The Experience versus the Expectations of Power: A Recipe for Altering the Effects of Power on Behavior

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Power transforms consumer behavior. This research introduces a critical theoretical moderator of power’s effects by promoting the idea that power is accompanied by both an experience (how it feels to have or lack power) and expectations (schemas and scripts as to how those with or without power behave). In some cases, the psychological experience of power predisposes people to behave one way, whereas attention to the expectations of power suggests behaving in another way. As a consequence, power’s effects for consumer behavior can hinge on consumers’ focus. Specifically, a focus on the experience or expectations of power critically moderates how power affects both information processing and status seeking. However, as the experience of power incites a desire to act, and the powerful are expected to act, power produces more action regardless of focus. These findings provide a new lens on power and have important implications for consumer behavior.

Having or lacking power has transformative effects on consumer behavior. The powerless are more careful and systematic in their processing of information (Brinol et al. 2007) and show an enhanced desire for status objects (Rucker and Galinsky 2008). On first blush, these laboratory findings seem at odds with real-world exemplars that suggest it is the powerful, not the powerless, that attend to information carefully and seek out status consumption. CEOs are in positions that require careful evaluation of information related to the actions their firms should take and internal management issues. And, as an individual exemplar, Donald Trump, a person with substantial power and influence, is adorned with numerous status objects. How might these potential disconnects between past research and real-world observations be resolved?

This article provides one answer to the question by introducing a new theoretical and empirical moderator of the effects of power on behavior. We advance the argument that power is accompanied by both an experience (the internal psychological and physiological tendencies that activate when one has or lacks power) and expectations (schemas and scripts that relate to how people in a given position of power behave). Although the last decade has seen an explosion of research in both marketing and psychology that has explored how the experience of power affects behavior, the current research reestablishes the importance of expectations associated with positions of power and demonstrates that the link between power and behavior can critically depend upon whether an individual focuses on the experience or expectations of power.

We first provide a brief overview of the power literature, which has emphasized how the psychological experience of power shapes consumer behavior. Subsequently, we introduce the idea that expectations associated with power exist. We elucidate how a focus on expectations of power might yield distinct and novel effects related to information processing and status seeking, but convergent consequences for the link between power and action.
**POWER**

Defined as asymmetric control over valued resources in social relations (Magee and Galinsky 2008; Thibaut and Kelley 1959), the definition of power contains two central features. First, power is a social construct, involving a relationship between two or more individuals. Second, power is hierarchical in that one person has more control over a valued resource than another person or persons. By creating a ranking- or ordering-collection of individuals, power serves as a social tool to structure and organize individuals and groups.

Research has established that power has influential effects on thought, perception, and behavior more generally (see Galinsky, Rucker, and Magee 2014 for a review) and consumer thought, perception, and behavior more specifically (see Rucker, Galinsky, and Dubois 2012 for a review). Importantly, power is not merely a structural variable but a psychological one—one can feel powerful or powerless independent of one’s structural position. For example, recalling a past episode in which they felt powerful or powerless altered people’s sense of power (Galinsky et al. 2014). Within the consumer domain, having power produces a variety of effects ranging from consumers’ perceived control over inanimate objects (Kim and McGill 2011), perceptions of price unfairness (Jin, He, and Zhang 2014), and preferences for large versus small objects offered in an assortment (Dubois, Rucker, and Galinsky 2012).

**POWER AS A PSYCHOLOGICAL EXPERIENCE**

Several papers have linked the effects of power on behavior via the experiential feeling that accompanies feeling powerful versus powerless. By experience, we refer to the internal psychological or physiological effects power has on how a consumer feels. We next summarize three prominent effects power has on consumer behavior based on its psychological substrates.

The experience of having power makes one feel confident and optimistic, whereas lacking power makes one feel doubtful and uncertain (Anderson and Galinsky 2006; Brinol et al. 2007). In addition, power serves to make people feel as if they are in greater control of their environment (Inesi et al. 2011). Because of these internal experiences related to confidence versus doubt, high power leads to less information processing than low power. For example, Brinol et al. (2007) manipulated power and then exposed participants to an advertisement for a new cell phone containing either strong or weak arguments, a classic measure of information processing. Brinol et al. found participants’ attitudes were less influenced by argument quality when they were in a state of high power compared with low power, suggesting that feelings of confidence versus doubt spilled over to influence information processing. Other research has found that the powerful rejected others’ advice and opinions (Galinsky et al. 2008; See et al. 2011; Tost, Gino, and Larrick 2012) and gave less attention to others’ emotions (Galinsky et al. 2006).

A second line of research suggests low power is generally viewed as a psychological experience that is aversive and undesirable. Put differently, people typically do not feel good about lacking power. In contrast, having power increases subjective well-being (Kifer et al. 2013). As a consequence of low power being an uncomfortable state, the powerless have been found to seek out, acquire, or display power in some form (Horwitz 1958; Rucker and Galinsky 2008; Worochel, Arnold, and Harrison 1978). Because status is associated with power (see Magee and Galinsky 2008), people who lack power may evince increased interest in purchasing and conspicuously displaying high-status goods (Dubois, Rucker, and Galinsky 2010; Rucker and Galinsky 2008, 2009). Rucker and Galinsky (2008) found that those who lacked power were willing to pay more for a framed portrait of a university landmark, but only when the object was described as being scarce and possessing status.

A third effort to understand the psychological experience of power has examined the link between power and action. Galinsky, Gruenfeld and Magee (2003) suggested that power predisposes individuals towards a psychological state of action readiness. Specifically, power imbues people with a sense of agency and control that puts their mind in a state to take action (see Jiang, Zhan, and Rucker, forthcoming). As an illustration, Galinsky et al. (2003) found that the powerful were more likely to take action in the form of requesting another card in a blackjack hand. Possessing power also increased the likelihood of negotiating for a better offer (Magee, Galinsky, and Gruenfeld 2007). Fast et al. (2009) found evidence that a power-induced sense of control mediated the relationship between power and action. In other words, powerful people take more assertive action because they psychologically experience a heightened sense of control.

The previous examples suggest that states of power or powerlessness produce a psychological experience that affects a wide variety of behaviors. Power makes consumers feel more confident, secure, and in control, whereas powerlessness provokes an undesirable state of doubt, insecurity, and a lack of control that people are motivated to assuage.

**THE EXPECTATIONS OF POWER**

The previously described research is part of a large body of work on how the internal experience of power affects behavior. However, the possession of power is not accompanied only by an internal experience. People often observe how the powerful and the powerless behave. For example, those with power are often seen to be in the possession of more status objects than those without power (Veblen 1899). Bosses are typically seen making important decisions and giving orders, whereas employees are observed to follow and obey those orders (Sande, Ellard, and Ross 1986). Because people observe the behavior of others, they may come to hold a variety of expectations for the roles tied to different levels of power. Indeed, hierarchies likely have such prominence in our social world because they provide clear rules or guidelines for how people behave based on their level of power (Magee and Galinsky 2008). We propose that

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through the observation of other’s behavior, consumers come to hold beliefs or expectations tied to the behavior that is enacted by the powerful and powerless.

We formally define the expectations of power as the cognitive associations or schemas people have regarding how people behave based on their position of power. As cognitive associations, expectations may be linked to both shared stereotypes about the behavior of the powerful or powerless as well as an individual’s own idiosyncratic associations with how the powerful or powerless behave. Contrasting expectations of power against the experience of power, expectations of power reflect organized knowledge structures and beliefs about how people should behave based on a role whereas the experience of power refers to the internal psychological state of how one feels. Importantly, as observers do not see the internal states of those with power, but only observe external behavior, it is possible that people can form expectations as to how the powerful behave that differ from the behavior an internal focus on one’s power produces. As a consequence, for the same individual, focusing on the experience of power may produce a given set of effects, whereas focusing on expectations of power may sometimes elicit different behavior.

Initial support for the idea that expectations of power may guide behavior can be found in behavioral priming research. For example, research has shown that cognitively priming the concept of politeness or rudeness led people to act in a more polite or rude fashion, respectively (Bargh, Chen, and Burrows 1996). The core idea is that the activation of schemas leads to a spreading activation of constructs that can nudge people’s behavior in a manner consistent with those schemas. Thus, people can behave in a manner consistent with the cognitive associations tied to a particular construct or role because those schemas become more accessible in one’s mind. Of relevance to power, in the seminal Stanford prison experiment, Zimbardo (1973, 1974) suggested that those in positions of power, the guards, conformed to behavior consistent with their role. For example, the guards acted as authorities and treated the prisoners as lesser human beings. However, in Zimbardo’s work it is impossible to disentangle whether the behavioral effects of power were specifically due to the expectations and cognitive associations to the role or the psychological experience people felt.

If power can lead people to ascribe to expectations associated with power, this activation could lead to divergent effects from those currently in the literature based on whether the schemas and scripts people hold for the role of power converge or diverge with what the internal psychological experience of power signals to individuals. In particular, in considering the three previous power findings reviewed that relate power to information processing, status seeking, and action, it seems like an activation of expectations or schemas of power could produce divergent outcomes for information processing and status seeking, but convergent outcomes for action. Because the internal experience of powerless is wrought with uncertainty and a state people often wish to alleviate, low power leads to greater information processing and a desire for status. In contrast, when it comes to the expectations people hold by observing others, it is the powerful who often have control over important decisions, whereas the powerless do not (Sande et al. 1986), which people may infer requires careful processing. With regard to status consumption, it is the powerful, not the powerless, who are likely to be observed to be in the possession of status objects. In fact, Veblen (1899) viewed conspicuous consumption and status consumption arising as a tool for the rich to signal their rank in society. And, the very idea that status is a signal of power is why people have postulated that low power people seek status (e.g., Charles, Hurst, and Roussanov 2009; Rucker and Galinsky 2008).

In contrast, with regard to action, a focus on the internal experience produces a psychological readiness to act (Galinsky et al. 2003). In addition, the observation of the powerful and powerless typically reveals that it is the powerful, such as leaders, who take action and are assertive (Ames and Flynn 2007). As a consequence, with regard to action, the activation of schemas or scripts related to power may produce a very similar outcome as is produced were one to focus on the internal experience of power.

FOCUSING ON THE EXPERIENCE VERSUS EXPECTATIONS OF POWER

Based on the idea that power might impact behavior via either the psychological experience it imparts on individuals or the specific schemas it activates, we offer the core proposition that the effects of power can hinge on whether people are focused on the experience or expectations tied to power. That is, people can focus on how an experience of power makes them feel and how they should respond based on those feelings, or it can focus them on the expected behavior based on their prior observations of the powerless and powerful. Although not developed within the power literature, other research has shown that people can focus on different elements surrounding a psychological state. For instance, in work on emotions, Labroo and Rucker (2010) found that people in a negative emotional state (e.g., sadness) could focus on either the experience of the emotion itself (i.e., how it felt to be sad) or on the cause of the emotion (i.e., what produced the emotion). When individuals were focused on the experience of sadness they preferred vacation destinations associated with happiness, presumably because happiness would reduce their sadness. However, when focused on the cause of their negative state (i.e., the event that made them feel sad), participants did not prefer vacation destinations associated with happiness, presumably because when focused on the actual cause of their emotion, vacation destinations that were irrelevant to the solution carried no special significance.

We propose that people can focus on either the experience or expectations of power. That is, when in a state of power individuals can be directed towards a more internal focus of “how they feel” or a more external focus of “the schemas
and scripts dictated by their relative power.” We propose that, when focused on expectations of power, people may act in accordance with the accessible scripts and schemas they have for how those with or without power behave. Based on the idea that the powerful, not the powerless, are expected to make important decisions and possess status, we suggest that an expectations focus will lead them to engage in such behavior.

Formally, we put forth the following set of hypotheses. First, with respect to information processing we propose:

**H1a:** When focused on the experience of power, states of low power will lead people to process information more carefully than states of high power.

**H1b:** When focused on expectations of power, states of high power will lead people to process information more carefully than states of low power.

Second, with regard to desire for status objects, we propose the following:

**H2a:** When focused on the experience of power, states of low power will lead people to show a stronger preference for status products than states of high power.

**H2b:** When focused on expectations of power, states of high power will lead people to show a stronger preference for status products than states of low power.

Importantly, in the case of action, the experience and expectations of power lead to similar predictions (see table 1 for a summary of predictions). That is, a focus on expectations should lead to the activation of behavioral scripts that the powerful should take action, producing a similar outcome compared with focusing on the internal state. Formally:

**H3:** Regardless of whether focused on the experience or expectations of power, states of high power will lead people to show a greater tendency to take action than states of low power.

### OVERVIEW OF EXPERIMENTS

We conducted a pretest and five experiments to test our hypotheses that a focus on the experience versus expectations of power alters the consequences of power. We first conducted a pretest to document expectations tethered to those who possess or lack power regarding different behaviors. Subsequently, we utilized two different manipulations of power to demonstrate that divergent effects of the experience versus expectations of power occurred regardless of whether the power manipulation involved episodic recall or imagined role assignment. In experiments 1a and 1b we examined the effects of the experience- versus expectations focus on information processing. Experiments 2a and 2b focused on status consumption. In each of these experiments we predicted that a focus on expectations of power would show the opposite pattern compared with a focus on the experience of power. Experiment 3 explored the effects of focus on action and predicted that both the experience and expectations of power would lead to more action, suggesting a focus on expectations does not reverse any effect of power but leads people to behave in a manner consistent with the schemas tied to their relative power.

### PRETEST

We conducted a pretest that examined the associations people had with power. Specifically, we focused on the three domains of interest previously reviewed: information processing, status consumption, and action. To assess people’s expectations participants were recruited from a national online subject pool using Amazon’s Mturk (N = 90, 66 female). Participants were randomly assigned into one of two conditions, in which they were asked about their expectations for either high- or low-power individuals. To assess expectations regarding information processing, participants were asked whether high- (or low-) power individuals “Process information at hand more thoughtfully and carefully,” and “Pay more attention and give due diligence to critical information” (r = .76). To assess expectations regarding status consumption, participants indicated agreement with the statements that high- (or low-) power individuals “Own

### TABLE 1

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Behavior</th>
<th>Past empirical findings</th>
<th>Participants’ reported expectations</th>
<th>Prediction of expectations focus</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Power and information processing</td>
<td>Powerless people process information more deeply (Briñol et al. 2007)</td>
<td>Powerful people expected to process information more deeply</td>
<td>Opposite prediction relative to past research</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Power and preference for status products</td>
<td>Powerless people have a higher willingness to purchase status goods (Rucker and Galinsky 2008, 2009)</td>
<td>Powerful people expected to purchase and possess status goods</td>
<td>Opposite prediction relative to past research</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Power and taking action</td>
<td>Powerful people are more likely to take action (Galinsky et al. 2003)</td>
<td>Powerful people expected to take action</td>
<td>Same as past research</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
possessions associated with status,” and “Purchase products that have status-related associations” (r = .77). Finally, to assess expectations regarding action, participants indicated agreement with the statements that high- (or low-) power individuals were “More likely to take action,” and “More likely to get things done” (r = .81). All items were assessed on 7-point Likert scales where 1 was labeled as “Definitely not consistent” and 7 was labeled as “Definitely consistent.”

Empirically supporting the propositions in table 1, participants expected the powerful to be more likely to process information carefully (M = 5.07; SD = 1.32) than the powerless (M = 3.82; SD = 1.44, F(1, 88) = 18.27, p < .001, ηp2 = .17). In addition, participants expected powerful people to be more likely to possess and purchase status objects (M = 5.24; SD = 1.36) compared with powerless people (M = 4.44; SD = 1.55, F(1, 88) = 6.80, p = .01, ηp2 = .07). Finally, participants expected powerful people to be more likely to take action (M = 5.64; SD = 1.22) compared with powerless people (M = 3.43; SD = 1.49, F(1, 88) = 59.17, p < .001, ηp2 = .40).

These findings demonstrate that people expect the powerful to process information more carefully, to buy status-based objects, and to take action. The first two of these effects run counter to the literature on the experience of power, whereas the last is consistent. Although beyond the scope of the pretest and current work, future research could examine the specific antecedents that lead people to hold these expectations in the first place. For example, it could be that people often observe the powerful acting, which gives rise to the belief they will take action. We turn next to five experiments that explore how a focus on the experience versus expectations of power systematically affects behavior.

EXPERIMENTS 1A AND 1B: POWER AND INFORMATION PROCESSING

Experiments 1a and 1b examined hypotheses 1a and 1b. Specifically, we tested whether focusing individuals in a low- or high-power state on expectations of power would reverse the effect of power on information processing found by Briñol et al. (2007). A foundational method for establishing depth of information processing is the discrimination between weak and strong arguments. If people are carefully processing information, the quality of arguments should affect how persuaded they are (Briñol et al. 2007; Maheswaran and Chaiken 1991; Petty and Cacioppo 1986).

Experiments 1a and 1b are conceptually similar as both examined how a focus on the experience or expectations of power affects information processing. Furthermore, both experiments used the tendency to discriminate between weak and strong arguments as a measure of information processing. The experiments differed in their manipulations of power and whether the strong-weak distinction was manipulated within or between subjects. Experiment 1a manipulated power with an episodic recall task and measured participants’ ability to discriminate between two job candidates read in sequence (i.e., within-task discrimination). Experiment 1b manipulated power via an imagined-role assignment task and looked at discrimination based on presenting weak versus strong arguments between conditions (i.e., between-task discrimination). By using two different operationalizations of power, information processing, and context, we sought to establish the generalizability of our novel predictions.

EXPERIMENT 1A

Participants and Design

One hundred and forty-eight undergraduate students (86 female) from Northwestern University were recruited to participate in this lab study in exchange for monetary compensation. Participants were randomly assigned to a 2 (power: high vs. low) × 2 (focus: experience vs. expectations) between-subject design. There was no significant effect of gender of participants in this experiment or any of the remaining experiments (all p ≥ .21). Therefore, participant gender is not discussed further.

Procedure

Participants first completed a series of tasks designed to manipulate both their power and their focus on the experience or expectations for that power state. The cover story portrayed the task as examining participants’ use of language and choice of words when facing different events and scenarios in life. After this task, participants were directed to an ostensibly unrelated task that involved reading and evaluating two job candidates for a chef position. One profile was designed to be stronger than the other. Specifically, the “weak” profile was presented first and described a chef with modest qualifications. In contrast, the “strong” profile was presented second and described a chef with superior qualifications. All participants read both profiles, with the weak profile presented first followed by the strong profile (see app. A for profiles).

The “strong” chef profile was rated as the superior candidate in a pretest in which people were asked to pay attention and critically assess the profiles (M = 5.85; SD = 1.22 vs. M = 3.46; SD = 2.03, F(1, 140) = 75.00, p < .001, ηp2 = .46). Thus, under conditions of careful information processing, the “weak” chef profile should be less preferred than the “strong” chef profile.

Independent Variables

Power. Adapted from Galinsky et al. (2003), the power manipulation consisted of an episodic recall task that asked participants to recall an event in which either they had power over someone else or someone else had power over them. The recall task had been demonstrated in multiple articles to successfully manipulate participants’ level of psychological power and not other constructs such as mood (e.g.,
Dubois et al. 2010; Kim and McGill 2011; Rucker and Galinsky 2008).

Focus. This original recall task was modified to focus participants on the experience of power or expectations tied to power. In the experience conditions, prior to describing what happened in the event, participants were first asked to “write down your relationship with the person who you had power over (who had power over you),” and then asked to describe “what happened during the incident and how you felt during the incident.” In the expectations conditions, participants were first asked to “write down the name or title of the role you held” and they were then asked to “describe what other people generally expect from someone in this role or similar roles and the stereotypes associated with this role.” Thus, the experience focus pushed participants to their own internal state and how they felt, whereas the expectations focus pushed participants to consider the schemas and role associations.

In the expectations conditions we chose to focus people on what others expected from them for two reasons. First, if we focused individuals on how they thought they should behave or act it is possible they may have consulted how they felt in that situation and became internally focused on the experience. That is, a self-focus may have made it difficult to disentangle an emphasis on the experience versus expectations associated with power. Second, people’s expectations for how they should behave may vary more from person to person than how people expect those in general to behave. Indeed, our earlier pretest focused on naïve theories about how people behave in general, but any given individual may believe he or she should behave differently. Thus, our manipulation utilizing others expectations towards the role allowed us to focus on the shared schemas in our initial examination of whether an expectations focus would change the link between power and consumer behavior.

We pretested the modified recall manipulations to establish that both focus manipulations uniquely affected a sense of power as well as their respective focus. Specifically, 80 participants completed the same manipulations from the main experiment and were asked “How powerful did you feel when completing the recall task” on a slider scale anchored from 1 to 100 with 1 labeled as “Not powerful at all” and 100 labeled as “Very powerful.” When focused on the experience of power, participants in the high-power condition (M = 77.90; SD = 18.58) felt more powerful compared with participants in the low-power condition (M = 58.75; SD = 25.25, p = .01). Similarly, when focused on expectations of power, participants in the high-power condition (M = 81.41; SD = 16.64) felt more powerful compared with participants in the low-power condition (M = 63.70; SD = 24.51, p = .01). Importantly, there was no interaction effect or a main effect of focus on power (all F < 1).

A coder blind to condition was instructed to rate each response to the extent to which the response emphasized how the person felt and their internal experience in the situation. The coder was instructed to use a 7-point scale where 0 was labeled as “Not at all focused on the experience” and 6 was labeled as “Very much focused on the experience.” In addition, the coder was instructed to code the extent to which the response emphasized how others expected or anticipated the participant to behave in the situation. This item was also completed on a 7-point scale where 0 was labeled as “Not at all focused on the expectations” and 6 was labeled as “Very much focused on the expectations.” Thus, the coder was instructed to code the essays on a simple core distinction of whether the essay contained content related to how an individual felt in the situation or content related to how they were expected to behave.

Sample responses coded high on the experience and low on expectations were “I spoke with several coworkers wanting a raise and promotion to manager but my boss continually rejected my requests. I felt angry and quit” (low power condition) and “I was giving a written test for him. I felt as if I were the master of my subject” (high power condition). Sample responses coded high on expectations and low on the experience were, “The teachers expect us students to be punctual, well mannered and studious” (low power condition), and “Expect organizational skills and leadership abilities such as problem solving and a certain amount of authority is needed to maintain the respect of colleagues” (high power condition).

Responses in the high-power conditions (M = 4.62; SD = 1.44) were also judged by the coder as more powerful compared with responses in the low-power conditions (M = 2.07; SD = 1.32, p < .001), and this outcome was not moderated by focus (F < 1). Also, the written responses for participants in the experience-focused conditions were judged by the coder as more focused on experience (M = 2.89; SD = 2.38) compared with the expectations-focused conditions (M = 0.52; SD = 0.90, t(78) = 37.19, p < .001). In contrast, the written responses for participants in the expectations-focused conditions were judged by the coder as more focused on expectations (M = 5.32; SD = 1.18) compared with the experience-focused conditions (M = 1.53; SD = 1.66, t(78) = 141.76, p < .001).

Dependent Variables

After reading each profile, participants were asked how suitable they felt each candidate was for the job on a 7-point Likert scale. We subtracted participants’ evaluation of the “weak” candidate from the “strong” candidate to create a difference score. This difference score served as our measure of the depth of information processing. A more positive difference score meant participants were better able to differentiate the superior profile from the weaker profile.

Results and Discussion

For all experiments, participants who did not successfully complete the power and focus manipulation tasks (i.e., blank or unintelligible written responses), if any, were excluded prior to any analyses. A significant power x focus interaction was found on the difference score (F(1, 144) = 12.84,
between-subject design. When focused on the experience of power, low-power participants showed greater discrimination ($M = 2.17; SD = 1.78$) compared with high-power participants ($M = 1.16; SD = 1.82, F(1, 144) = 6.88, p = .01, \eta^2_p = .07$). In contrast, when focused on expectations of power, high-power participants ($M = 2.31; SD = 1.56$) displayed greater discrimination compared with low-power participants ($M = 1.39; SD = 1.62, F(1, 144) = 5.03, p = .03, \eta^2_p = .08$). These findings support both hypotheses 1a and 1b.

Means for the separate evaluations of the weak and strong chef profiles are shown in Table 2. Interestingly, the results indicate that most of the differences in elaboration occurred with the weak chef profile compared to the strong chef profile. Such an asymmetry may be a result of the weak message being presented first, which may have led to either enhanced elaboration of the strong message for everyone, or a relative acceptance of the second chef given all attitudes for the weak chef condition were relatively unfavorable (i.e., below or near the scale midpoint). Nonetheless, in experiment 1b we manipulated argument quality between participants to avoid any sequential effects.

**EXPERIMENT 1B**

Experiment 1b was designed to conceptually replicate experiment 1a using a different manipulation of power, a different topic, a different population, and varying argument quality between participants.

**Participants and Design**

Two hundred and fifty participants (93 female, 2 missing) were recruited from Amazon’s Mturk in exchange for a small monetary compensation. Participants were randomly assigned to a 2 (power: high vs. low) × 2 (focus: experience vs. expectations) × 2 (argument quality: strong vs. weak) between-subject design.

**Procedure**

We manipulated power and focus through a task that involved imagined roles. The cover story stated that the task was designed to assess the perceptions people hold towards different roles in life. After the power and focus manipulation task, all participants evaluated a new snack as part of an ostensibly unrelated task. The description of the snack, Lengonia Bites, as well as the argument quality manipulation, was adapted from Wan et al. (2010). After reading the material participants were asked for their opinion of the product, thanked, and debriefed.

**Independent Variables**

*Power.* Participants were told to imagine themselves either as a boss or an employee of a company while reading a description of that role (see Dubois et al. 2010; Rucker et al. 2012). Specifically, participants assigned to the high-power conditions read:

> “As a boss, you are in charge of directing your subordinates in creating different products and managing work teams. You decide how to structure the process of creating products and the standards by which the work done by your employees is to be evaluated. As the boss, you have complete control over the instructions you give your employees. In addition, you also evaluate the employees at the end of each month in a private questionnaire; that is, the employees never see your evaluation. The employees have no opportunity to evaluate you.”

In contrast, participants assigned to the low-power conditions read:

> “As an employee, you are responsible for carrying out the orders of the boss in creating different products. The boss decides how to structure the process of creating these products and the standards by which your work is to be evaluated. As the employee, you must follow the instructions of the boss. In addition, you are evaluated by the boss each month, and this evaluation will be private; that is, you will not see your boss’s evaluation of you. This evaluation will help determine the bonus reward you get. You have no opportunity to evaluate your boss.”

*Focus.* After reading the description of their role, participants wrote about the role they were assigned. In the experience conditions, participants were asked to write about “what people in this role (boss or employee) would think and how they would feel.” In the expectations conditions, participants wrote about “what other people generally expect from someone in this role (boss or employee).”

These manipulations were pretested on a separate group of participants ($N = 89$). When focused on the experience

**TABLE 2**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Profile</th>
<th>High power</th>
<th>Low power</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Weak chef:</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Experience focus</td>
<td>$M = 4.39; SD = 1.72$</td>
<td>$M = 3.12; SD = 1.55$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Expectations focus</td>
<td>$M = 3.14; SD = 1.64$</td>
<td>$M = 4.30; SD = 1.70$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Strong chef:</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Experience focus</td>
<td>$M = 5.55; SD = 1.13$</td>
<td>$M = 5.26; SD = 1.15$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Expectations focus</td>
<td>$M = 5.44; SD = 0.94$</td>
<td>$M = 5.70; SD = 1.08$</td>
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</tbody>
</table>
of power, participants in the high-power condition ($M = 79.31; SD = 20.97$) felt more powerful compared with participants in the low-power condition ($M = 64.38; SD = 27.51, p = .02$). Similarly, when focused on expectations of power, participants in the high-power condition ($M = 78.77; SD = 21.78$) felt more powerful compared with participants in the low-power condition ($M = 51.93; SD = 29.02, p = .005$). The interaction between power and focus was not significant ($p > .27$). A blind coder rated participants’ written responses for how much power participants had and to what extent they focused on the experience or expectations of power using the same coding scheme as in the pretest in experiment 1a. Responses in the high-power conditions ($M = 4.50; SD = 1.54$) were judged to be more powerful compared with responses in the low-power conditions ($M = 1.61; SD = 1.66, p < .001$), and this outcome was not moderated by focus ($F < 1$). The written responses for participants in the experience-focused conditions were also judged as more focused on experience ($M = 4.06; SD = 2.00$) compared with the expectations-focused conditions ($M = 1.78; SD = 1.89, t(87) = 29.16, p < .001$), whereas responses in the expectations-focused conditions were judged as more focused on expectations ($M = 5.24; SD = 1.30$) compared with the experience-focused conditions ($M = 2.50; SD = 1.86; t(87) = 59.52, p < .001$). These effects were not moderated by power (all $F < 1$).

**Argument Quality.** Participants were randomly assigned to receive information about the snack designed to be either strong or weak and specious (see app. B for complete arguments used).

**Dependent Variables**

After reading the message about the snack, participants reported how much they liked the snack on a 7-point scale anchored at 1 = “Dislike,” 7 = “Like.”

**Results and Discussion**

A between-subject ANOVA revealed a significant main effect of argument quality ($F(1, 242) = 9.64, p = .002, \eta^2_g = .04$), such that participants reported more favorable attitudes when they read the message with strong arguments ($M = 5.18; SD = 1.43$) compared with weak arguments ($M = 4.44; SD = 1.75$). There was neither a main effect of power nor focus (all $F < 1$). More importantly, there was a significant three-way interaction between power, focus, and argument quality ($F(1, 242) = 7.23, p = .008, \eta^2_g = .03$).

Replicating past research, in the experience conditions, there was a marginally significant two-way interaction between power and argument quality ($F(1, 242) = 3.25, p = .07, \eta^2_g = .03$). Participants in the low-power conditions liked the snack more after receiving strong arguments ($M = 5.57; SD = 1.17$) than weak arguments ($M = 4.28; SD = 1.78, F(1, 242) = 14.74, p < .001, \eta^2_g = .06$). In contrast, participants in the high-power conditions did not show a significant difference in liking based on whether the arguments were strong or weak ($M = 4.80; SD = 1.71$ vs. $M = 4.50; SD = 1.84, F < 1$). This replicates the previous link between power and information processing (Briñol et al. 2007).

In the expectations conditions, there was a significant two-way interaction between power and argument quality ($F(1, 242) = 4.22, p = .04, \eta^2_g = .04$). Participants in the high-power conditions liked the snack more after strong arguments ($M = 5.52; SD = 1.24$) compared with weak arguments ($M = 4.40; SD = 1.85, F(1, 242) = 5.83, p = .02, \eta^2_g = .04$). However, participants in the low-power conditions did not show any significant difference in liking after reading the strong or the weak arguments ($M = 4.52; SD = 1.48$ vs. $M = 4.65; SD = 1.637, F < 1$).

As an alternative analysis, comparing within the high-power conditions, participants focusing on expectations of power differentiated the strong arguments from the weak ($F(1, 242) = 6.43, p = .01, \eta^2_g = .12$), whereas participants focusing on the experience of power did not ($F < 1$). In contrast, comparing within the low-power conditions, participants focusing on the experience of power significantly differentiated the strong arguments from the weak ($F(1, 242) = 16.04, p < .001, \eta^2_g = .16$), whereas participants focusing on expectations of power did not ($F < 1$). Results are shown in figure 1.

Across experiments 1a and 1b, when focused on the experience of power, low-power participants processed information more carefully compared with high-power participants, replicating previous research (Briñol et al. 2007) and supporting hypothesis 1a. However, when focused on expectations of power, high-power participants processed information more carefully compared with low-power participants, supporting hypothesis 1b.

The finding that the experience focus conditions replicate past results in the literature suggests that individuals were likely focused on the experience of power in past research. Indeed, if one looks at past uses of the recall task, they often instruct individuals to describe, “how they felt,” which might have tended to focus individuals on the experience of power. Alternatively, it is possible that the experience of power is typically the more salient feature to individuals in their environment. However, as demonstrated in the present experiments, individuals can be led to focus on expectations, producing diametrically opposite effects to the experience of power.

**EXPERIMENTS 2A AND 2B: POWER AND STATUS PRODUCTS**

The second set of experiments tested hypotheses 2a and 2b. Specifically, focusing people on expectations of power is hypothesized to reverse the documented effect of power on status consumption. Past research has shown that the experience of low power is aversive and can cultivate a desire for status to reduce feelings of powerlessness (see Rucker and Galinsky 2008, 2009; Rucker et al. 2012). In contrast, a focus on expectations may lead to a greater desire
for status among high-power individuals. Experiment 2a tested this hypothesis by inducing power through episodic recall and measuring participants’ willingness to pay for status objects, whereas experiment 2b used the imagined-role manipulation and included both status and nonstatus objects to generalize the results.

**EXPERIMENT 2A**

Participants and Design

Seventy-six undergraduate students (33 female) from Northwestern University participated in this lab experiment in exchange for monetary compensation. The design of the study is a 2 (power: high vs. low) × 2 (focus: experience vs. expectations) between-subject design.

Procedure

After arriving at the lab, participants were told that they would take part in a series of unrelated tasks. The first task, which consisted of our manipulations, was represented as examining participants’ use of language and choice of words when facing different events and scenarios in life. Next, participants were directed to an ostensibly unrelated task in which they had to evaluate two hypothetical products. Both products were intentionally related to status, and participants’ willingness to pay for these products was measured as the dependent variable.

Independent Variables

**Power and Focus.** Both power and focus were manipulated through episodic recall, as in experiment 1a.
Dependent Variables

The stimuli used as status products were an executive pen and a briefcase. Pretesting confirmed that both objects were associated with status among the target population. Participants were shown single-screen ads for each of the two products. Participants indicated below the ad their willingness to pay in the form of an online auction. They responded using a sliding scale where they could choose from 0% of the retail price to 120% of the retail price (see Rucker and Galinsky 2008, 2009). For ease of presentation, we collapsed across the two products and conducted the following analyses based on the composite measure. A repeated measures analysis yielded the same results with no significant differences between the two products ($F < 1$).

Results and Discussion

A two-way ANOVA revealed a significant power × focus interaction on willingness to pay ($F(1, 72) = 10.27, p = .002, \eta^2_p = .13$). When focused on the experience of power, participants in the low-power condition showed a significantly higher willingness to pay ($M = 60.16; SD = 29.06$) compared with participants in the high-power condition ($M = 39.81; SD = 24.80, F(1, 72) = 5.66, p = .02, \eta^2_p = .13$). In contrast, when focused on expectations of power, high-power participants showed a significantly greater willingness to pay ($M = 53.48, SD = 24.59$) compared with participants in the low-power condition ($M = 37.40, SD = 20.50, F(1, 72) = 5.29, p = .03, \eta^2_p = .12$).

Comparing within the high-power conditions, participants focusing on the experience showed a marginally significant increase in their willingness to pay compared with participants focusing on the experience ($F(1, 72) = 2.97, p = .09, \eta^2_p = .07$). In contrast, within the low-power conditions, participants focusing on the experience showed a significantly greater willingness to pay compared with participants focusing on expectations ($F(1, 72) = 7.81, p = .01, \eta^2_p = .18$). The results support hypotheses 2a and 2b and are presented in figure 2.

EXPERIMENT 2B

Experiment 2b manipulated power and focus through the boss-employee imagined-role task. In addition, we experimentally manipulated whether the product featured was associated with status. We expected to replicate the results of experiment 2a for the status product. For the product unassociated with status we did not expect a difference for those focused on the experience of power, replicating prior research (Rucker and Galinsky 2008, 2009). For those focused on expectations of power, we did not have a priori reason to anticipate a difference given that nonstatus products do not have strong associations with the powerful or the powerless.

Participants and Design

Three hundred and nine participants (227 female) were recruited from a national online subject pool (eLab) maintained by Northwestern University to participate in an online study in exchange for a chance to win a gift card from a major online retailer. The design of the study was a 2 (power: high vs. low) × 2 (focus: experience vs. expectations) × 2 (brand status: high-vs. non status) between-subject design.

Procedure

Participants first completed the manipulation task involving imagined roles that manipulated both power and focus.
After the manipulation task, participants were directed to an ostensibly unrelated task where they were asked about their willingness to pay for either a high-status brand of car (BMW) or a nonstatus brand of car (Toyota).

Independent Variables

Power and Focus. Both power and focus were manipulated through a task involving imagined roles, as in experiment 1b.

Brand Status. Participants were shown a picture of either a BMW or a Toyota. Pretesting (N = 36) confirmed that BMW was rated higher in status compared with Toyota (F(1, 34) = 12.86, p = .001, η²_p = .27).

Dependent Variables

Participants indicated their willingness to pay using a sliding scale where they could choose from 0% of the retail price to 120% of the retail price, as in experiment 2a.

Results and Discussion

There was a significant three-way interaction between power, focus, and brand status (F(1, 301) = 8.28, p = .004, η²_p = .03). For participants evaluating a high-status brand (BMW), a significant two-way interaction between power and focus emerged (F(1, 301) = 14.02, p < .001, η²_p = .07). Among participants who focused on the experience of power, low-power participants reported a higher willingness to pay for the BMW (M = 72.93; SD = 21.32) compared with high-power participants (M = 60.15; SD = 28.84, F(1, 301) = 6.84, p = .009, η²_p = .09). In contrast, among participants who focused on expectations of power, high-power participants reported a higher willingness to pay for the BMW (M = 73.56; SD = 20.16) compared with low-power participants (M = 60.75; SD = 25.85, F(1, 301) = 7.19, p = .008, η²_p = .09).

Within the high-power conditions, participants focused on expectations reported a higher willingness to pay for the BMW compared with participants focused on the experience (F(1, 301) = 7.59, p = .007, η²_p = .08). In contrast, within the low-power conditions, participants focused on expectations reported a lower willingness to pay for the BMW compared with participants focused on the experience (F(1, 301) = 6.06, p = .02, η²_p = .06; see fig. 3). These results further support hypotheses 2a and 2b.

For participants who evaluated a Toyota, there was no significant interaction between power and focus (F < 1). This latter finding suggests that when it comes to a product that is nonstatus, people do not hold strong or salient associations in relation to those with or without power. Of note, participants’ overall willingness to pay appeared higher for the nonstatus versus status products, an effect found elsewhere (see Rucker and Galinsky 2008). This main effect may be due to the differential cost of the BMW (i.e., a higher base cost restricts participants’ maximum value) or general differences that exist in consumer preferences for nonstatus versus status brands.

EXPERIMENT 3: POWER AND ACTION

According to our perspective, participants’ focus associated with power will not always lead to divergent effects on behavior. In the case of power and action, prior research has documented that the experience of power increases action (Galinsky et al. 2003). Furthermore, as our first pretest identified, people expected the powerful to act more than the powerless. Therefore, a focus on the experience versus expectations of power in the form of schemas and scripts should produce similar effects on action (hypothesis 3). This prediction is conceptually important to rule out that a focus on expectations simply reverses the effect of an experience focus. Experiment 3 tested this hypothesis by manipulating power and focus and subsequently having participants participate in a simulated blackjack game in which they had the option to act or not act in the form of taking a card (Galinsky et al. 2003; experiment 1). As the blackjack study was the first paradigm ever reported on the link between power and action, we adopted this already existing measure.

Participants and Design

One hundred and fifty-six participants (108 female) were recruited from a national online subject pool (eLab) maintained by Northwestern University to participate in this study in exchange for a chance to win a gift card from a major online retailer. Only participants who indicated familiarity with the rules of blackjack were eligible to participate. The design of the study was a 2 (power: high vs. low) × 2 (focus: experience vs. expectations) between-subject design.

Procedure

Participants first completed an episodic recall task that manipulated power and focus. Next, participants were directed to an ostensibly unrelated task where they were asked to take part in a simulated blackjack scenario. Specifically, participants completed the same scenario from Galinsky et al. (2003), in which they were told to imagine being at a blackjack table in Las Vegas. In this simulated game, participants’ two cards totaled 16 while the dealer’s face up card was a 10. Participants were then asked whether they wanted to hit (i.e., take a card). They made a binary choice between “Yes” and “No.”

Independent Variables

Power and Focus. Both power and focus were manipulated through the episodic recall task used in experiments 1a and 2a.
Dependent Variable

A “Yes” answer was coded as action (i.e., 1), whereas a “No” was coded as inaction (i.e., 0).

Results and Discussion

A chi-square test revealed a significant difference in the tendency to take a card between high-power and low-power participants ($\chi^2(1, N = 156) = 13.55, p < .001$). Sixty-six percent (52 out of 79) of high-power participants, regardless of focus, chose to take a card, whereas only 36% (28 out of 77) of low-power participants chose to take a card. More importantly, this effect held within each focus condition. When focused on the experience of power, 64% (27 out of 42) of high-power participants chose to take a card, while only 41% (16 out of 39) of low-power participants chose to take a card ($\chi^2(1, N = 81) = 4.39, p = .04$). Similarly, when focused on expectations of power, 68% (25 out of 37) of high-power participants chose to take a card, while only 32% (12 out of 38) of low-power participants chose to take a card ($\chi^2(1, N = 75) = 9.71, p = .002$). We also analyzed the results with binary logistic regression and obtained a similar main effect of power ($p < .001$) with no significant interaction between power and focus ($p = .41$) or a main effect of focus ($p = .69$).

NOTE.—A. Corresponds to BMW. B. Corresponds to Toyota.
The result of experiment 3 provided additional support for our central hypotheses. Focusing on expectations does not simply reverse the effect of power found in the experience conditions. Rather, a focus on expectations can lead to effects that are consistent with the experience of power, supporting hypothesis 3. In addition, we replicated this main effect in a separate sample (N = 81) using the same paradigm, such that we observed a main effect of power ($p = .001$) with no significant interaction between power and focus ($p = .60$) or a main effect of focus ($p = .12$).

GENERAL DISCUSSION

The current research introduced a new theoretical perspective for understanding the effects of power in consumer behavior. We began with the observation that power not only affects our internal state of how we feel but is tied to a set of expectations of the behavior appropriate for the role. Consequently, we suggested that a focus on expectations of power can have dramatically different effects from those already found in the literature. For the paradigms of information processing and status consumption, our pretest showed that people expected the powerful to behave in the exact opposite ways as past results on power would suggest. Indeed, our experiments found that when focused on expectations the powerful showed greater depth information processing and a greater attraction to high-status objects than the powerless. However, when focused on the experience of power, these findings reversed, replicating prior research. In addition, consistent with our perspective, focus did not matter in the case of action.

Contributions of the Present Research

In this work we provide a more nuanced understanding of how power affects consumer behavior as well as contribute to our understanding of the power construct more broadly. With respect to the consumer behavior literature, we have provided boundary conditions to two prior findings. Specifically, low power does not always lead to more information processing or greater status seeking than high power. In fact, when people focus on expectations, the reverse is true: high power increases information processing as well as status seeking. These findings emphasize the importance of understanding the multiple pathways by which states of power can affect consumer behavior.

With respect to the power literature, our work suggests that power researchers need to consider both the role of experience and expectations in their paradigms. A seemingly subtle change in how people construe a power episode—with regard to the experience or the activated expectations—can lead to very divergent outcomes on behavior. This suggests that other effects in the power literature may be highly dependent upon where people’s attention is focused at the time of possessing or lacking power. Thus, to truly understand the myriad effects of power on behavior, both the experience power produces, and the expectations it activates, must be considered.

A final contribution of this research is that it offers not only a new theoretical lens to guide future efforts but suggests a practical empirical tool. Specifically, the present research demonstrates the effects of expectations on behavior can be predicted in an a priori fashion by assessing the mental associations or expectations people have tied to power. Thus, future research could examine other associations people have for power as a starting point to generating their hypotheses. For example, states of high power, compared with low power, have been found to lead individuals to spend less money on others (Rucker et al. 2011). Whether creating an expectations focus would moderate this finding can be examined by looking at the expectations that individuals have when it comes to power and spending on others. If people hold the theory that a role of the powerful is to be generous to others, then focusing those in a higher power state or position on their role may lead to more, not less, generous behavior.

Future Directions and Limitations

The present article is by no means the final word on the distinction between the experience and expectations related to power. Far from it, there are numerous directions required by future research efforts.

To begin, the present research found strong evidence for the moderating role of expectations, but it did not provide meditational evidence for the process. Future research might accomplish this objective by assessing the accessibility of various schemas after power activation and testing whether schema accessibility mediates the effects of expectations on behavior but not of experience on behavior. For example, according to our perspective, power holders might be more likely to show a stronger activation of the word “status” when paired with the word “self” than low power holders, as this fits with the schema of the powerful. In contrast, when focused on the experience of power, it is not schema accessibility that would matter but people’s desire to elevate their power, as shown in prior research (Rucker and Galinsky 2008). Thus, future research could build and complement this work via measured evidence of the process.

On a related point, the present research parsed out a focus on the experience versus expectations of power by manipulating participants’ focus. This provided a controlled means to test our causal argument that a focus on the experience versus expectations of power has distinct effects on behavior. Future research could inform us of natural triggers in the environment that lead consumers to focus on the experience or expectations of power. For example, it may be possible to prompt people to focus on expectations in their everyday experience by simply presenting questions such as, “Do you know what others expect of you?” Given that we have documented this phenomenon experimentally, an exciting future direction is to examine when people are naturally more geared to focus on expectations.

Future research should explore variance in the expectations people hold for power. While our pretest suggests that people hold general schemas about how the powerful and
powerless should behave, this does not preclude individual variation. Rather, different consumers might have idiosyncratic beliefs. One individual might hold the belief that power means one needs to take pause and consider the situation, whereas another individual may hold the belief that power means one needs to take action. Based on our perspective, a focus on expectations should have different effects for these two individuals. Practically, to the extent one individual constantly observes that his boss does not take time to think about information carefully, he may develop the theory that those in positions of power do not spend a lot of time on tasks. If so, the activation of expectations for power may lead to less information processing for this individual. Relatedly, where the current work suggests people possess schemas that the powerful should act, people may have more specific schemas such as the powerful should act when the situation is important but should allow others to act when the situation is unimportant. This highlights a useful, and perhaps forgotten, need in the power literature—a systematic documentation of the different schemas and scripts people associate with the role.

In a similar vein, it is possible that culture serves as an antecedent to triggering either the experience or expectations of power based on one’s cultural background. For instance, individuals immersed in cultures with an interdependent self-construal might be prone to consider the expectations of power. In such cultures, individuals may be more likely to focus on the interpersonal relationship with others and how they ought to act in the presence of others (Markus and Kitayama 1991). In contrast, individuals immersed in cultures with an independent self-construal might be more likely to focus on the experience of power as they focus more on the self in comparison.

Some may wonder whether our findings might be captured by differences in goal priming versus semantic priming explanations (see Förster, Liberman, and Friedman 2007). That is, might an experience focus prime a goal, whereas an expectations focus prime semantic associations? While such a relationship is possible, we do not believe that an expectations focus and an experience focus can be distilled down to goal versus semantic priming. First, one might focus on expectations for reasons separate from priming per se. For instance, one might be given the explicit goal to “Be sure to perform as your role requires you to.” Such a request might lead to the increased accessibility of schemas related to the role, but there is now a clear goal to behave in accordance with that role. Similarly, the experience of power may affect behavior without any goal activation. For instance, the experience of power makes one feel more confident (Briñol et al. 2007) and optimistic (Anderson and Galinsky 2006) than the powerless. This can be understood as an experience focus that signals, “everything is under control,” but no goal is required to explain it; rather, the experience itself serves as input into one’s sense of control. It therefore seems unlikely that the semantic versus goal distinction can explain the totality of the current results, but it remains an interesting distinction for future research.

CONCLUSION

Power has been shown to have numerous and far-reaching consequences for consumer behavior. In the present research we have provided evidence that our understanding of the path by which power guides behavior can be substantively enriched by taking into account expectations that accompany having versus lacking power. Indeed, the course that individuals take when occupying a position of power or a position of subordination is not chained to the psychological experience itself but can be significantly altered by expectations tethered to those positions.

DATA COLLECTION INFORMATION

The second author supervised the collection of data for studies 1a and 2a by research assistants at the Marketing and Experimental Economics Lab at Northwestern University during the fall of 2010 and the spring of 2011. The second author managed the collection of data for the pretest and study 1b using Amazon’s Mechanical Turk online service from the spring of 2011 to the winter of 2012. The second author managed the collection of data for studies 2b and 3 using a national online subject-pool (eLab) maintained by Northwestern University from the winter of 2013 to the winter of 2014. The second author analyzed these data under the supervision of the first author. We report all manipulations and any data exclusions in the studies. Sample sizes were based on subject availability as well as other unrelated research projects run in conjunction with these experiments. No additional data were added after preliminary data analyses. In some experiments we collected additional measures after the key hypothesis-related measures for exploratory purposes. Discussions of these measures are available from the authors upon request.

APPENDIX A

CHEF PROFILES USED IN EXPERIMENT 1A

Weak Profile

Name: Scott
Age: 42
Hometown: Houston, TX
Type of cooking: Italian
Growing up in a diverse family, Scott has always had a passion for cooking. He started cooking at home around the age of 8. As a teenager, he often helped out at his uncle’s restaurant, assigned the task of shelling peas and peeling potatoes. He remembered being fascinated by what went on in the kitchen, as it just seemed such a cool place where everyone worked together to make this lovely stuff and having a laugh while doing it.

With such enthusiasm for the art of cooking, Scott has travelled many countries and has dined in many famous restaurants around the globe. He believes that people work-
ing in restaurants have a big responsibility of providing safe, healthy, and delicious food to customers. For example, restaurants should order supplies from trustworthy vendors and in some cases going directly to the growers for the freshest possible vegetables and fruits. He also believes that communication with staffs and customers is key to a wonderful dining experience. He has had 15 years of experience cooking for family and friends. Scott’s famous dishes include PB&J sandwiches and deep fried onion rings. His cooking has attracted many loyal fans around the neighborhood.

Scott believes that he is suitable for this job and is looking forward to meeting the owner of the restaurant.

Strong Profile

Name: Mike
Age: 40
Hometown: Atlanta, GA
Type of cooking: Italian

Mike’s cooking career started when his grandmother showed him a brochure about a culinary program at Atlanta Central Community College. He found that culinary school was indeed fun. “Unlike the other schools I had attended, I felt like I was now having fun learning. For me, it was also a creative outlet. I could bring in any recipe I wanted, and the chef instructors would get the ingredients for me to test the recipe,” he says enthusiastically.

Professional training has prepared Mike for a wonderful career in culinary arts. He has gained valuable experience while working at restaurants in New York City and Washington, DC. While working as a chef, Mike usually gets to work early in the morning and sets the day’s menu with the staff. He is a very responsible person and would constantly meet with the various chefs in the restaurant to discuss menu planning and pairing of entrée, appetizers, and dessert selections. Mike is a very experienced cook. He has attracted loyal fans that would travel hundreds of miles for his famous dish of honey-glazed duck with savoy cabbage and smoked salmon.

Mike feels that he is capable of handling the job as the chef of the new restaurant.

Weak Argument Condition

Introducing to You: Lengonia Bites. Lengonia Bites is a fatty, golden cube-shaped croquettes snack. Following a shared recipe commonly used in the baking food industry, it is made to taste crispy outside and rough inside. Having wheat flour and butter as the major ingredients, each piece of Lengonia Bites is prepared following a common procedure in making baked food such as biscuits and crackers. Lengonia Bites goes well with water. By adding different types of syrups and powders, Lengonia Bites offers a variety of specific flavors including onion spicy (containing spicy onion powder and other flavor additives), oatmeal original (mixed with traces of oats), and fruit festival (chilled in concentrated syrups). It can taste salty and a little tart depending on the specific flavor type. It brings out the smell of these flavors when chewing in your mouth, so you’ll probably want to brush afterward. Lengonia Bites provides different pack sizes ranging from the pocket-size (5 pieces in a pack) to the family size (80 pieces in a pack). So you may not be able to always find your favorite ones in the preferred pack size.

“Lengonia Bites,” a fun and tasty snack that you will enjoy.

REFERENCES


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