiller decomposition of the price-consumption ratio), we find that the volatility of long-run shocks from a 2-state model with parameter uncertainty is 3.4 times the volatility of the fixed parameters counterpart over the postwar sample. Thus, these long-run risks are driven mainly by parameter and not state uncertainty. Long-run shocks are largest during recessions, as there is more uncertainty about the parameters governing infrequent bad states, and therefore more updating when these states are visited (see also Chen, Joslin, and Tran (2010)). This contributes to the high volatility of returns in recessions.

To investigate the asset pricing implications of the estimated beliefs process, we consider a formal equilibrium model assuming Epstein-Zin preferences. In particular, at each time $t$, our agent prices a levered claim to future consumption given beliefs over parameters, models, and states, computing quantities such as ex-ante expected returns and dividend-price ratios. Then, at time $t+1$, our agent updates beliefs using new macro realizations at time $t+1$, recomputes prices, expected returns and dividend-price ratios. From this time series of prices, we compute realized equity returns, volatilities, etc. Thus, we feed in historically realized macroeconomic data and analyze the asset pricing implications for this particular sample. We use standard preference parameters taken from Bansal and Yaron (2004).

Solving the full pricing problem with priced parameter and model uncertainty is computationally prohibitive, as the dimensionality of the problem is too large. To price assets and incorporate the time-varying parameter and model beliefs, we follow Piazzesi and Schneider (2010) and Cogley and Sargent (2009) and use a version of Kreps’ (1998) anticipated utility. Anticipated utility implies that claims are priced at each point in time using current posterior means for the parameters and model probabilities, assuming those values will persist into the indefinite future. We do account for state uncertainty in this pricing exercise.

This pricing experiment provides additional evidence, along multiple dimensions, for the importance of learning. The estimated fixed parameters 2- and 3-state models do not match standard asset pricing moments: the realized equity premium, Sharpe ratio, the levels of predictability, and price-dividend volatility are all much lower than those observed in the data. Parameter and model learning uniformly improves all of these statistics, bringing them close to observed values. Permanent revisions in beliefs, such as those generated by parameter and model learning, have a particularly large impact on price-dividend ratios. The
substantial variation we document in parameter and model beliefs is therefore an important source of excess return volatility. Moreover, price-dividend ratios generated by our learning models have a significantly higher covariance with observed price-dividend ratios (15-30 times higher) than those generated by the fixed parameter models. Overall, the agent perceives the economy to have higher growth and be less risky than initially believed, and this also generates \textit{ex post} average excess returns about twice as large as the \textit{ex ante} expected returns.

In terms of predictability, the returns generated by learning over time closely match the data. In forecasting excess market returns with the lagged log dividend-price ratio, the regression coefficients and $R^2$'s are increasing with the forecasting horizon and similar to those found in the data. The fixed parameters case, however, does not deliver significant \textit{ex post} predictability, although the \textit{ex ante} risk premium is in fact time-varying in these models as well, because the time-variation in the risk premium assuming fixed parameters is too small relative to the volatility of realized returns to result in significant $t$-statistics. The intuition for why \textit{in-sample} predictability occurs when agents are uncertain about parameters and models is the same as in Timmermann (1993) and Lewellen and Shanken (2002), and can be understood as a strong form of the Stambaugh (1999) bias.

Our results are robust along a number of dimensions. We have considered several different prior specifications. For instance, we present in an Online Appendix results from a case where the prior parameter means are centered at the postwar maximum likelihood estimates. Our findings are overall the same, both empirically and theoretically. Adding GDP growth to investors information set only makes our main findings stronger. Finally, we solve the fully rational pricing problem, where the representative agent prices the parameter uncertainty \textit{ex ante}, for a limited learning problem: the 2-state model where all the parameters are unknown, but where the state is observed. This is a 9-dimensional problem and the most complicated parameter learning problem it is computationally feasible to solve with reasonable accuracy. The long-run risks induced by parameter learning are in this case priced risks, which increases \textit{ex ante} risk prices (see Collin-Dufresne, Johannes, and Lochstoer (2013)). The main conclusions regarding the empirical relevance of structural learning are robust also to this alternative pricing framework.

Below we relate our paper to the literature, Section 2 lays out the formal learning environment, Section 3 characterizes the estimated time-series of beliefs, Section 4 shows results from empirical tests that relate updates in beliefs to stock returns, while Section 5 present the asset pricing implications of the estimated beliefs process.
1.1 Existing literature and alternative approaches for parameter, state, and model uncertainty

Our paper is related to a large literature on learning and asset pricing (see Pastor and Veronesi (2009) for a comprehensive review). Most of the literature studying the asset pricing implications of parameter or state learning focuses on learning about a single unknown parameter or state variable (assuming the other parameters and/or states are known) that determines dividend dynamics and power utility. For example, Timmermann (1993) considers the effect of uncertainty on the average level of dividend growth, assuming other parameters are known, and shows in simple discounted cash-flow setting that parameter learning generates excess volatility and patterns consistent with the predictability evidence (see also Timmermann (1996)). Lewellen and Shanken (2002) study the impact of learning about mean cash-flow parameters with exponential utility with a particular focus on return predictability.


Cogley and Sargent (2008) consider a 2-state Markov-switching model, parameter uncertainty over one of the transition probabilities, tilt beliefs to generate robustness via pessimistic beliefs, and use power utility. After calibrating the priors to the 1930s experience, they simulate data from a true model calibrated to the post War experience to show how priced parameter uncertainty and concerns for robustness impact asset prices, in terms of the finite sample distribution over various moments. Cogley and Sargent (2009) consider the differences between anticipated utility and full learning in simple macroeconomics models and find small differences. Due to its computational advantages, anticipated utility is the dominant approach in macroeconomics for handling parameter learning.

A number of papers consider state uncertainty, where the state evolves discretely via a Markov switching model or smoothing via a Gaussian process. Moore and Shaller (1996) consider consumption/dividend based Markov switching models with state learning and power utility. Brennan and Xia (2001) consider the problem of learning about dividend growth which is not a fixed parameter but a mean-reverting stochastic process, with power utility.


2 The Environment

2.1 Model

Consider a Markov switching model for aggregate, real, per capita consumption growth:

$$\Delta c_t = \mu_{s_t} + \sigma_{s_t} \varepsilon_t,$$

where $\Delta c_t$ is log-consumption growth, $\varepsilon_t \sim \text{i.i.d. } \mathcal{N}(0,1)$, $s_t \in \{1, ..., N\}$ is a discrete-time Markov chain with transition matrix $\Pi$, and $(\mu_{s_t}, \sigma_{s_t}^2)$ are the state-dependent mean and variance. The transition probabilities are defined as $P[s_t = j | s_{t-1} = i] = \pi_{ij}$ with $\sum_{j=1}^{N} \pi_{ij} = 1$. We consider general 2- and 3-state models and an i.i.d. 2-state model that assumes $\pi_{11} = \pi_{21}$ and $\pi_{22} = \pi_{12} = 1 - \pi_{11}$, generating an i.i.d. mixture of normal distributions. The unrestricted 2- and 3-state models have 6 and 12 static parameters, respectively and the i.i.d. two state model has 5 static parameters.

Since Mehra and Prescott (1985) and Rietz (1988), Markov switching models are commonly used for modeling aggregate consumption dynamics due to their flexibility and tractability. Recently, Barro (2006, 2009), Barro and Ursua (2008), Barro, Nakamura, Steinsson and Ursua (2009), Backus, Chernov, and Martin (2009), and Gabaix (2009) use these models to study consumption disasters. The models generate a range of economically interesting
and statistically flexible distributions by varying the number, persistence, and distribution of states, even though the $\varepsilon_t$’s are i.i.d. normal. Markov switching models are also tractable, as likelihood functions and filtering distributions are analytic, conditional on parameters. It is common to provide business cycle labels to the states, and to preview some of our results, we estimate states, in the unrestricted 2-state model, that correspond closely to recessions and expansions, while the 3-state model also has a rare ‘Depression’ state.

2.2 Information and learning

To operationalize the model, we need to specify how and from what our agent learns over time. As our main goal is to study an agent facing the same inference problems as an econometrician, we assume the agent does not know the Markov state, the true parameters, or the true specification. We refer to these unknowns as state, parameter, and model uncertainty.

Our agent learns rationally from current and past consumption growth, updating beliefs using Bayes rule as new data arrives. The primary data is the ‘standard’ data set used in the consumption-based asset pricing literature—final real, per capita quarterly growth in services and nondurable consumption as given in the National Income and Product Account tables from the Bureau of Economic Analysis from 1947:Q1 until 2009:Q1. Although we consider consumption-based asset pricing models, agents could learn from other macroeconomic data about consumption dynamics. We develop an extension to handle this problem and implement a case of learning using consumption and GDP growth data.

Formally, the learning problem is as follows. $\mathcal{M}_k$ indexes a model, $k = 1, \ldots, K$, and a given model has states, $s_t$, and parameters, $\theta$. The posterior distribution, $p(\theta, s_t, \mathcal{M}_k | y^t)$, summarizes beliefs after observing data $y^t = (y_1, \ldots y_t)$ and is given by

$$p(\theta, s_t, \mathcal{M}_k | y^t) = p(\theta, s_t | \mathcal{M}_k, y^t) \mathbb{P}(\mathcal{M}_k | y^t) .$$

$p(\theta, s_t | \mathcal{M}_k, y^t)$ solves the parameter and state “estimation” problem conditional on a model and $\mathbb{P}(\mathcal{M}_k | y^t)$ provides model probabilities and solves the model learning problem. The learning process refers to how the posterior distribution sequentially changes over time, as the agents beliefs evolve as a function of the specific observed sequence of macroeconomic data during the postwar sample. This learning problem is a difficult high-dimensional problem, as

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3This is a notational abuse. In general, the state and dimension of the parameter vector should depend on the model, thus we should superscript the parameters and states by ‘$k$’, $\theta^k$ and $s^k_t$. For notational simplicity, we drop the model dependence and denote the parameters and states as $\theta$ and $s_t$, respectively.
posterior beliefs depend in a complicated, non-analytical manner on past data and can vary substantially over time. A description of our econometric approach for posterior sampling (particle filtering) is in the Online Appendix.

In general, posterior beliefs over fixed quantities like parameters and model indicators are martingales. This has the crucial implication that shocks to beliefs over $\theta$ and $M_k$ affect the agent’s expectations of consumption growth indefinitely into the future, generating truly long-run risks. These permanents effects are the signature or hallmark of parameter/model learning and can be contrasted with the transient nature of beliefs over $s_t$, which mean-revert over time. Bansal and Yaron (2004) show that long-run risks have important asset pricing implications, but empirically identifying these long-run risks is difficult. Our empirical strategy identifies and quantifies one source of these long-run risks, the permanent updates arising from rational parameter and model learning (see also Collin-Dufresne, Johannes, and Lochstoer (2013)).

Our analysis differs from existing work on learning in an asset pricing setting (see Pastor and Veronesi (2009) for a recent survey) along three key dimensions. First, we consider simultaneous learning about parameters, hidden state variables, and even model specifications—i.e., the learning problem closely mimics that of the real-world econometrician. Most existing work focuses on learning a single parameter or state variable. Learning about multiple unknowns is more difficult as additional unknowns often confounds inference, slowing the learning process. Second, we focus on the specific implications of sequential learning about aggregate consumption dynamics from macroeconomic data during the U.S. post World War II experience. Thus, we are not expressly interested in general asset pricing implications of learning in repeated sampling settings, but rather the specific implications generated by the historical macroeconomic shocks realized in the United States over the last 65 years. Third, we use a new and stringent test of learning that relates updates in investor beliefs about aggregate consumption dynamics to realized equity returns. If learning is important for asset price dynamics, the historical time-series of beliefs should be strongly related to the historical time-series of aggregate asset prices.

2.3 Initial beliefs

The learning process begins with initial beliefs—the prior distribution. In terms of functional forms, we assume proper, conjugate prior distributions (Raiffa and Schlaifer (1956)). Conjugate priors imply that the functional form of beliefs is the same before and after sam-
pling (beliefs are closed under sampling); they are analytically tractable for econometric implementation; and they are flexible enough to express a wide range initial beliefs.

The conjugate prior for location/scale parameters is

\[ p(\mu_i, \sigma^2_i) = p(\mu_i|\sigma^2_i)p(\sigma^2_i) \sim \mathcal{NIG}(a_i, A_i, b_i, B_i), \]

where \( \mathcal{NIG} \) is the normal/inverse gamma distribution, generating a fat-tailed t-distributed marginal prior for \( \mu_i \), adding a layer of robustness. The Beta/Dirichlet distribution is a conjugate prior for transition probabilities. Conjugate priors are commonly used since flat or ‘uninformative’ priors can not be used with Markov switching models, as they generate identification issues (the label switching problem) and improper posterior distributions.\(^4\)

We endow our agent with economically motivated and realistic initial beliefs, using a training sample to specify the prior parameters. Training samples use an initial data set to inform the parameter location and scale and are a common way of generating data-based reference priors. We use Shiller’ s annual consumption data from 1889 until 1946. The use of prewar macroeconomic data as a prior training sample does create some issues. Most notably, there is evidence for a structural break in the quality of macroeconomic data (see Romer (1989)) and the parameters need to be converted from annual to quarterly data, which is only available starting in 1947. Romer (1989) presents evidence that a substantial fraction of the volatility of macro variables such as consumption growth pre-WW2 is due to measurement error. To account for this, we set the prior mean over the volatility parameters in 1947\(Q1\) to a quarter of the value estimated over the annual Shiller sample. To add an additional layer of robustness, we use a 10-year burn-in period of quarterly data in the postwar sample, updating beliefs using the quarterly NIPA data from 1947 through 1956. Thus, our pricing exercises begins in 1957\(Q1\), proceeding through 2009\(Q1\). Further prior details are in the Online Appendix.\(^5\)

\(^4\)The label switching problem refers to the fact that the likelihood function is invariant to a relabeling of the components, thus the parameters are not uniquely identified. For example, in a 2-state model, it is possible to swap the definitions of the first and second states and the associated parameters without changing the value of the likelihood. Identification, for either Bayesian or classical methods, requires additional constraints such as ordering of the means or variances of the parameters. For discussions of these issues, see Marin, Mengersen, and Robert (2005) or Fruhwirth-Schnatter (2006).

\(^5\)For robustness, we also considered alternative priors. Earlier drafts used priors centered at the estimated values from the Shiller sample, but with substantially larger prior variances to capture the idea that an agent in 1947 would not have taken the pre-war sample at face value and would have allowed for more uncertainty. We also considered a rational expectations or ‘look-ahead’ prior centered at postwar full-sample parameter estimates (see Online Appendix). In both cases, all of our main results hold, both qualitatively and quantitatively.
We contrast our learning results with those from a model with 'fixed parameter' priors. This is a point-mass prior located at the parameter MLE for a given model estimated on the postwar period. In this case, the agent only learns about the latent Markov state, which is the typical rational expectations approach which assumes the agent knows the most likely parameters. Contrasting the full-learning and fixed-parameter cases allows us to separately identify the roles of state and parameter learning.

Table 1 - Priors (1957Q1) and end-of-sample posteriors (2009Q1)

Table 1: The table shows the 1957Q1 priors for the parameters of the three different models of log, real per capita, quarterly consumption growth considered in the paper, as well as the end-of-sample posteriors (as of 2009Q1). The parameters within a state (mean and variance) have Normal/Inverse Gamma distributed priors, while the transition probabilities have Beta distributed priors. Note that $\hat{\pi}_{ij} \equiv \frac{\pi_{ij}}{1-\pi_{ij}}$.

Panel A: Priors and end-of-sample posteriors for i.i.d. model

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Parameter</th>
<th>$\mu_1$</th>
<th>$\mu_2$</th>
<th>$\sigma_1^2$</th>
<th>$\sigma_2^2$</th>
<th>$\pi_{11}$</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Prior mean</td>
<td>0.60%</td>
<td>-1.56%</td>
<td>0.59 (%)$^2$</td>
<td>2.78 (%)$^2$</td>
<td>5.51%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Prior st.dev.</td>
<td>0.11%</td>
<td>0.73%</td>
<td>0.14 (%)$^2$</td>
<td>1.31 (%)$^2$</td>
<td>3.80%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Posterior mean</td>
<td>0.61%</td>
<td>-0.96%</td>
<td>0.25 (%)$^2$</td>
<td>2.39 (%)$^2$</td>
<td>3.79%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Posterior st.dev</td>
<td>31%</td>
<td>73%</td>
<td>21%</td>
<td>73%</td>
<td>49%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Panel B: Priors and end-of-sample posteriors for 2-state model

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Parameter</th>
<th>$\mu_1$</th>
<th>$\mu_2$</th>
<th>$\sigma_1^2$</th>
<th>$\sigma_2^2$</th>
<th>$\pi_{11}$</th>
<th>$\pi_{22}$</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Prior mean</td>
<td>0.81%</td>
<td>-0.03%</td>
<td>0.40 (%)$^2$</td>
<td>0.84 (%)$^2$</td>
<td>0.88</td>
<td>0.83</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Prior st.dev.</td>
<td>0.18%</td>
<td>0.28%</td>
<td>0.16 (%)$^2$</td>
<td>0.23 (%)$^2$</td>
<td>0.07</td>
<td>0.09</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Posterior mean</td>
<td>0.70%</td>
<td>0.13%</td>
<td>0.15 (%)$^2$</td>
<td>0.63 (%)$^2$</td>
<td>0.93</td>
<td>0.83</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Posterior st.dev</td>
<td>18%</td>
<td>41%</td>
<td>11%</td>
<td>51%</td>
<td>34%</td>
<td>70%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Panel C: Priors and end-of-sample posteriors for 3-state model

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Parameter</th>
<th>$\mu_1$</th>
<th>$\mu_2$</th>
<th>$\mu_3$</th>
<th>$\sigma_1^2$</th>
<th>$\sigma_2^2$</th>
<th>$\sigma_3^2$</th>
<th>$\pi_{11}$</th>
<th>$\pi_{12}$</th>
<th>$\pi_{21}$</th>
<th>$\pi_{22}$</th>
<th>$\pi_{31}$</th>
<th>$\pi_{33}$</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Prior mean</td>
<td>0.74%</td>
<td>-0.23%</td>
<td>-1.84%</td>
<td>0.52 (%)$^2$</td>
<td>0.55 (%)$^2$</td>
<td>0.56 (%)$^2$</td>
<td>0.92</td>
<td>0.86</td>
<td>0.86</td>
<td>0.75</td>
<td>0.35</td>
<td>0.65</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Prior st.dev.</td>
<td>0.17%</td>
<td>0.29%</td>
<td>0.47%</td>
<td>0.15 (%)$^2$</td>
<td>0.21 (%)$^2$</td>
<td>0.28 (%)$^2$</td>
<td>0.05</td>
<td>0.13</td>
<td>0.01</td>
<td>0.08</td>
<td>0.24</td>
<td>0.10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Posterior mean</td>
<td>0.72%</td>
<td>0.01%</td>
<td>-1.77%</td>
<td>0.18 (%)$^2$</td>
<td>0.45 (%)$^2$</td>
<td>0.56 (%)$^2$</td>
<td>0.94</td>
<td>0.93</td>
<td>0.92</td>
<td>0.77</td>
<td>0.34</td>
<td>0.65</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Posterior st.dev</td>
<td>22%</td>
<td>42%</td>
<td>98%</td>
<td>14%</td>
<td>46%</td>
<td>95%</td>
<td>40%</td>
<td>54%</td>
<td>60%</td>
<td>85%</td>
<td>97%</td>
<td>99%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
To summarize parameter prior beliefs, Table 1 reports the prior means and dispersion. The unrestricted 2-state model priors correspond to business cycle fluctuations, with slightly negative consumption growth in recessions that are persistent but shorter-lived than the high growth expansions. The 3-state model has an additional rare and short-lived ‘Depression’ state, with a mean expected quarterly growth rate of $-1.8\%$. This is low and reasonable, but certainty not a consumption disaster. The low growth state in the i.i.d. 2-state model is in between the recession and the depression states of the 3-state model. The prior standard deviation of the mean in the good state in the 3-state model is $0.17\%$, whereas the prior standard deviation of the mean in the Depression state is $0.47\%$, reflecting the fact that historically there are more observations drawn from the good state than from the recession state than from the depression state. In sum, the information in the training sample leads to priors that embody reasonable properties given the pre-WWII data, as well as the 1947 to 1956 burn-in period, used to train the priors.

To incorporate model uncertainty, we need to specify initial probabilities of the three models at the beginning of the postwar sample. There is good reason to consider all of these models ex-ante possible. The i.i.d. consumption growth model is a benchmark model in the literature, as a natural outcome of the permanent income hypothesis (see Friedman (1957), Hall (1978), Campbell and Cochrane (1999)). On the other hand, business cycle fluctuations are well-documented, supporting a persistent 2-state model (Kandel and Stambaugh (1990)). Similarly, the Great Depression which was fresh in investors minds in 1947, would suggest the importance of a third ‘crisis’ state. In fact, there has been a resurgence of interest models with ‘disaster’ states in the macro-finance literature (see, e.g., Rietz (1988), Barro (2006, 2009)). For simplicity, we specify equal model probabilities for each model in 1947 and use the 10-year burn-in period from 1947 to 1956 to update these model priors. One of our main results is that the 2-state model provides a dramatically better fit to the postwar data, which implies that our results are not sensitive to reasonable variation in this prior assumption. In addition to model averaged results, we separately report results for the each of the individual models in the following.

3 Characterizing the time series of beliefs

This section summarizes the agent’s dynamic learning process over the post-WW2 sample, including the initial burn-in period from 1947 to 1956. We discuss state, parameter, and model learning, then implications for the time series of conditional consumption moments,
as well as long-run consumption growth dynamics.

3.1 State, parameter, and model learning

For a given model, the agent learns about parameters and states, with belief updates driven by a combination of the specific sequence of realized data, model specification, and initial beliefs. To start, consider state beliefs, where state 1 is an ‘expansion’ state, state 2 the ‘recession’ state and, if a 3-state model, state 3 the ‘Depression’ state. Figure 1 reports state estimates, $E[s_t|M_k,y^t]$. Note that this quantity is marginal, integrating out parameter uncertainty. Although $s_t$ is discrete, the mean estimates are not integer valued.

First, state beliefs primarily capture business cycle fluctuations, as they are strongly related to NBER recessions (shaded yellow) and expansions, especially in the unrestricted 2- and 3-state models. The only exceptions are the mild recessions in the late 1960s and 2001, which did not have substantial consumption declines. This implies that state beliefs largely capture the transitory and stationary aspects of business cycle fluctuations. Second, there is a strong difference across models in state persistence. The i.i.d. model identifies recessions as one-off transient negative shocks, while the 2- and 3-state models identify persistent recession states. Only two periods place even modest probability on the Depression state – the recession in 1980 and the financial crisis in 2008. Depression states are essentially ‘Peso’ events in the postwar sample, something that would have been difficult to forecast in 1947. Third, state beliefs are more volatile early in the sample in all models, due to higher parameter uncertainty, which, in turn, makes state identification more difficult.

Next, consider the dynamics of parameter beliefs. For parsimony, we focus on a few economically interesting and important parameters in the 2-state model as the next section provides additional details for all of the models. The top panels of Figure 2 document a gradual decline in the posterior means of $\sigma_1^2$ and $\sigma_2^2$ over the postwar sample, a combination of the Great Moderation (realized consumption volatility decreased over time) and initial beliefs, which are based on a historical experience with higher consumption growth volatility. The decline in consumption volatility in the expansion state is quite large, from about 0.7% per quarter to about 0.4% per quarter.

The lower panels in Figure 2 display the mean beliefs over the transition probabilities, $\pi_{11}$ and $\pi_{22}$. After the 10-year burn-in period, the former essentially increases over the sample, while the latter decreases. That is, 50 years of, on average, long expansions and high consumption growth generates revisions in beliefs consistent with more persistent good
Figure 1 - Evolution of Mean State Beliefs

Figure 1: The plots show the means of agents’ beliefs about the state of the economy at each point in time, $E_t[s_t]$. Note that $s_t = 1, 2$ in the i.i.d. and the 2-state model, while $s_t = 1, 2, 3$ in the 3-state model. '1' is an expansion state, '2' is a recession state, and '3' is a disaster state. Thus, the mean state belief is between 1 and 2 for the 2-state models, and between 1 and 3 for the 3-state model. The time $t$ state beliefs are formed using the history of consumption only up until and including time $t$. The "i.i.d. Model" is a model with i.i.d. consumption growth but that allows for jumps ('2' is a jump state). The sample is from 1947:Q2 until 2009:Q1.
states and less persistent bad states. The conditional probability of staying in an expansion, increases from 0.88 to 0.93. Thus, there is non-stationary drifts in parameter beliefs—permanent shocks—that generate changes in beliefs over long-run consumption dynamics. These drifts can have first order asset pricing implications. For both variances and transition probabilities, the specific sequence of realized data generated positive shocks to the agents’ beliefs that, all else equal, will lead to higher ex post equity returns relative to ex ante expectations. Later, we quantify these effects.

Figure 3 displays model probabilities over time. Note first that the probability of the i.i.d. model increases until the early 1960s and then rapidly decreases in the late 1960s and 1970s, due to the persistently high growth, low volatility expansion in the 1960s and the persistently low growth and high volatility recessions in the 1970s. Thus, it does not take long for a Bayesian agent to learn consumption growth is not i.i.d. This conclusion is robust even if the prior probability of the i.i.d. model is set to 0.95 - in this case it takes somewhat longer (but still only slightly more than half the sample) for the probability of the i.i.d. model to become negligible.

The 2-state model dominates, as the 3-state model has less than a 1% probability and the i.i.d. model is effectively zero at the end of the sample. The 2-state model fits the postwar sample so well precisely because there were no severe consumption recessions. This result does not mean an investor should not have considered the 3-state model in 1947 or should not consider the 3-state model going forward. After World War II, it was natural for an agent to allow for the possibility of a model with severe recessions and, moreover, it would seem odd if an agent did not allow for this given the extreme level of macroeconomic and political uncertainty present in 1947. Looking forward, even though the 3-state model has a low posterior probability, a single severe consumption recession would drastically increase the probability of the 3-state model, as these shocks are highly unlikely in the 2-state model. In particular, four consecutive quarters if -2% growth, makes the model probability of the 3-state model jump from 0.2% to 68.4%. Such a large consumption drop was exactly the

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6Note that marginal model probabilities (i.e., where parameter uncertainty is integrated out) penalizes extra parameters as more sources of parameter uncertainty tends to flatten the likelihood function. Thus, it is not the case, as we see an example of here, that a 3-state model always dominates a 2-state model in Bayesian model selection.

7This result holds for various prior specifications and is robust to time-aggregation. In the Online Appendix, we show that taking out an autocorrelation of 0.25 from the consumption growth data, which is what time-aggregation of i.i.d. data predicts (see Working (1960)), does not qualitatively change these results - if anything it makes the rejection of the i.i.d. model occur sooner. The same is true if we purge the data of its full sample first order autocorrelation.
Figure 2: The two top plots in this figure show the mean beliefs about the variance parameters within each state for the 2-state model ($\sigma_1^2$ is the variance parameter in the 'expansion' state, while $\sigma_2^2$ is the variance parameter in the 'recession' state). The two lower plots show for the same model the mean beliefs of the probabilities of remaining in the current state ($\pi_{11}$ is the probability of staying in the 'expansion' state, while $\pi_{22}$ is the probability of staying in the 'recession' state). The sample is from 1947:Q2 until 2009:Q1.
outcome in 1932 (-8%). These sorts of shocks are certainly not out of the question, especially after the financial crisis where there was a widespread discussion of the possibility of another Great Depression.

Additionally, these results are likely conservative in terms of the model probabilities for the 3-state model. The likelihood of the 3-state model increases when additional macroeconomic variables are included or under less restrictive prior distributions. The 3-state model, even though its probability falls throughout much of the sample, also provides important pricing benefits, as discussed later.

3.1.1 Speed of learning and confounding effects

Table 1 reports end-of-sample (2009Q1) posterior means and standard deviations for each parameter, where the latter is expressed as a fraction of the 1957Q1 standard deviation of beliefs. This quantifies the total ‘amount’ of learning over the sample.

As noted earlier, the agent updates mean beliefs in the overall direction of a less-risky world—expansions last longer, recessions are less severe, and volatilities are lower at the end of the sample. Importantly, the speed of learning varies significantly across parameters. In general, there is more learning about expansions than recessions, and, in turn, more learning about recessions than a Depression. For example, in the 3-state model, the posterior standard deviations for the good state parameters, $\mu_1$ and $\sigma_1^2$, decrease 78% and 86%. The decrease for the recession state parameters is less: $\mu_2$ and $\sigma_2^2$ decrease by 58% and 54%, respectively. At the same time, the posterior uncertainty over $\mu_3$, $\sigma_3^2$, $\pi_{33}$, and $\pi_{31}$ barely decreases at all. This indicates there is very little learning about the Depression state in the 3-state model.

Empirically, documenting that the speed of learning varies dramatically across parameters is intuitive—some parameters are harder to learn than others—and lends support to arguments that a high level of parameter uncertainty is a likely feature of models with a rarely observed state and is an important feature for disaster risk models (see Chen, Joslin, and Tran, 2010). This also implies that there will be a large ‘amount’ of learning when and if the disaster state is reached.

Learning about multiple unknowns can introduce confounding effects—e.g., the fact that it is more difficult to learn in settings when multiple parameters and/or states are uncertain than in a setting where a single parameter or just the states are unknown. We find that the principal confounding effect is joint learning about the unobserved state and parameters. To quantify the confounding effects of state and parameter learning, Table 2 shows the results
Figure 3: The top panel shows the evolution of the probability of each model being the true model, where the models at the beginning of the sample are set to have an equal probability, and where state and parameter uncertainty have been integrated out. The model probabilities sum to 1 at all times, and each model's probability is then represented by the area the model's color (dark blue for i.i.d., bright red for 2-state and bright green for 3-state) occupies in the graph at each point in time. The lower plot shows the same when the agent considers only the general 2-state and 3-state models as possible models of consumption dynamics, again with equal initial model probabilities. The sample period is 1947:Q2 - 2009:Q1.
Table 2 - The speed of learning:
A Monte-Carlo experiment of observed vs. unobserved states

Table 2: The table shows the results of the following Monte-Carlo experiment. Assume a 2-state Markov switching regime model, like that considered in the body of the paper, with true parameters as estimated by MCMC over the post-WW2 sample. These true parameters are reproduced in the row 'True values.' Next, we simulate 500 economies of 209 quarters from this model, assuming the first state is drawn randomly according to the unconditional probability of each state. Finally, using the particle filter, we run sequentially through each sample with unbiased prior means and with prior variances as used for the 2-state model and given in Table 1, Panel B. For each sample, we run the particle filter assuming either that the current state is observed or, like in the actual main empirical exercise, that the state is also unobserved. Thus, the latter problem embodies the joint problem of learning about both states and parameters, whereas the former only has parameter learning. Finally, we report the average end-of-sample posterior variances for each parameter for the case of known states as well as unknown states to investigate whether the joint learning about both states and parameters confounds inference and slows down parameter learning.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Parameter</th>
<th>$\mu_1$</th>
<th>$\sigma_1^2$</th>
<th>$\mu_2$</th>
<th>$\sigma_2^2$</th>
<th>$\pi_{11}$</th>
<th>$\pi_{22}$</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>True values</td>
<td>0.68%</td>
<td>0.13(%)²</td>
<td>0.21%</td>
<td>0.49(%)²</td>
<td>0.95</td>
<td>0.83</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Posterior mean</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unknown states</td>
<td>0.69%</td>
<td>0.12(%)²</td>
<td>0.22%</td>
<td>0.45(%)²</td>
<td>0.93</td>
<td>0.80</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Known states</td>
<td>0.68%</td>
<td>0.13(%)²</td>
<td>0.21%</td>
<td>0.47(%)²</td>
<td>0.95</td>
<td>0.82</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Posterior variance</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unknown states</td>
<td>0.0012(%)²</td>
<td>0.0004(%)²</td>
<td>0.0238(%)²</td>
<td>0.0146(%)²</td>
<td>0.0012(%)²</td>
<td>0.0050(%)²</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Known states</td>
<td>0.0008(%)²</td>
<td>0.0002(%)²</td>
<td>0.0114(%)²</td>
<td>0.0109(%)²</td>
<td>0.0003(%)²</td>
<td>0.0024(%)²</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Reduction of posterior variance when states are known relative to unknown: 33% 46% 52% 25% 77% 52%

The results are striking. For all the parameters, the posterior variance decreases significantly more rapidly when states are observed, and the effect is strongest for the transition probabilities—learning occurs more than twice as fast when states are known. With known states, learning transition probabilities is trivial, only requiring counting the frequency of state transitions over time. With unobserved states, however, inference about transition
probabilities depends on inference on the specific state transitions taken over the sample, which in turn, depend on parameter beliefs at each point in time, which also depend on the specific path of observed data.

Overall, the results show that learning speeds vary substantially across parameters and there are strong confounding effects in realistic learning settings. Because prior research largely focusses on learning about a single parameter or state variable and often in theoretical settings, these effects have not been documented previously. Both of these effects have important asset pricing implications, which are discussed in Section 5.

3.2 Beliefs about conditional consumption growth moments

In consumption-based asset pricing models, the conditional dynamics of consumption growth—and not the variation in individual parameters, states or models—drives the asset pricing implications. As an example, consider the conditional volatility of consumption growth. A decrease in the probability of the bad state, which has higher consumption growth volatility, could be offset by an increase in the consumption volatility in the good state, \( \sigma_1 \), keeping the total conditional volatility of consumption growth constant. To summarize learning in an asset pricing relevant manner, we therefore report the agent’s beliefs about key short- and long-run moments of consumption growth.

3.2.1 Short-run moments

Figures 4 and 5 show the conditional quarterly mean and standard deviation of consumption growth over the postwar sample for each model (assuming parameter and state learning), the full learning model including model averaging, as well as for the fixed parameter 3-state model. All of these quantities are marginal, integrating out parameter, state, and/or model uncertainty. Focusing first on the fixed parameters case, the conditional mean and variance fluctuations are strongly business cycle related. This is to be expected as states are directly linked to business cycles. Expected quarterly consumption growth is about 0.3% in recessions and 0.6% in expansions, while volatility is about 0.9% in recessions and 0.45% in expansions. Notably, there is no strong drift in either moment over the sample—again, this is natural given the cyclical nature of the states and since there are many business cycles in the sample.

The learning models, with the exception of the i.i.d. model, show similar business cycle fluctuations in both the mean and the volatility. In particular, for both the 2- and 3-state models the expected consumption growth is again about 0.3% in recessions and about 0.6% in
Figure 4: The top panel shows the quarterly conditional expected consumption growth, where state and parameter uncertainty have been integrated out, from each of the three benchmark models: the "i.i.d.", and the general 2- and 3-state switching regime models. The solid line shows the conditional expected consumption growth rate for the 'full' model, where also model uncertainty has been integrated out. The lower plot shows again the conditional expected consumption growth for the full learning model (solid line), but adds the same moment from the fixed parameter 3-state model (dotted line). The sample period is 1947:Q2 - 2009:Q1.
expansions, which implies that model uncertainty is not central for this particular moment. There is an overall increase in expected quarterly consumption growth over the sample, consistent with the updates in transition probabilities associated with the surprisingly long expansions and short and mild recessions (see Figure 2).

The conditional volatility of quarterly consumption growth is about twice as high in recessions as in expansions also in the learning models. However, there is a strong downward drift in the conditional volatility in all the learning models. The predictive conditional volatility of consumption growth in expansions decreases from more than 1% per quarter to about 0.5% at the end of the sample. This reflects in part the Great Moderation—the fact that realized consumption volatility decreased over the postwar sample, which in turn leads to downward revisions in the volatility parameters—and also a general decrease in parameter uncertainty as the agent learns over time.

In terms of the conditional volatility, model learning increases the downward drift, exacerbating the Great moderation. The 3-state model has a higher overall conditional consumption volatility than the 2-state model due to the presence of the Depression state. At the same time, the probability of the 3-state model is decreasing over the sample, which shows how model uncertainty, like parameter uncertainty, contributes to non-stationary changes in beliefs.

3.2.2 Long-run moments

Bansal and Yaron (2004) highlight the first order importance of long-run consumption risks for asset pricing when agents have a preference for an early resolution of uncertainty. Parameter and model learning creates a natural source of truly long run consumption risks, as changes in beliefs persist indefinitely into the future, affecting the distribution of consumption growth forever. Our empirical approach allows us to quantify these long-run shocks in the postwar sample.

To do this, we compute shocks to long-run expected consumption growth, which we define as $E_t \left[ \sum_{j=1}^{\infty} \rho^j \Delta c_{t+j} \right]$, where $\rho$ is set to 0.99 and the expectation integrates out state and parameter uncertainty. To focus the issues, we consider the 2-state model, as the results are similar for other models and model averaged long-run consumption growth.

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8The discount parameter, $\rho$, is important for the definition of the long-run shocks. In particular, with the permanent shocks induced by parameter learning, the long-run shock would be infinite with $\rho = 1$, whereas the transient shocks in the model with stationary state learning would be finite. Our chosen value of $\rho = 0.99$ corresponds to an annual discount of 0.96 which is not particularly high and, if anything, conservative.
Figure 5: The top panel shows the quarterly conditional standard deviation of consumption growth, where state and parameter uncertainty have been integrated out, from each of the three benchmark models: the "i.i.d.", and the general 2- and 3-state switching regime models. The solid line shows the conditional standard deviation for the 'full' model, where also model uncertainty has been integrated out. The lower plot shows again the quarterly conditional standard deviation of consumption growth for the full learning model (solid line), but adds the same moment from the fixed parameter 3-state model (dotted line). The sample period is 1947:Q2 - 2009:Q1.
The top plot in Figure 6 displays long-run expected consumption growth shocks in the 2-state models with either parameter uncertainty or fixed known parameters. There are a number of important results. First, these long-run shocks are much more volatile—in fact, 3.4 times more volatile—with unknown parameters. Thus, parameter learning generates quantitatively large long-run consumption growth shocks, and the learning setup we propose here provides a way to identify these shocks sequentially in the data. These permanent shocks to long-run beliefs have a large impact on aggregate valuation ratios and thus help generate substantial excess return volatility. Further, to the extent the preference specification prices such long-run risk, parameter uncertainty can be a significant additional source of macro risk (see Collin-Dufresne, Johannes, and Lochstoer (2013)).

Second, the largest shocks to long-run consumption growth occur during recessions, because there is more uncertainty over recession/Depression state parameters and consumption observations are more volatile in these periods. Thus, parameter learning generates countercyclical volatility of long-run risks. Further, this crucially provides an explanation for why equity returns are so volatile in recessions: not only do state transitions generate high volatility, but parameter updating generates quantitative large, permanent shocks to beliefs during recessions.

The lower plot of Figure 6 compares the shocks to long-run expected consumption growth from a 2-state model to those from a simple i.i.d. lognormal model, in both cases with unknown parameters. This 1-state model features no state uncertainty, captures uncertainty about the two first moments of consumption growth in the simplest possible fashion, and is calibrated to, in 1889, have the same prior beliefs about the mean and variance parameters as for the good state of the 2-state model (see the Online Appendix for details on these priors). Thus, the difference in the long-run shocks from these models measures the added long-run consumption risks arising from a realistic, high-dimensional learning problem. The volatility of long-run consumption shocks is much higher (2.8 times) in the general 2-state model than in the 1-state i.i.d. model. Thus, parameter learning in a simple 1-state setting generates volatility of long-run shocks just slightly higher than those from the 2-state model with fixed parameters and unobserved states.

The two plots in Figure 6 show how parameter learning is an important source of long-run risk shocks, highlighting the importance of realistic learning problems and confounding effects. The magnitude of these long-run risk shocks is particularly large in economic downturns, as the agent is more uncertain about parameters governing such less frequently observed states.
Figure 6: The top plot shows shocks to long-run expected consumption growth for the 2-state model with known (solid line) or unknown parameters (dotted line). In both cases, there is state uncertainty. The state and, if relevant, parameter uncertainty are integrated out when forming expectations. Long-run expected consumption growth is calculated as the sum of expected quarterly consumption growth from time $t$ to infinity, where the expected consumption growth of period $t + j$ is discounted by $0.99^j$. The lower plot shows again long-run shocks for the 2-state model with state and parameter uncertainty (solid line), but adds the long-run shocks from a 1-state model for log consumption growth with parameter uncertainty over the mean growth rate and the variance of the normally distributed shocks (dotted line). Thus, this latter model features no state uncertainty and only parameter uncertainty about two parameters. The priors for this simple model are calibrated to match the priors for the 2-state model’s good state in 1889, with adjustments and learning as explained in the main text until 1957. The sample period for the plots is from 1957:Q2 to 2009:Q1.
3.2.3 Tail risk

Tail risks are particularly important for investors, and have been the focus of a large literature on consumption disasters, as mentioned earlier. Figure 7 quantifies these risks, plotting the time-series of the conditional probability that consumption growth falls by more than 4% in a given year, \( P[\Delta c_{t+1} + \ldots + \Delta c_{t+4} < c|y^t] \), where \( c = -4\% \). We focus on the \(-4\%\) one-year tail as this event would mark a deep recession. It is important to study cumulative one-year tails as much of the downside in Markov switching model arises from the persistence of the bad state. In contrast, the i.i.d. model has severe one-quarter drops, but there is no persistence which implies the tails are relatively thinner for longer horizons. Tail probabilities are more interpretable than standard tails measures like conditional skewness and kurtosis.

Figure 7 shows a general secular decline in the likelihood of a severe recession over the sample. The declines are most severe for the 2-state and i.i.d. models, both of which have a near negligible probability of a severe recession at the end of the sample. The 3-state model has the highest probability of a severe recession and less of a secular decline (the probability, conditional on being currently in an expansion, drifts from about 2% at the beginning of the sample to about 1.5% at the end of the sample). This is due to the very limited learning that occurs about the Depression state—i.e., the amount of downside parameter uncertainty is very high in this model and decreases only slightly. When parameters are fixed, the lower plot in Figure 7 shows there is no strong drift in downside risk, again due to the fact that tail risk fluctuates with the state beliefs, which, in turn, fluctuate at business cycle frequencies.

Since there is a larger difference between each model’s implications for downside risk relative to the implications for the short-run conditional mean and variance, model uncertainty plays a more important role here. The decreasing likelihood of the 3-state model through the sample causes a larger downward drift in downside risk in the full learning model than in any of the individual learning models. In sum, the perceived risk of very severe recessions for the full learning problem declined strongly over the sample, again consistent with the notion that the realized shocks over the post-WW2 sample led to revisions in beliefs in the direction of a less risky environment.

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9 The time-variation in tail risk has potentially interesting option pricing implications (see, e.g., Backus, Chernov, and Martin (2009)), as tail behavior is related to volatility smiles. We leave an exploration of these issues for future research.
Figure 7: The top panel shows the conditional probability of a $-4\%$ drop in consumption over the next year, where state and parameter uncertainty have been integrated out, from each of the three benchmark models: the "i.i.d.", and the general 2- and 3-state switching regime models. The solid line shows this probability for the 'full' model, where also model uncertainty has been integrated out. The lower plot shows again the conditional probability of a $-4\%$ drop in consumption over the next year for the 3-state model with parameter and state uncertainty (solid line), but adds the same moment from the fixed parameter 3-state model, which only features state uncertainy (dotted line). The sample period is 1957:Q2 - 2009:Q1.
3.3 Learning from additional macroeconomic data

Agents have access to more than just aggregate consumption growth data when forming beliefs. This section provides an approach for incorporating additional information in the learning problem. Let $x_t$ denote the common growth factor in the economy with dynamics $x_t = \mu_st + \sigma_s\varepsilon_t$. Here $\varepsilon_t \sim N(0,1)$, and $s_t$ is the state of the economy, which follows the same Markov chains specified earlier. Consumption growth $\Delta c_t$ and $J$ additional variables $Y_t = [y_{1t}, y_{2t}, \ldots, y_{Jt}]'$ are assumed to follow $\Delta c_t = x_t + \sigma_c\varepsilon_t$ and $y_{jt} = \alpha_j + \beta_j x_t + \sigma_j \varepsilon_{jt}$, where $\varepsilon_{jt} \sim N(0,1)$, and $\varepsilon_{jt} \sim N(0,1)$ for any $j$. The regression coefficients are state independent, which implies that the additional variables can have a large impact on state identification, which in turn can affect parameter estimation. Additional observables could be stronger or weaker signals of the underlying state than consumption growth. For the case of GDP growth, this setup captures the idea that investment is more cyclical than consumption, which can make GDP growth a better business cycle indicator.

We again use conjugate priors, and have the same priors for the location/scale parameters and transition probabilities. $\sigma_c$ has inverse gamma prior distribution $\mathcal{IG}(b_c, B_c)$, and for each $j = 1, 2, \ldots, J$, $p(\alpha_j, \beta_j|\sigma_j^2) \sim \mathcal{NIG}(a_j, A_j, b_j, B_j)$, where $p(\alpha_j, \beta_j|\sigma_j^2)$ is a bivariate normal distribution $\mathcal{N}(a_j, A_j\sigma_j^2)$, $a_j$ is a $2 \times 1$ vector and $A_j$ is a $2 \times 2$ matrix. Particle filtering is straightforward to implement in this specification by modifying the algorithm described in the Online Appendix. To analyze the implications of additional information, we use real, per capita U.S. GDP growth as an additional information source. This exercise generates a battery of results: time series of parameter beliefs, conditional moments, and model probabilities. We report only a few particularly interesting statistics in the interest of parsimony.

The main difference is that GDP growth improves state identification and results in a greater difference in expected consumption growth across states. Figure 8 shows that the difference in the expected consumption growth rate in recessions versus expansions now is about 0.6% per quarter, versus about 0.3% in the case of consumption information only (see Figure 4). The dynamic behavior of the conditional standard deviation of consumption growth is not significantly changed and not reported for brevity.

Figure 9 shows that the model specification results are similar, as the data again favors the 2-state model, leaving the 3-state model with a very low probability at the end of the sample. Overall, however, the 3-state model has a higher probability than earlier as the additional GDP growth data has relatively ‘worse’ outcomes in recessions that more closely corresponds
Figure 8: The top panel shows the quarterly conditional expected consumption growth, where state and parameter uncertainty have been integrated out, from each of the three benchmark models: the "i.i.d.", and the general 2- and 3-state switching regime models. The solid line shows the conditional expected consumption growth rate for the 'full' model, where also model uncertainty has been integrated out. In this case, GDP growth is used in addition to consumption growth in the agent’s learning problem, as explained in the text. The sample period is 1947:Q2 - 2009:Q1.
to the 3rd state. Again, as in the case of consumption data, these model probabilities are likely conservative for the 3-state model.

Finally, in results not reported here, but available upon request, we find that the conditional mean and variance of consumption growth obtained from the full learning problem forecasts future consumption growth and realized consumption growth variance, respectively, over the sample. In fact, when including the market price-dividend ratio in the forecasting regressions, we find that the price-dividend ratio does not contain additional information about these moments. This lends additional support to the view that learning from macroeconomic data is empirically relevant for understanding asset price dynamics.

4 A test for the empirical relevance of learning

4.1 Learning from consumption growth

To this point, our results show that the sequence of shocks realized over the postwar sample generate beliefs that (a) vary substantially over time, (b) are correlated with business cycles, and (c) generate large shocks to long-run expected consumption growth. In the simplest terms: if learning is important for asset pricing, when beliefs change, asset prices should also change. Therefore, revisions in beliefs should be correlated with realized asset returns over the same sample. This is a fundamental test—arguably ‘the’ fundamental test—of a learning-based explanation for asset prices, which to our knowledge has not been done in the previous literature. It is a particularly stringent test since our agent does not use any asset price information in the estimation. This can be contrasted with typical calibration exercises where the parameters and states are chosen to generate asset prices and valuation ratios that most closely match those observed over the sample.

The mechanics of how updates in beliefs translate into asset prices is easy to explain. Suppose agents revise their beliefs higher about expected consumption growth. If the substitution (wealth) effect dominates, the wealth-consumption ratio will increase (decrease) when agents revise upwards their beliefs about expected consumption growth rate. As another example, if agents learn that aggregate risk (consumption growth volatility) is lower than previously thought, this will generally lead to a change in asset prices as both the risk premium and the risk-free rate are affected. In the Bansal and Yaron (2004) model, where the elasticity of intertemporal substitution is greater than one, an increase in aggregate volatility leads to a decrease in the stock market’s price-dividend ratio.
Figure 9: The top panel shows the evolution of the probability of each model being the true model, where the models at the beginning of the sample are set to have an equal probability, and where state and parameter uncertainty have been integrated out. The model probabilities sum to 1 at all times, and each model’s probability is then represented by the area the model’s color (dark blue for i.i.d., bright red for 2-state and bright green for 3-state) occupies in the graph at each point in time. The lower plot shows the same when the agent considers only the general 2-state model and the 3-state model as possible models of consumption dynamics, again with equal initial model probabilities. In this case, GDP growth is used in addition to consumption growth in the agent’s learning problem, as explained in the text. The sample period is 1947:Q2 - 2009:Q1.
To test this empirically, we regress excess quarterly stock market returns (obtained from Kenneth French’s web site) on shocks to beliefs about expected consumption growth and expected consumption growth variance: $E_t (\Delta c_{t+1}) - E_{t-1} (\Delta c_{t+1})$ and $\sigma_t^2 (\Delta c_{t+1}) - \sigma_{t-1}^2 (\Delta c_{t+1})$.\textsuperscript{10} The conditional moments used to generate the regressors integrate out state, model and parameter uncertainty.

Table 3 - Updates in Beliefs versus Realized Stock Returns

Table 3: The table shows the results from regressions of innovations in agents’ expectations of future consumption growth ($E_{t+1} [\Delta c_{t+2}] - E_t [\Delta c_{t+2}]$) and conditional consumption growth variance ($\sigma_{t+1}^2 [\Delta c_{t+2}] - \sigma_t^2 [\Delta c_{t+2}]$) versus excess stock market returns. Expectations integrate out parameter, state and model uncertainty, unless otherwise noted. The controls are lagged and contemporaneous realized log consumption growth, as well as the innovation in expected consumption growth derived from the 3-state model with fixed parameters (i.e., no model or parameter uncertainty), as well as the i.i.d. model with uncertain parameters. Heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation adjusted (Newey-West; 3 lags) standard errors are reported in paranthesis. * denotes significance at the 10% level, ** denotes significance at the 5% level, and *** denotes significance at the 1% level. The sample is from 1947:Q2 until 2009:Q1. In the below regressions, we have removed the first 40 observations (10 years), as a burn-in period to alleviate misspecification of the priors.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Dependent variable: $r_{m,t+1} - r_{f,t+1}$ (log excess market returns)</th>
<th>1</th>
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<td>32.42**</td>
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<td>$[E_{t+1} [\Delta c_{t+2}] - E_t [\Delta c_{t+2}]]_{3\text{-state model}}$</td>
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<tr>
<td>$\left[ \ln \left( \frac{\Pi_{t+1}/D_{t+1}+1}{\Pi_t/D_t} \right) \right]_{3\text{-state model}}$</td>
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<td></td>
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<td></td>
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<td>8.44</td>
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<td>(11.03)</td>
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<tr>
<td>$R^2_{adj}$</td>
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<td>11.7%</td>
<td>5.9%</td>
<td>10.0%</td>
<td>9.8%</td>
<td>6.3%</td>
<td>9.9%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\textsuperscript{10}Following Campbell (2003), we use the beginning-of-period timing convention to deal with the time-averaging feature of macro data (see Working (1960), Grossman, Melino, and Shiller (1987), and Breeden, Gibbons, and Litzenberger (1989)). Thus quarterly consumption is assumed to flow at the beginning and not end of the quarter. When relating consumption growth to stock market returns and consistent with minor lags in consumption responses, Campbell (2003) shows the correlation is higher using beginning of period flows, which we also find.
Specifications 1 and 2 in Table 3 show that shocks to expected conditional consumption growth from the full learning model are positively and strongly significantly associated with excess stock returns. Crucially, this result holds controlling for contemporaneous and lagged consumption growth, and thus the results do not simply reflect the fact that realized, contemporaneous consumption growth (a direct cash flow effect) was, for example, unexpectedly high. Thus, revisions in beliefs are significantly related to realized excess returns, consistent with the learning story.

These results could be driven by state learning. Specification 3 shows that the updates in expected consumption growth derived from the 3-state model with fixed parameters (that is, a case with state learning only) are also significantly related to realized stock returns. The $R^2$, however, is half of that obtained for the full learning model. When revisions in beliefs from both specifications (with and without parameter learning) are in the regression (specification 4), the updates in expected consumption growth from the fixed parameters model are insignificant and have the wrong sign, while belief revisions from the full learning model remain significant. The same results hold using the 2-state model with fixed parameters as a control. Thus, updates in expectations derived from learning about about parameters, states, and models are significantly and positively related to realized stock market returns, controlling for the updates generated by a model with hidden states and fixed parameters.\footnote{The updates in beliefs in these regressions are with respect to consumption growth in the near future. These shocks are very highly correlated with shocks to beliefs about long-run consumption dynamics ($>0.9$) and therefore we unfortunately do not have power to distinguish between long-horizon and short-horizon shocks in our setup. In fact, all the results would go through at the same significance levels if we instead used long-horizon consumption growth.}

This result is driven by the nonlinear process of jointly learning about parameters and states. However, returns will in general be a nonlinear function of the updates in beliefs, also in the case with only state uncertainty. To control for this possible effect, specification 5 adds the change in the price-dividend ratio as it appears in returns for the fixed parameter model (with preference parameters that are standard and will be discussed in the next section) as a control. Again, the “full” learning case dominates that of the model with only state learning. In sum, the beliefs generated from a model with fixed parameters, a traditional full-information or ‘rational expectations’ model with respect to the parameters, is rejected when compared to a specification with learning about parameters, models, and states.

Specifications 6 and 7 in Table 3 show that beliefs about shocks to consumption variance are significantly negatively related to stock returns, as expected if the elasticity of intertemporal substitution is above one, as we will assume later in the paper. This result is not
significant at the 5% level when including contemporaneous and lagged consumption growth in the regressions (specification 7). This does not mean there is no effect; we just cannot distinguish it from the direct cash flow effect when learning exclusively from consumption data.

Table 4 shows the regressions of stock returns and updates in agent beliefs about conditional expected consumption growth and consumption growth variance when including GDP growth as a source of additional information. The results are similar, but in fact are overall stronger than results using only historical consumption growth. Updates in agent expectations about both the first and second moment of consumption growth from the full learning model are significantly related to stock returns, also after controlling for contemporaneous and lagged consumption growth and updates in expected consumption growth derived from a model with fixed parameters.

To summarize, there is strong evidence that updates in beliefs from our full learning model are significantly related to stock market returns—a particularly stringent test of the importance of parameter learning about macro dynamics. It is important to recall that no asset price data was used to generate these belief revisions. This highlights the special and significant role played by learning in realistic settings and, moreover, questions the common ‘rational expectations’ approach, which assumes that agents have full knowledge of the model specification as estimated using the full sample.\textsuperscript{12}

### 4.2 Alternative prior beliefs

We also consider a number of alternative priors. In the Online Appendix, we report results from a model where the mean prior beliefs as of 1947Q1 are equal to maximum likelihood estimates using data from 1947Q1 to 2009Q1. Thus, this ‘look-ahead’ prior incorporates future information and thus captures the notion that investors, using perhaps a combination of economic theory and additional data, correctly estimated the most likely parameters for the postwar sample. The prior standard deviation of beliefs, however, accommodates parameter and model uncertainty as before. Again, we use the first 10 years, from 1947 through 1956, as a prior ‘burn-in’ period. While quantities change somewhat, the overall

\textsuperscript{12}This is a subtle point. In terms of the pricing implications, the learning model is isomorphic to a model where agents know the parameters and the model specification and where the consumption growth dynamics are assumed to be the same as the subjective dynamics that we estimate from the learning problem. However, the highly non-linear, non-stationary aspects of learning lead to dynamics that we typically would not, and in many cases even could not, otherwise write down.
Table 4: The table shows the results from regressions of innovations in agents’ expectations of future consumption growth ($E_{t+1}[\Delta c_{t+2}] - E_t[\Delta c_{t+2}]$) and conditional consumption growth variance ($\sigma_{t+1}^2[\Delta c_{t+2}] - \sigma_t^2[\Delta c_{t+2}]$) versus excess stock market returns. Expectations integrate out parameter, state and model uncertainty, unless otherwise noted. The controls are lagged and contemporaneous realized log consumption growth, as well as the innovation in expected consumption growth derived from the 3-state model with fixed parameters (i.e., no model or parameter uncertainty). Both consumption and GDP data is used to estimate the models, as described in the main text. Heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation adjusted (Newey-West; 3 lags) standard errors are reported in paranthesis. * denotes significance at the 10% level, ** denotes significance at the 5% level, and *** denotes significance at the 1% level. The sample is from 1947:Q2 until 2009:Q1. In the below regressions, we have removed the first 40 observations (10 years), as a burn-in period to alleviate misspecification of the priors.

### Dependent variable: $r_{m,t+1} - r_{f,t+1}$ (log excess market returns)

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<td>(7.97)</td>
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<tr>
<td>$[E_{t+1}[\Delta c_{t+2}] - E_t[\Delta c_{t+2}]][3\text{-state model}]$</td>
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<td>(6.79)</td>
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<td>$\left[\ln\left(\frac{P_{t+1}/P_{t+1+1}}{P_t/D_t}\right)\right][3\text{-state model}]$</td>
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<tr>
<td>$R^2_{adj}$</td>
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<td>13.9%</td>
<td>14.0%</td>
<td>10.9%</td>
<td>13.0%</td>
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</table>

Patterns and conclusions are the same as before when considering belief dynamics from 1957 to 2009. Thus, the results we present in this paper are mainly due to the specific time-series of shocks realized in the postwar sample, as opposed to something specific to those generated from priors trained on historical data. An earlier version of this paper also considered priors with substantially larger prior uncertainty, which captures a higher degree of uncertainty over the location of the parameters. The results from this case are, again, qualitatively and quantitatively similar.

In terms of the model probabilities, centering the priors at their post-WWII estimated values or using larger prior uncertainty in 1947 both lead to a higher likelihood of the 3-
state model as the crisis state is not in expectation as severe in these cases from 1957 and on. Thus, as argued earlier, the model probabilities of the 3-state model are conservative relative to alternative prior specifications. Overall, however, the conclusions of the paper do not hinge on the particular priors used—they are robust to reasonable variations in the prior specifications.

5 Asset pricing implications in general equilibrium

The previous results show that the sequential updates in beliefs are significantly correlated with realized equity returns. This section provides a formal asset pricing framework to quantify the asset pricing implications for an agent who solves these realistic, high-dimensional, sequential learning problems using postwar aggregate macro data. In particular, we are interested in understanding if learning can explain some of the well-documented puzzling features of the postwar experience, such as a high equity premium, excess return volatility, excess return predictability, and a high volatility of the price-dividend ratio.

Theoretically, asset pricing in a world with unknown parameters, states, and models is straightforward, as the agent’s expected utility and asset pricing relevant quantities like the price-dividend ratio and the ex-ante equity premium are just functions of the overall state of the economy. The state of the economy is the posterior distribution of the parameters, states, and models. To solve this problem, a fully rational agent with Epstein-Zin utility needs to take into account the fact that the agent will revise her beliefs in the future. This requires calculating all possible belief configurations into the indefinite future. Such a calculation is prohibitively computationally expensive due to the curse of dimensionality. In our general setting with parameter and model learning, the joint posterior distribution over parameters, states, and models is not a known analytical function of the data and, in this case, the pricing problem for an Epstein-Zin agent is infinite-dimensional. This is true even in the case of a 2-state model with unobserved states and parameters.

Given this, we assume the agent uses an “anticipated utility” approach, originally suggested in Kreps (1998) and previously applied in asset pricing settings with learning by Sargent and Cogley (2008, 2009) and Piazzesi and Schneider (2010). Kreps suggests this approach when economic agents are faced with the dual problems of estimating parameters and models and making decisions/pricing assets in a dynamic setting. The interaction of the estimation and pricing make these problems horribly complex—so complex, in fact, that it is difficult to believe that economic agents could or would solve such a problem. Instead,
Kreps argues agents maximize utility at each point in time assuming the current parameter estimates and model probabilities are the true parameters, but the agents then updates the estimates when new data arrives. Thus, the agent is ‘rational,’ in that they maximize expected utility and estimate models/parameters using sophisticated econometrics, but due to computational constraints, they do not account for the fact that their estimates will change in the future. In Kreps’s view, this is not a researcher’s short-cut, but rather a normative theory of how agents compute utility when confronted with complex decisions dependent on parameter estimates and models. This is the dominant paradigm in macroeconomics for dealing with parameter uncertainty in a dynamic setting.

While parameter and model uncertainty are not priced risk factors in this framework, they are nonetheless important for the time-series of asset prices as updates in mean parameter and model beliefs lead to changes in prices. We do integrate out state uncertainty in the pricing exercise, so state uncertainty is still a priced risk factor (as in, e.g., Lettau, Ludvigson, and Wachter (2008)). The anticipated utility approach reduces the number of state variables to three in the full learning model (the belief about the state in the general 2-state model, and the 2-dimensional belief about the state in the 3-state model). This approach allows us to focus on how changes in beliefs arising from the full, high-dimensional learning problem translate into observable asset returns, return volatilities, and price-dividend ratios.

Later, we characterize asset prices in a simplified 2-state model with unknown parameters, but known states, where the agent takes parameter uncertainty into account ex-ante. Solving this simplified model requires GPU parallel computing and a very high level of programming sophistication. More realistic and higher dimensional problems are well outside the bounds of computing capabilities.

5.1 Preferences and dividends

Consider a representative agent with Epstein and Zin (1989) preferences, defined recursively as:

\[ U_t = \left\{ (1 - \beta)C_t^{1-1/\psi} + \beta \left( E_t U_{t+1}^{1-\gamma} \right)^{1-1/\psi} \right\}^{1-\psi}, \tag{3} \]

where \( C_t \) is consumption, \( \psi \neq 1 \) is the elasticity of intertemporal substitution (EIS), and \( \gamma \neq 1 \) is relative risk aversion. These preferences imply the stochastic discount factor:

\[ M_{t+1} = \beta \left( \frac{C_{t+1}}{C_t} \right)^{-\gamma} \left( \beta \frac{P_{t+1}}{P_t} + 1 \right)^{1/1-\psi}, \tag{4} \]
where $PC_t$ is the wealth-consumption ratio—that is, the price-dividend ratio for the claim to the stream of future aggregate consumption. The first component of the pricing kernel is common to standard power utility preferences, while the second component is present if the agent has a preference for the timing of the resolution of uncertainty (i.e., if $\gamma \neq 1/\psi$). Given that the consumption dynamics are not \textit{ex post} calibrated but estimated sequentially, we also do not calibrate preference parameters to match any particular moment(s). Instead, we simply use the preference parameters in the main calibration in Bansal and Yaron (2004): $\gamma = 10$, $\psi = 1.5$, and $\beta = 0.998^{-3}$. As mentioned earlier, we consider first an anticipated utility approach to the pricing problem in terms of parameter and model uncertainty, while state uncertainty is priced. This corresponds to a world where investors understand and account for business cycle fluctuations, but where they simply use their best guess for the parameters governing these dynamics.

The model is solved numerically through value function iteration \textit{at each time} $t$ in the sample, conditional on the mean parameter beliefs at time $t$, which gives the time $t$ asset prices. The state variables when solving this model are the beliefs about the hidden states of the economy for each model under consideration. For a detailed description of the model solution algorithm, please refer to the Online Appendix.

Following both Bansal and Yaron (2004) and Lettau, Ludvigson, and Wachter (2008), we price a levered claim to the consumption stream with a leverage factor $\lambda$ of 4.5. The annual consumption volatility over the postwar sample is only 1.34\%, and so the systematic annual dividend volatility is therefore about 6\%. Quarterly log dividend growth is defined as:

$$\Delta d_t = \mu + \lambda (\Delta c_t - \mu) + \varepsilon_{d,t},$$

where $\varepsilon_{d,t} \overset{i.i.d.}{\sim} \mathcal{N} \left(-\frac{1}{2}\sigma_d^2, \sigma_d^2\right)$ is the idiosyncratic component of dividend growth. $\sigma_d$ is chosen to match the observed annual 11.5\% volatility of dividend growth reported in Bansal and Yaron (2004). With these choices of $\lambda$ and $\sigma_d$ we also in fact closely match the sample correlation they report between annual consumption and dividend growth (0.55).\footnote{The dividend dynamics imply that consumption and dividends are not cointegrated, which is a common assumption (e.g., Campbell and Cochrane (1999), and Bansal and Yaron (2004)). One could impose cointegration between consumption and dividends, but at the cost of an additional state variable. Further, it is possible to also learn about $\lambda$ and $\sigma_d^2$. However, quarterly dividends are highly seasonal, which would severely complicate such an analysis. Further, data on stock repurchases are mainly annual. We leave a rigorous treatment of these issues to future research.}
5.2 Empirical results

5.2.1 Unconditional moments

Table 5 reports realized asset pricing moments in the data, as well as those generated by the learning models over the same sample period. The models with parameter uncertainty match the sample equity premium reasonably well: 4.7% in the data versus 3.7% for the full model with parameter and model uncertainty when learning from consumption data only, and 5.2% for the full model with learning from both consumption and GDP data. The models using GDP as an additional signal have a more severe recession state, which explain higher average equity returns. Models with fixed parameters generate very small sample equity premiums 1.1% and 1.7% for the 2- and 3-state models, respectively. Thus, allowing for parameter and model uncertainty more than triples the sample risk premiums, despite the fact that parameter and model uncertainty are not priced risk factors under anticipated utility pricing.

The source of differences in equity premiums between the fixed and unknown parameters cases can be seen from sample average ex ante equity risk premiums \( E_T \left[ E \left( R_{\text{excess}}^{m,t+1} | I_t \right) \right] \), where \( I_t \) denotes the information set (beliefs) of agents at time \( t \) and \( E_T \left[ \cdot \right] \) denotes the sample average. Since parameter and model uncertainty are not priced risks with anticipated utility, one may expect the average ex ante risk premiums to be similar to the corresponding model with known parameters. However, for the 2-state model with parameter uncertainty and learning from consumption only, for instance, the average ex ante sample risk premium is 1.8%, whereas the average ex ante sample risk premium for the 2-state model with known parameters is 0.9%. A similar difference is present between the 3-state models. Through the postwar period, the agent learns that expansions are longer, recessions milder than initially thought, and volatility is lower than previously thought. This leads to a higher ex ante risk premium early in the sample. At the end of sample, on the other hand, the conditional risk premium of the models with parameter uncertainty is lower and similar to that of the fixed parameters models.

These unexpected, overall positive surprises in belief updates not only decrease the ex ante risk premium over the sample, but also increases the price-dividend ratio. Thus, ex post average returns are higher than the ex ante expected returns, explaining the remaining difference between the sample risk premium with parameter and model learning versus the fixed parameter case. Fama and French (2002) reach a similar conclusion in terms of the ex post versus the ex ante risk premium when looking at the time-series of the aggregate price-
Table 5 - Asset Price Moments

Table 5: The table reports the asset pricing implications of the models with an anticipated utility version of the Epstein-Zin preferences under different priors, as well as the fixed parameters cases. For all the models, $\gamma = 10$, $\beta = 0.994$, $\psi = 1.5$, $\lambda = 4.5$. The volatility of the idiosyncratic component of dividend growth ($\epsilon_{d,t}$) is calibrated to match the historical standard deviation of dividend growth, as reported in Bansal and Yaron (2004). The statistics are annualized. The expectation operator with a $T$ subscript, $E_T$, denotes the sample average, while the volatility operator, $\sigma_T$ denotes the sample standard deviation. The sample period is from 1957:Q2 until 2009:Q1, with 1957Q1 priors as given in Table 1 for the case of learning from observing consumption growth only, and as given in an Online Appendix for the case of learning from both consumption and GDP growth.

<table>
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<th>Moments</th>
<th>Data 1957:Q2-2009:Q1</th>
<th>Learning from consumption Full model</th>
<th>Learning from cons. &amp; GDP Full model</th>
<th>Known parameters 2-state model</th>
<th>Known parameters 3-state model</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>$E_T(r_t^f)$</td>
<td>1.6%</td>
<td>3.7%</td>
<td>3.7%</td>
<td>3.7%</td>
<td>3.5%</td>
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<tr>
<td>$\sigma_T(r_t^f)$</td>
<td>1.6%</td>
<td>0.7%</td>
<td>0.3%</td>
<td>0.8%</td>
<td>1.0%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The real risk-free rate:

$E_T(r_t^f)$

The dividend claim: $\Delta d_t = \mu + \lambda (\Delta c_t - \mu) + \epsilon_{d,t}$

**ex post:**

$E_T(r_t - r_t^f)$

$\sigma_T(r_t - r_t^f)$

Sharpe ratio

$\sigma_T(pd_t)$

$Corr_T(pd_t^{Model}, pd_t^{Data})$

**ex ante:**

$E_T[r_t^{f+1}$

| $E_T[\epsilon_{d,t+1}]$ | n/a | 1.8% | 1.4% | 1.8% | 3.2% | 3.2% | 1.4% | 1.4% | 3.2% | 2.4% | 5.2% | 0.9% | 1.5% |
earnings and price-dividend ratios. Our results are consistent with theirs, but our models are estimated from macro fundamentals alone.

Learning generates additional volatility in equity returns and the price-dividend ratio. Equity return volatility in the parameter and model uncertainty cases are about 15%, close to the 17% annual return volatility in the data. In contrast, equity return volatility in the models with fixed parameters is about 12%, only slightly higher than the annual dividend growth volatility (11.5%). Thus, sample variation in discount and expected dividend growth rates arising from belief updates cause excess return volatility (Shiller (1980)), through a volatile price-dividend ratio. The sample volatility of the log price-dividend ratio is 0.38 in the data and is only 0.06 – 0.07 in the fixed parameter cases. With parameter/model learning, the log price-dividend ratio volatility is 0.25 (depending somewhat of the exact model specification), which is four times the values observed with fixed parameters.\footnote{The price-dividend ratio in each model is calculated as the corresponding in the data by summing the last four quarters of payouts to get annual payout. The price-dividend ratio from the data includes share repurchases in its definition of total dividends.} This is exactly what one would expect, as learning generates shifts and drifts in parameters that have a first order impact on price-dividend ratios.

We also find a high correlation between our learning model implied log price-dividend ratios and those in the data: 0.67 for the full learning model estimated with both GDP and consumption and 0.42 for the full learning model using only consumption. Of the individual models, the dividend-price ratio from the 3-state model has highest correlation with its observed counterpart. Thus, even though the 3-state model has a very low model probability towards the end of the sample (see Figure 3), it is important for pricing. In fact, the full learning specification with model uncertainty has a higher correlation between the dividend-price ratio from the model and the data than any of the individual, underlying models, with the iid model having the lowest correlation.

The fixed parameter models have lower correlations, 0.25 for the 2-state model and 0.26 for the 3-state model. Thus, the covariance between the price-dividend ratio in the data and the full learning model using both consumption and GDP growth is roughly 30 times higher than the highest covariance between the price-dividend ratio in the data and the models with fixed parameters (0.0354 vs. 0.0013). Overall, parameter/model learning generates a time-series of the aggregate stock market price level (normalized by dividends) that much more closely match the observed data than models with fixed parameter models.
5.2.2 The time-series of asset prices

To further understand how our learning models match the aggregate stock price level (the log dividend-price ratio), we regress the dividend-price ratio in the data on the dividend-price ratios implied by the different models, both in levels and in changes. This allows to separately identify the effect of state learning (in models with fixed parameters) from the effect of parameter and model learning (in models with unknown states, parameters, and models).

Panel A of Table 6 summarizes the level regressions. The anticipated utility model with learning about both parameters and models from both consumption and GDP data provides the best ‘fit.’ This model has an $R^2$ of 46% and one cannot reject a zero intercept and slope of one. The dividend-price ratio generated by the fixed parameter model is insignificant in a regression that also includes the full-learning model. Even though the 2-state model quickly dominates in terms of model probabilities, the model-averaged specification has additional explanatory power relative to the 2-state model. This occurs as the 3-state model’s depression state is important for asset prices even though it is quite unlikely. The increase in fit when going from the fixed parameter models to the full learning models stems from both an improvement in matching business cycle fluctuations in the dividend yield and a better fit to low-frequency fluctuations. In particular, with parameter learning the dividend yield displays a downward trend over the sample, similar to that found in the data as documented by, for instance, Fama and French (2002).

As a robustness check, Panel B of Table 6 shows the same regressions in differences. Again, the models with anticipated utility fare the best and are significant, and fixed parameter specifications are insignificant. In sum, including parameter and model uncertainty leads to not only better fit of the unconditional asset pricing moments, but a significantly better fit of the realized time-path of the aggregate stock price level in the postwar era. The ‘full’ learning models with joint learning about states, parameters, and models match the data best.

5.2.3 Permanent shocks and the volatility of long-run yields

With parameter and model uncertainty, the belief updates constitute permanent shocks to expectations about consumption growth rates, consumption growth volatility, and higher order moments. While shocks to a transitory state variable eventually die out, and so (very) long-run expectations are constant, shocks to, for instance, the mean belief about the
Table 6 - Dividend Yield Regressions

Table 6: The table reports the results of regressions where the U.S. log aggregate stock market dividend price ratio is the independent variable. Panel A shows regressions of this on the contemporaneous log dividend price ratios from the Anticipated utility ‘full’ model with parameter and model uncertainty ($dp_{AU\_full}$), the Anticipated utility 2-state model ($dp_{AU\_2state}$), the fixed parameters 3-state model ($dp_{FixedPar\_3state}$), as well as the 2-state model with observed states but fully rationally priced parameter uncertainty ($dp_{PricedParUnc\_2state}$). Panel B shows the corresponding regressions using changes in the log dividend-price ratios. The standard errors are corrected for heteroskedasticity and given in parantheses under the coefficient estimates. The ‘dagger’ symbol seen in the final column means that the particular regressor has been orthogonalized with respect to the other regressors. * denotes significance at the 10% level, ** denotes significance at the 5% level, and *** denotes significance at the 1% level. The full sample period is from 1957:Q2 until 2009:Q1, with 1957Q1 priors as given in Table 1 for the case of learning from observing consumption growth only, and as given in an Online Appendix for the case of learning from both consumption and GDP growth.

### Panel A: Learning from consumption

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Indep. var.: $dp^{\text{data}}$</th>
<th>Learning from consumption</th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th>Learning from consumption and GDP</th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
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<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>constant</strong></td>
<td>$-0.87$</td>
<td>$1.86$</td>
<td>$0.57$</td>
<td>$3.44^{***}$</td>
<td>$-0.09$</td>
<td>$1.86$</td>
<td>$-0.71$</td>
<td>$-1.43^{***}$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.64)</td>
<td>(1.98)</td>
<td>(1.67)</td>
<td>(0.91)</td>
<td>(0.46)</td>
<td>(1.98)</td>
<td>(1.40)</td>
<td>(0.34)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$dp_{AU_full}$</td>
<td>$0.77^{***}$</td>
<td>$0.71^{***}$</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>$1.13^{***}$</td>
<td>$1.15^{***}$</td>
<td>$2.71^{***}$</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.19)</td>
<td>(0.17)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(0.15)</td>
<td>(0.15)</td>
<td>(0.33)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$dp_{AU_2state}$</td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$dp_{FixedPar_3state}$</td>
<td>$1.47^{***}$</td>
<td>$0.45$</td>
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<td></td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.54)</td>
<td>(0.42)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$dp_{PricedParUnc_2state}$</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>$R^2$</td>
<td>$18.7%$</td>
<td>$6.2%$</td>
<td>$18.8%$</td>
<td>$46.3%$</td>
<td>$45.5%$</td>
<td>$6.2%$</td>
<td>$45.3%$</td>
<td>$63.4%$</td>
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</table>

### Panel B: Learning from consumption

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<tr>
<th>Indep. var.: $\Delta dp^{\text{data}}$</th>
<th>Learning from consumption</th>
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<th></th>
<th></th>
<th>Learning from consumption and GDP</th>
<th></th>
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<td><strong>constant</strong></td>
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<td>$-0.00$</td>
<td>$0.00$</td>
<td>$-0.00$</td>
<td>$-0.00$</td>
<td>$-0.00$</td>
<td>$0.00$</td>
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<td>(0.01)</td>
<td>(0.01)</td>
<td>(0.01)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$dp_{AU_full}$</td>
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<td>$0.72^{**}$</td>
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<td></td>
<td>$0.38^{***}$</td>
<td>$0.77^{***}$</td>
<td>$0.83^{*}$</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.09)</td>
<td>(0.30)</td>
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<tr>
<td>$dp_{FixedPar_3state}$</td>
<td>$0.34^{***}$</td>
<td>$-0.51$</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>$0.34^{***}$</td>
<td>$-0.56^{*}$</td>
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<td>(0.10)</td>
<td>(0.36)</td>
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<td>(0.32)</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$R^2$</td>
<td>$6.5%$</td>
<td>$3.9%$</td>
<td>$7.2%$</td>
<td>$3.4%$</td>
<td>$8.4%$</td>
<td>$3.9%$</td>
<td>$10.1%$</td>
<td>$8.7%$</td>
</tr>
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</table>
unconditional growth rate of consumption are permanent, leading to permanent shocks to marginal utility growth. This has implications for all asset prices, but can be most clearly seen when considering the volatility of long-run default-free real yields, which can be readily calculated from our model.

Table 7 shows annualized yield volatility for default-free real, zero-coupon bonds at different maturities. The data column gives the volatility of yields on U.S. TIPS, calculated from monthly data for the longest available sample, 2003 to 2011, from the Federal Reserve Board, along with standard errors. In the remaining columns report corresponding model-implied yield volatilities, calculated from each of the models over the postwar sample.

Note first that yield volatilities for the models with parameter and model uncertainty are substantially higher than the yield volatilities from the models with fixed parameters. Two year yields are twice as volatile and ten year yields are an order of magnitude more volatile, reflecting the fact that long-run consumption shocks are much smaller in the fixed parameter models (as seen in Figure 6). Notably, the long maturity yields in the data have about the same yield volatility as in the models with parameter uncertainty, providing another dimension along which learning about parameters and models aid in understanding and explaining historical asset price behavior over the postwar period.

Table 7 - Real risk-free yield volatilities

Table 7: The table reports the sample standard deviation of annualized real risk-free yields at different maturities as computed from each of the models with anticipated utility pricing considered in the paper over the post-WW2 sample (1957 – 2009). The data column reports the standard deviation of annualized yields from the available data on TIPS from the Federal Reserve, which is monthly from January 2003 to February 2011.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>TIPS (2003 – 2011)</th>
<th>Data (s.e.)</th>
<th>Learning from consumption</th>
<th>Learning from consumption, GDP</th>
<th>Fixed Parameters</th>
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<td>5-yr yield</td>
<td>0.75%</td>
<td>0.35%</td>
<td>0.54%</td>
<td>0.16%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.18%)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>0.21%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10-yr yield</td>
<td>0.45%</td>
<td>0.33%</td>
<td>0.45%</td>
<td>0.08%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.11%)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>0.10%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20-yr yield</td>
<td>0.30%</td>
<td>0.31%</td>
<td>0.43%</td>
<td>0.05%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.06%)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>0.06%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30-yr yield</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>0.31%</td>
<td>0.42%</td>
<td>0.03%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>0.03%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
5.2.4 Excess return forecastability

Next, we consider excess market return forecasting regressions using the dividend yield as the predictive variable. These regressions have a long history and remain a feature of the data to be explained by asset pricing models (e.g., Campbell and Cochrane (1999), Bansal and Yaron (2004)), even if the strength of the empirical evidence is debatable (see, e.g., Stambaugh (1999), Ang and Bekaert (2007), Boudoukh, Richardson and Whitelaw (2008), and Goyal and Welch (2008) for critical analyses). We consider standard forecasting regressions overlapping at the quarterly frequency using model-implied market returns and dividend yields. As before, we are not looking at population moments or average small-sample moments, but the single sample generated by feeding the models the actual sample of realized consumption growth.

Table 8 shows the forecasting regressions over different return forecasting horizons from the data. We use both the market dividend yield and Lettau and Ludvigson’s (2001) approximation to the consumption-wealth ratio, $cay$, to document the amount of predictability implied by these regressions in the data. We then run the same regressions using model implied returns and dividend yields. The fixed parameters models (bottom right in the table) generate no significant return predictability at the 5% significance level and the $R^2$’s are very small. These models do, in fact, feature time-variation in the equity risk premium, but the risk premium volatility is only about 0.5% per year and so the signal-to-noise ratio in these regressions is too small to generate significant in-sample predictability.

The models with parameter uncertainty, however, display significant in-sample return predictability and the regression coefficients and the $R^2$’s are large and increasing in the forecasting horizon similar to those in the data. The ex ante predictability in the models with anticipated utility pricing is in fact similar to that in the fixed parameters cases, but since the parameters are updated at each point in time, there is significant ex post predictability. For instance, an increase in the mean parameter of consumption growth leads to a high return and lower dividend yield. Thus, a high dividend yield in sample forecasts high excess returns in sample. This mechanism was previously identified by Timmermann (1993) and Lewellen and Shanken (2002), and can be understood as a strong form of the Stambaugh (1999) bias. Thus, the model predicts that the amount of predictability is much smaller out-of-sample, consistent with the empirical evidence in Goyal and Welch (2008) and Ang and Bekaert (2007).
Table 8 - Return Forecasting Regressions

Table 8: This table presents quarterly excess market return forecasting regressions over various forecasting horizons (q quarters; 1 to 16). The top left panel shows the results when using market data and a measure of the log aggregate dividend yield; the cay-variable of Lettau and Ludvigsson (2001) and the CRSP aggregate log dividend yield (ln(D_t/P_t) where dividends are measured as the sum of the last four quarters' dividends. The rest of the table shows the results using the returns and dividend yield generated within the models. "Cons. only" denotes the model results in the case where only consumption growth is used to update beliefs, while "Cons. and GDP" denotes the model results in the case where both consumption and GDP growth are used to update beliefs. The results for 'Anticipated E-Z utility' refers to the anticipated utility case of the full model with state, parameter, and model uncertainty. The 'P.P.U. E-Z utility' results refer to the 2-state model with fully rational pricing of the parameter uncertainty where the states are observed. Finally, the fixed parameters case correspond to the case of state uncertainty where the parameters are known. Newey-West autocorrelation and heteroskedasticity adjusted standard errors are given in parentheses (the number of lags is equal to the number of overlapping observations). * denotes significance at the 10% level, ** denotes significance at the 5% level, and *** denotes significance at the 1% level. The sample period is from 1957:Q2 until 2009:Q1, with 1957Q1 priors as given in Table 1 for the case of learning from observing consumption growth only, and as given in an Online Appendix for the case of learning from both consumption and GDP growth.

\[
r_{t,t+q} - r_{f,t,t+q} = \alpha_q + \beta_{q,dp} \ln(D_t/P_t) + \varepsilon_{t,t+q}
\]

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<thead>
<tr>
<th>Data</th>
<th>Anticipated E-Z utility</th>
</tr>
</thead>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Cons. only</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Cons. only</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>P.P.U. E-Z utility</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>q</th>
<th>(\beta_{dp} \ (s.e.))</th>
<th>(R^2_{adj})</th>
<th>(\beta_{dp} \ (s.e.))</th>
<th>(R^2_{adj})</th>
<th>(\beta_{dp} \ (s.e.))</th>
<th>(R^2_{adj})</th>
<th>(\beta_{dp} \ (s.e.))</th>
<th>(R^2_{adj})</th>
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<td>1</td>
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<td></td>
<td>(0.02)</td>
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<td>0.11**</td>
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<td>0.18**</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>7.60***</td>
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<td>0.17*</td>
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<td>14.7%</td>
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<td>13.4%</td>
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<td>(0.10)</td>
<td></td>
<td>(0.09)</td>
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<tr>
<td>16</td>
<td>12.31***</td>
<td>41.6%</td>
<td>0.22**</td>
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<td>0.59***</td>
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<td>16.6%</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(1.82)</td>
<td></td>
<td>(0.11)</td>
<td></td>
<td>(0.16)</td>
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</table>

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<tr>
<th>q</th>
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<th>(R^2_{adj})</th>
<th>(\beta_{dp} \ (s.e.))</th>
<th>(R^2_{adj})</th>
<th>(\beta_{dp} \ (s.e.))</th>
<th>(R^2_{adj})</th>
<th>(\beta_{dp} \ (s.e.))</th>
<th>(R^2_{adj})</th>
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<td>0.12***</td>
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<td>0.005</td>
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<td>(0.04)</td>
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<td>(0.06)</td>
<td></td>
<td>(0.06)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>0.32*</td>
<td>6.0%</td>
<td>0.42***</td>
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<td>0.19</td>
<td>1.1%</td>
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<td>(0.15)</td>
<td></td>
<td>(0.17)</td>
<td></td>
<td>(0.16)</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>0.54*</td>
<td>9.1%</td>
<td>0.68**</td>
<td>15.9%</td>
<td>0.40</td>
<td>2.5%</td>
<td>0.44*</td>
<td>3.3%</td>
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<td>(0.32)</td>
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<td>(0.28)</td>
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<td>16</td>
<td>1.03</td>
<td>12.6%</td>
<td>1.16**</td>
<td>18.0%</td>
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<td>0.8%</td>
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<td>(0.31)</td>
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<td>(0.31)</td>
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5.3 Anticipated utility versus priced parameter uncertainty

One potential criticism of the anticipated utility results is that the impact of changing beliefs would be tempered if the agent took into account that the parameters could change in the future and properly priced the parameter risk. This section contrasts the results for a model with fully-priced parameter uncertainty to our anticipated utility specification.

Collin-Dufresne, Johannes, and Lochstoer (2013) provide a detailed study of the impact of priced parameter uncertainty, develop solution methods, and theoretically quantify the impact of priced parameter uncertainty in a range of simple models and for various parameters. They find that priced parameter uncertainty can have quantitatively large and long-lasting asset pricing effects. Pricing parameter uncertainty dramatically increases the dimensionality of the pricing problem, however, pushing the bounds of computational limits even for models with a modest number of parameters. Here, we utilize their pricing approach and consider a 2-state model with observed states with parameters unobserved. This is the most general model for which it is computationally feasible to solve for prices. This ignores the confounding effects we discussed earlier, but insures that the posterior distribution is summarized by a fixed-dimensional set of sufficient statistics, which allows the computation of expected utility. As mentioned earlier, if the Markov state is unobserved, the pricing problem for an Epstein-Zin agent is infinite-dimensional.

The details of the numerical solution for this exercise are given in the Online Appendix. The problem is extremely computationally intensive with 9 state variables, where 8 state variables are needed to characterize the hyperparameters governing parameter beliefs, and 1 state variable is the current state of the Markov chain. We solve the model using parallel computing techniques on a workstation using a GPU (graphical processing unit) card, efficiently programmed in C++ and Cuda.\textsuperscript{15} A full learning model including both model and parameter uncertainty across all models is vastly out of reach given current available computing power.\textsuperscript{16} We solve the 2-state model with priced parameter uncertainty for $\gamma = 10$, the same value as used for the anticipated utility models, and $\gamma = 5$. Otherwise, the parameters are the same across the two models.

\textsuperscript{15}We run the code on a single computer using in parallell 16 high-speed CPU’s and 1024 lower speed processors on a GPU card. CUDA programming is required for efficiently communicating with the GPU card. Further, the problem requires 96Gb of RAM memory due to the size of the state-space. It takes about 2 weeks to solve the model with sufficient accuracy. Thus, since computing time is exponential, adding even one more continuous state variable makes the problem computationally infeasible.

\textsuperscript{16}It is also prohibitively computationally expensive for us to calculate long-run real yields for the 2-state model with priced parameter uncertainty, as the yield calculations require additional recursive calculations.
We classify the states sequentially based on the mean state beliefs from the 2-state model with unknown states and parameters, as shown in the middle plot of Figure 1, where state 2 (1) is said to occur if the mean state belief \( E_t [s_t] \) is above (below) 1.5. Thus, as seen in Figure 1, every NBER recession except the recessions in 1969-1970 and 2001 are identified as state 2 observations. This classification thus accounts for parameter uncertainty. The parameter priors are the same as those used earlier, as described in Table 1.

Table 9 summarizes the results. Average excess returns increase with priced parameter uncertainty, from 3.7% for the 2-state model with anticipated utility to 7.5% for the case with priced parameter uncertainty. With \( \gamma = 5 \) the risk premium is close to that in the data (4.6%). The average ex ante sample risk premiums for \( \gamma = 5 \) or 10 are 5.6% and 2.5%, respectively, compared to 1.8% for the anticipated utility case. Two observations are warranted. First, ex ante risk premiums are much higher with priced parameter uncertainty. This is due to the permanent shocks to beliefs about consumption dynamics arising from parameter belief updates. These long-run shocks are priced risks when the agent has a preference for early resolution of uncertainty, as explained in Collin-Dufresne, Johannes, and Lochstoer (2013). For instance, an update in the mean belief about the growth rate of either of the states \( (\mu_1 \text{ or } \mu_2) \) will cause an upward revision in the wealth-consumption ratio. From the stochastic discount factor, as given in Equation (4), this corresponds to a negative shock to the pricing kernel. This is similar to the mechanics in the Bansal and Yaron (2004) model. Second, a large fraction of the realized average equity returns are due to unanticipated positive shocks, as observed in the difference between the average realized excess returns versus the average expected excess returns \( E_T \left[ E \left( R_{m,t+1}^{\text{excess}} | I_t \right) \right] \). However, the fraction is a little smaller than for the anticipated utility cases. This occurs since discount rates are higher with priced parameter uncertainty, which in turn means that the shocks to the growth rate affects the price-dividend ratio less, causing more muted updates in the price level.

In terms of volatilities, return volatility and the volatility of the price-dividend ratio are lower than in the anticipated utility case, due to the same effect—discount rates are higher ex ante with priced parameter uncertainty. The correlation between the model-implied and observed price-dividend ratios is higher for 2-state model with priced parameter uncertainty, than for the same model with anticipated utility case or with fixed parameters. The correlation in the full learning model was 0.67, and is comparable to the case with priced parameter uncertainty.
Table 9 - Priced parameter uncertainty vs. Anticipated utility:
The asset price moments

The table reports the asset pricing implications of the 2-state Markov switching regime model for different assumptions on investors' information set, as well as the pricing methodology. In particular, 'P.P.U. E-Z' stands for priced parameter uncertainty Epstein-Zin utility, and corresponds to the fully rational case where investors account for the parameter uncertainty ex ante in the pricing of asset claims. In this case, the state is assumed to be observed. 'Anticipated E-Z' corresponds to the anticipated utility Epstein-Zin agent as given in Table 5, where the agent at each point in time prices assets using their current best guess of the parameter value. In this case, the state is unobserved, and the agent takes into account state uncertainty when pricing the claim. Finally, 'Known parameters' correspond to the case where parameters are known but where the state is unobserved, with no parameter uncertainty.

The table includes data for the real risk-free rate, the dividend claim, and other moments, along with the expected value of next period's dividend growth.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>2-state model</th>
<th>2-state model</th>
<th>2-state model</th>
<th>2-state model</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1957Q2</td>
<td>1.0% 0.9% 0.8%</td>
<td>1.0% 0.9% 0.8%</td>
<td>1.0% 0.9% 0.8%</td>
<td>1.0% 0.9% 0.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1997Q1</td>
<td>1.0% 0.9% 0.8%</td>
<td>1.0% 0.9% 0.8%</td>
<td>1.0% 0.9% 0.8%</td>
<td>1.0% 0.9% 0.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2009Q1</td>
<td>1.0% 0.9% 0.8%</td>
<td>1.0% 0.9% 0.8%</td>
<td>1.0% 0.9% 0.8%</td>
<td>1.0% 0.9% 0.8%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In all cases, the agent learns from observing consumption growth only. For all the models, $\beta = 0.994$, $\gamma = 1.5$, $\delta = 4.5$.

The volatility of the idiosyncratic component of dividend growth ($d_t^d$) is calibrated to match the historical standard deviation of dividend growth, as reported in Bansal and Yaron (2004). The statistics are annualized. The expectation operator with a $T$ subscript, $E_T$, denotes the sample average, while the volatility operator, $\sigma_T$, denotes the sample standard deviation. The sample period is from 1957Q2 until 2009Q1, with 1957Q1 priors as given in Table 1 for the case of learning from observing consumption growth only, and as given in an Online Appendix for the case of learning from both consumption and GDP growth.

Table 9: The table reports the asset pricing implications of the 2-state Markov switching regime model for different assumptions on investors' information set, as well as the pricing methodology. In particular, 'P.P.U. E-Z' stands for priced parameter uncertainty Epstein-Zin utility, and corresponds to the fully rational case where investors account for the parameter uncertainty ex ante in the pricing of asset claims. In this case, the state is assumed to be observed. 'Anticipated E-Z' corresponds to the anticipated utility Epstein-Zin agent as given in Table 5, where the agent at each point in time prices assets using their current best guess of the parameter value. In this case, the state is unobserved, and the agent takes into account state uncertainty when pricing the claim. Finally, 'Known parameters' correspond to the case where parameters are known but where the state is unobserved, with no parameter uncertainty.
5.3.1 Conditional Moments

Figure 10 displays the time-series of the conditional risk premium and Sharpe ratio for the 2-state model with anticipated utility pricing as well as the 2-state model with priced parameter uncertainty (where the state is assumed to be observed). The latter has a strongly counter-cyclical risk premium and Sharpe ratio, due to the higher parameter uncertainty in recessions. Of particular importance, as shown in Collin-Dufresne, Johannes, and Lochstoer (2013), is the uncertainty about the transition probabilities. These parameters govern the persistence of the consumption growth process—an aspect of consumption dynamics that an Epstein-Zin agent with a preference for early resolution of uncertainty finds particularly risky. Table 1 shows that the uncertainty about transition probabilities remain large throughout the sample. The anticipated utility model also has a countercyclical risk premium and Sharpe ratio, though the magnitude is smaller as the ex ante priced risk in this case is related only to the known dynamics within a state as well as the state uncertainty.

The lower left quadrant of Table 8 shows forecasting regressions for the case with priced parameter uncertainty in the 2-state model. Although there is more ex ante variation in discount rates, as seen in Figure 10, there is less of a response in the dividend price ratio to belief updates, due to the higher average discount rate, as discussed in an earlier section. Thus, fully rational pricing decreases the in-sample evidence of predictability due to ex post revisions in beliefs, but in turn has more actual variation in the risk premium. In fact, the predictability evidence is strongest for the high risk aversion case ($\gamma = 10$), which exhibits very high time-variation in the ex ante conditional risk premium.

5.3.2 Discussion

In terms of robustness, the main difference between anticipated utility and priced parameter uncertainty is that the former generates more return and dividend-price volatility, and the latter higher ex-ante risk premiums. Both approaches generate a large difference between the ex ante and ex post risk premium, excess return volatility, return predictability, and a higher correspondence to the time-series of the price-dividend ratio in the data than the fixed parameters benchmark models. It is important to note that none of the results in Sections 2 and 3 depend on whether we use anticipated utility or fully price the parameter uncertainty, thus of all the main empirical results are robust to priced parameter uncertainty, at least for the 2-state model. Cogley and Sargent (2009) find similar results in a number of simple macroeconomic models.
Figure 10 - Anticipated utility vs. priced parameter uncertainty: Conditional risk premium and Sharpe ratio in the 2-state model

Figure 10: The top plot shows the annualized conditional risk premium on the dividend claim from the 2-state model with anticipated utility pricing (the black, solid line), as well as the case where the parameter uncertainty is fully rationally priced, but the state is assumed to be observed (the red, dashed line). In the former case, the risk aversion parameter $\gamma = 10$, whereas in the latter case $\gamma = 5$, such that the average risk premium over the sample is similar in both models. The sample period is 1957:Q2 - 2009:Q1. The bottom plot shows the annualized conditional Sharpe ratio of returns to the dividend claim for the same two cases over the same sample period.
Priced parameter uncertainty requires a number restrictive assumptions. Most notably, it requires that states are observed which precludes the strong confounding effects documented earlier in Table 2. Parameter learning is much slower with unobserved states, thus the 2-state model with priced parameter uncertainty omits an important source of confounding risk that substantially affects the belief updating process.

Overall, although priced parameter uncertainty is certainly realistic and a powerful pricing mechanism, there are also good reasons to believe that economic agents engage in ‘anticipated utility’-type pricing along some dimensions. First, as suggested by Kreps (1998), this appears to be the way that economists approach difficult pricing problems with non-trivial parameter estimation. Second, since joint parameter and state learning is a realistic feature of the data and since anticipated utility in this case is required to generate a finite-dimensional pricing problem, this also suggests the practicality of an anticipated utility approach. To our knowledge, there are no known methods for truly infinite dimensional pricing problems. Third, we also find that the covariance between the price-dividend ratio in the data and the price-dividend ratio of the models with anticipated utility pricing are substantially higher than the covariance between the price-dividend ratio in the data and the price-dividend ratio from the model with priced parameter uncertainty.

6 Conclusion

This paper empirically studies the impact of parameter and model uncertainty on US postwar equity returns in the context of standard consumption based asset pricing models, and contributes to a growing empirical literature documenting the importance of learning for asset prices (see Pastor and Veronesi (2009) for a review article).

We take the perspective of a Bayesian agent who learns from macroeconomic data about consumption dynamics, updating beliefs as new data arrives. If structural learning is an important determinant of the US postwar experience, three conditions should hold. First, the agent’s subjective beliefs generated from learning should be substantially different from those arising from traditional implementations of similar models. Second, when beliefs change, so should asset prices: thus belief updates should be significantly correlated with market returns. Third, these beliefs, when embedded in an equilibrium asset pricing model, should help us understand the standard asset pricing puzzles: the realized high equity premium, excess return volatility, excess return predictability, and a volatile price-dividend ratio. We find strong evidence along all three dimensions, supporting the empirical relevance of structural
learning.

Parameter and model learning generates subjective beliefs that are nonstationary over time, and this, in turn generates large shocks to beliefs about long-run consumption dynamics. These long run beliefs have first order asset pricing implications for agents with Epstein-Zin preferences (see, e.g., Bansal and Yaron (2004)). We also find that the largest shocks to long-run beliefs occur during recessions, as agents update their views about difficult to estimate parameters. Over the sample, agents learn that consumption dynamics are less risky: shorter recessions, longer expansions, and lower volatility, which generates higher ex post equity returns than those expected ex-ante.

These results have a number of implications. First, we find an alternative narrative for US postwar equity experience: macroeconomic learning is an important component of equity returns helps to explain the high realized equity returns, high equity volatility relative to fundamentals, return predictability, and the time series of price-dividend ratios. Second, the evidence suggests that expected equity returns going forward is substantially lower than the historical average excess returns, which has first important implications for long-run portfolio investment and capital budgeting decisions. Third, looking forward, there is still substantial uncertainty over parameters associated with recessions/depressions and future data could dramatically change beliefs over these states.

Our results and methodology can be extended in a number of ways. First, it would be useful to use our methods to understand the experience of other countries through the lens of learning about macroeconomic fundamentals. In particular, the macroeconomic and equity market experiences of Japan are dramatically different, and it would interesting to study how agent’s macroeconomic beliefs have evolved over time. Second, we assume learning without structural breaks. For many countries, structural shifts like currency devaluations, bailouts, or shifts in central bank policies may be important, which could ‘re-start’ structural learning. Our approach can easily be modified to handle this case. Finally, there is strong evidence for cross-sectional heterogeneity in agents’ asset holdings and consumption dynamics. These effects would likely introduce additional asset pricing implications when combined with learning effects. We leave these topics for future research.

References


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