Power Increases Hypocrisy
Moralizing in Reasoning, Immorality in Behavior

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Abstract

Five studies explored whether power increases moral hypocrisy, a situation characterized by imposing strict moral standards on others but practicing less strict moral behavior oneself. In Experiment 1, compared to the powerless, the powerful condemned other people’s cheating, while cheating more themselves. In Experiments 2-4, the powerful were more strict in judging others’ moral transgressions but more lenient in judging their own transgressions. A final study found that the effect of power on moral hypocrisy depends on its legitimacy: When power was illegitimate, the moral hypocrisy effect not only disappeared but reversed, with the illegitimate powerful becoming more strict in judging their own than others’ behavior. This pattern, which might be dubbed hypercrisy, was also found among low-power participants in Experiments 3 and 4. We discuss how patterns of hypocrisy and hypercrisy among the powerful and powerless can help perpetuate social inequality.
Anecdotal evidence from various domains of society suggests that power undermines people’s sense of morality, corrupting their thoughts and behavior. In the political domain, newspapers repeatedly report on government officials who have extramarital affairs despite decrying the breakdown of family values or who use public funds for private benefits despite condemning governmental waste. This pattern of sanctimony combined with lechery and gluttony have led some to suggest that double standards are the hallmark of politicians (Runciman, 2008). In the economic domain, captains of industry have recently asked the government for billions of dollars to protect their banks, industries, and companies from economic ruin, but at the same time, these CEO’s have secured millions in financial bonuses for themselves while continuing to clamor about the divinity of free-market capitalism (Kanagaretnam, Lobo & Mohammad, 2008).

The current research aims to demonstrate that there is a direct, causal link between the experience of power and moral hypocrisy. By moral hypocrisy we mean a situation in which individuals do not follow their own expressed moral rules and principles. We propose that power increases hypocrisy, meaning that the powerful show a greater discrepancy between what they practice and what they preach. Given that powerful individuals often make crucial decisions that have moral considerations, the question whether power increases moral hypocrisy is important. Nonetheless, the relationship between power and hypocrisy has not been tested empirically.

Hypocrisy

Although the terms immorality and moral hypocrisy are sometimes used interchangeably, it is important to stress their conceptual difference. Someone who behaves in an immoral manner is not a hypocrite if (s)he admits this and does not expect others to behave any better. Hypocrites, as the opening examples highlight, are people who publicly
uphold strict moral norms, expecting and demanding others to follow them, but who privately violate these espoused standards in their own behavior.

The phenomenon of hypocrisy has been approached in two ways in literature. Some authors have studied the discrepancy between what respondents think is normative and how they actually behave (Batson, Kobrynowicz, Dinnerstein, Kampf, & Wilson, 1997; Batson & Thompson, 2001; Batson, Thompson, Seuferling, Whitney & Strongman, 1999; Stone, Wiegand, Cooper, & Aronson, 1997). Others have studied the discrepancy between what respondents believe other people should do and what they actually would do themselves in such a situation (see Valdesolo & DeSteno, 2007, 2008). In the current manuscript we use both approaches: (1) the discrepancy between expressed standards and behavior and (2) the discrepancy between the appropriateness and defense for a moral transgression committed by the self and the same transgression by another.

We posit that power increases hypocrisy because the powerful are both (a) stricter in their moral judgments on how people should behave and (b) at the same time more lenient in following these moral norms themselves. The effect of power on the expression of moral standards goes in completely opposite directions depending on whether they refer to how others should behave versus to how one personally does behave.

**Why the Powerful are Stricter in Moral Judgments About Others**

Intuitively, one would suspect that the degree to which people judge others’ behavior depends exclusively on the degree to which that behavior is morally objectionable. Research has shown, however, that people’s inclination also strongly depends on more peripheral aspects; for example, whether they feel entitled to judge others (Yzerbyt, Schadron, Leyens, & Rocher, 1994). The experience of power might very well increase such feelings of entitlement: high-power roles are culturally associated with the right to judge others in order to maintain moral norms (Foucault & Gordon, 1980). Individuals in these high-power roles,
such as judges, teachers, or police officers, are socially entitled to lay down rules and to demand and ensure that others follow them. This idea—that feelings of power make people more likely to judge others and be more strict in their moral judgments when doing so—is strengthened by Lammers and Stapel’s (2009) demonstration that the powerful tend to be more focused on rules and less willing to make exceptions to those rules. In addition, powerful people are also more inclined to voice their opinion, telling other people what to do and what to refrain from (DePaulo & Friedman, 1998; Galinsky, Magee, Gruenfeld, Whitson, & Liljenquist, 2008). Also, anger—an emotion associated with increased power (Keltner, et al., 2003)—is associated with increased judging of others (Chaurand & Brauer, 2008). All in all, the powerful appear to create strict and broad constructions of moral standards.

Why the Powerful are Less Strict in Moral Behavior

Despite the previous demonstrations that the powerful espouse exacting moral standards, other research has found that they are less strict in the morality of their own behavior. According to Keltner, Gruenfeld, and Anderson’s (2003) approach/inhibition theory of power, the powerful are more focused on the potential rewards of any action and therefore tend to follow their self-interest more compared to the powerless (see also: Galinsky, Gruenfeld, & Magee, 2003; Guinote, 2007; Smith & Bargh, 2008). Normally, social disapproval acts as a check against self-interest (Batson et al., 1997; Gilbert & Jones, 1986), but feelings of power reduce sensitivity to social disapproval (Emerson, 1962; Thibaut & Kelley, 1959), thus allowing social norms and standards to lose their grip on the power-holders’ behavior (Galinsky et al., 2008). As a result, even very strong norms, such as those regulating sexual behavior or compassion, are often ignored by the powerful (Bargh, Raymond, Pryor, & Strack, 1995; Van Kleef, Oveis, Van der Löwe, LuoKogan, Goetz, & Keltner, 2008).

Moral Hypocrisy and the Crucial Role of Legitimacy
Based on these two separate literatures described above, we propose that power inspires hypocrisy: it makes people stricter in moral judgments of others but less strict in their own behavior. We aim to demonstrate this in a series of experiments that manipulate power and then measure hypocrisy. Furthermore, we propose that a crucial factor that drives these two effects is the finding that a position of power carries with it a sense of entitlement (De Waal, 1983; Overbeck, 2009; Weber, 1948). As a result, the powerful feel they are entitled to deviate a bit from the moral rules that they demand others to follow. However, if this position of power is denied a sense of entitlement—for example, because it is seen illegitimate—the effect of power on hypocrisy should be eliminated. Powerful people who feel that their position is illegitimate are less inclined to assertively take what they want (Lammers, Galinsky, Gordijn, & Otten, 2008) and at the same time are less inclined to judge others for doing so (Chaurand & Brauer, 2008). Therefore, a final study independently manipulates power and its legitimacy to demonstrate this crucial moderation.

Experiment 1: Judging versus Engaging in Cheating

Our first experiment manipulated a feeling of high or low power and then measured hypocrisy, defined here as the discrepancy between expressed standards (what respondents think is normative) and actual behavior (following Batson et al., 1997; 1999). We asked half of the participants whether cheating was acceptable versus giving the other half the actual opportunity to cheat. We predicted that the powerful would be less accepting of cheating, but would actually cheat more.

Method

Participants and Design

Participants were 61 Dutch students (47 female, mean age 19.3 years) who took part for course credit. Participants were seated in closed cubicles and were randomly assigned to
one condition of a 2 (high power versus low power) X 2 (dilemma: judgment versus behavior) between-participants design.

**Procedure**

*Manipulation.* We first induced a sense of power (high versus low), using an experiential power prime. Participants in the high (low) power condition were asked to recall an experience of high (low) power (Galinsky et al., 2003).

*Dilemma.* For half of the participants we measured cheating behavior, using a paradigm adapted from Fischbacher and Heusi (2008). Participants were told that they would be compensated for time spent in this experiment by participating in a lottery, for one of three prizes (of 100, 50 and 25 Euros). In the privacy of their cubicle, participants used two differently colored ten-sided dices to determine their own number of lottery tickets. Thus, the procedure offers participants ample opportunity to cheat. If participants are perfectly honest, the mean response should be close to the expected mean of 50. Hence, actual cheating behavior (averaged within condition) is presented by a significant mean deviation from 50.

The other half of the participants did not enter this lottery. Instead, we asked them whether it is morally acceptable or not for people to over-report their travelling expenses (on a 9-point scale).

**Results and Discussion**

We first standardized the responses to both the morality judgment (9-point scale) and the cheating measure (a 100-point scale). Next, we performed a 2 (power: high, low) X 2 (judgment, behavior) ANOVA on participants’ decision and found the expected interaction effect, $F(1, 57) = 7.33, \ p = .009, \ \eta^2_p = .12$, and no main effects ($F$'s < .01) (see Figure 1). High-power participants were stricter in their judgment than low-power participants, finding it less acceptable to over report expenses, $t(57) = 1.78, \ p = .08$. In contrast to their expressed
standards for others, however, they claimed a higher number of lottery tickets than low-power participants, $t(57) = 2.09, p = .04$.

Experiment 2, 3, and 4 – Own and Others’ Moral Transgressions

Consistent with our predictions, the powerful were less tolerant of cheating but more likely to cheat, demonstrating heightened hypocrisy. Yet a disadvantage of our approach in Experiment 1 is that judgment and behavior cannot be directly compared, because they were measured on different scales and involved different settings (lottery tickets and travelling expenses). We can therefore not precisely quantify hypocrisy.

In the next experiments we therefore decided to use a different approach. Following Valdesolo and DeSteno (2007, 2008), we measured hypocrisy as the discrepancy between the moral acceptability and appropriateness of own moral transgressions and those committed by others. Because both can be measured with comparable scales, hypocrisy can be directly calculated as the absolute discrepancy between the two. We also aim to generalize our findings by manipulating power with three different techniques and by measuring hypocrisy with three different moral dilemmas. Because the three experiments have similar methods, we describe them together.

Method

Participants and Design

172 Dutch students (129 women, mean age 20.5 years) took part in partial fulfillment of a course requirement. Participants were randomly assigned to one condition of a 2 (low versus high power) X 2 (target: own versus others’ transgressions) between participants design.

Procedure

Manipulations. In Experiment 2 we manipulated power positions by simulating a bureaucratic organization and randomly distributing high-power roles (prime-minister) and
low-power roles (civil servant) in a bureaucracy simulation (adapted from Anderson and Berdahl, 2002). The prime-minister could control and direct the civil servants. In Experiment 3 we again primed the *experience of power* using Experiment 1’s essay manipulation. In Experiment 4 we primed the *concept of power*, using Chen, Lee-Chai, and Bargh’s (2001) word-search puzzle.

*Dilemmas.* After the manipulations of power, participants were presented with a moral dilemma that was supposedly unrelated to the actual experiment. Specifically, the dilemma in Experiment 2 was about breaking *traffic* related rules and norms. Is someone who is late for an appointment, allowed to break the speed limit to make it in time, given that it is quiet on the road? In Experiment 3 we asked participants about *tax declarations*. Is it acceptable to omit from one’s tax declaration additional wages that one obtained in one’s spare time? In Experiment 4 the dilemma was about *keeping a stolen bike*. Is it acceptable if someone who needs a bike but has no money to buy one and who finds an abandoned bike, takes and keeps it, rather than bring it to the police? We picked these dilemmas because they all constitute serious immoral behaviors (technically, they are all legal offenses or even felonies) but they all are behaviors that many people occasionally engage in.

*Measures.* In all experiments, participants in the *others’ transgression* condition were asked to what degree it would be acceptable for people to show the described behavior. Participants in the *own transgression* condition were asked to what degree they would find it acceptable if they themselves engage in the described behavior. In Experiments 2 and 3 participants answered these questions on one 9-point scale, between 1 (completely unacceptable) and 9 (fully acceptable). In Experiment 4 they answered them on four 9-point scales (acceptable, admissible, o.k., and appropriate, $\alpha = .92$).

We used a mood measure (Currently I feel happy, cheerful, satisfied, sad, unhappy, dejected, $\alpha$’s $>.85$) and a power manipulation check (I feel influential, independent, leading,
dependent, unimportant, subordinate, α’s > .88) that have been used extensively in previous research (e.g. Lammers & Stapel, 2009). In Experiment 2 we also checked with 4 items (α = .88) that low-power participants identified equally with their role as high-power participants. We also asked in Experiment 4 about participants’ thoughts of the aim of the research and found that none were aware that the puzzle manipulated power.

There were no mood effects (F’s < 1, p > .5). The manipulation checks showed that participants felt more powerful in the high than in the low-power conditions (p’s < .001, η_p^2’s > .55). In Experiment 2, high and low-power participants identified equally with their roles (p = .42).

Results

In all three experiments we found the same interaction pattern between power and target, which was marginally significant in Experiment 2, F(1, 38) = 3.53, p = .068, η_p^2 = .09, significant in Experiment 3, F(1, 68) = 9.05, p = .004, η_p^2 = .12, and again significant in Experiment 4, F(1, 70) = 8.16, p = .007, η_p^2 = .18. None of the main effects in any experiment was significant, (F’s < .3, n.s.).

Table 1 shows the means per condition in the three experiments, and shows the level of hypocrisy (as the discrepancy score between the two conditions) within high power and low power conditions. In all three experiments, high-power participants showed significant moral hypocrisy, independent of whether this was about speeding (p = .02), tax dodging (p = .03), or keeping a stolen bike (p = .06). In none of the low-power conditions did we find signs of hypocrisy. In fact, in two experiment we even found an unexpected significant effect in the opposite direction (p = .03 and p = .04), indicating that low-power participants were more lenient in their moral judgment of others’ transgression than of own. We return to this finding in the General Discussion.
An additional analysis, using the combined data of the three studies (that employed the same design and the same 9 point measure of moral acceptability) and adding study as an additional between-participants factor, confirmed that participants in the high-power conditions overall showed significant levels of moral hypocrisy, $F(1,74) = 13.14, p < .001$, $\eta_p^2 = .15$. Low-power participants did not show moral hypocrisy; in fact they showed the abovementioned opposite effect and were more lenient in judging others’ than own transgressions, $F(1, 86) = 5.99, p = .02, \eta_p^2 = .08$. Overall, high-power participants were stricter in judging others’ behaviors, $F(1,81) = 16.81, p < .001, \eta_p^2 = .17$, but more lenient in judging own behavior, $F(1,85) = 6.24, p = .01, \eta_p^2 = .07$, than low-power participants.

Experiment 5 – The Moderating Effect of Illegitimacy

The previous studies consistently found that high-power participants demonstrated moral hypocrisy, whereas low-power participants never did. We proposed earlier that one of the reasons why power increases hypocrisy is because the powerful feel entitled to take more than others and to prescribe for others how they should behave. Accordingly, when power is disconnected from such entitlement—for example when the powerful feels that their position is illegitimate—the power-induced hypocrisy effect should be eliminated.

Method

Participants and design. 105 Dutch students (82 women, mean age 19.8 years) participated in the experiment in partial fulfillment of a course requirement. Participants were randomly assigned to one condition of a 2 (power) X 2 (legitimacy) X 2 (dilemma frame) between participants design.

Procedure. We manipulated power and its legitimacy using an adapted experiential power prime. Half of the participants were asked to write about an experience in which they enjoyed an experience of legitimate high or low power, meaning that the participant believed that he or she was entitled to that powerful or powerless position. The other half of the
participants were instructed to write about an experience of illegitimate (high or low) power, meaning that they personally believed they were not entitled to that position (see Lammers et al., 2008 for details).

We next used the same bike dilemma as in Experiment 4. Finally, we used identical measures of mood ($\alpha = .89$), and a manipulation check of power ($\alpha = .97$) and legitimacy ($\alpha = .97$). Our manipulation checks showed that we successfully induced feelings of high and low power, $F(1, 97) = 232.61, p < .001, \eta_p^2 = .71$, that were seen as either legitimate or not, $F(1, 97) = 59.05, p < .001, \eta_p^2 = .38$.

Results

We found the predicted three-way interaction effect between power, legitimacy and judgment/behavior, $F(1, 97) = 6.42, p = .01, \eta_p^2 = .06$. As can be seen in Table 2, under conditions of legitimacy we replicated the finding that the powerful showed moral hypocrisy, manifested in a discrepancy between their judgment of own and others’ transgressions ($p = .06$). Importantly, however, illegitimate power did not cause moral hypocrisy. In fact, we again found the reverse ($p = .01$). Both low-power conditions did not show moral hypocrisy.

Further analyses showed that the above three-way interaction effect was fully mediated by the experienced feelings of power and legitimacy (measured by the manipulation checks). Adding the interaction between measured power, measured legitimacy and target (that was highly significant, $\beta = -.50, p = .04$), reduced the three-way interaction effect to non-significance, $\beta = -.22, p = .41$, see Table 3. Finally, although we found that mood (measured as before) was associated with more moral leniency ($p = .02$), controlling for mood did not affect the results.

General Discussion

Across five experiments, irrespective of how power was manipulated or hypocrisy measured, we found strong evidence that the powerful are more likely to engage in moral
hypocrisy than those lacking power. In Experiment 1 when we measured the discrepancy between moral judgments and actual immoral behavior, the powerful engaged in more immoral behavior but found such behavior less acceptable, than low-power participants. In Experiments 2 to 5, we measured the discrepancy between the acceptability of one’s own moral transgression and those committed by others. The former method has the advantage that it measures actual behavior, but it does not allow for computing an absolute degree of hypocrisy through a precise discrepancy. Across these experiments, the powerful judged their own moral transgressions more acceptable but the same transgressions committed by others less acceptable compared to low-power participants. Accordingly, across all the studies, only the powerful showed hypocrisy, producing a significant difference between the acceptability of other’s versus their own transgressions. We found this irrespective of whether the behavior constituted something mildly inappropriate (cheating for extra lottery tickets) or something very inappropriate, such as a legal offense or a felony. Our final study demonstrated the crucial role of entitlement: only when power is experienced as legitimate, earned and entitled is moral hypocrisy a likely result. If power is not experienced as such, then the moral hypocrisy effect disappears.

Hypercrisy

In Experiments 3 and 4, we unexpectedly found that low-power participants were in fact stricter in judging their own transgressions than in judging others’. This effect could be termed hypercrisy, meaning that people are too—rather than insufficiently—critical on themselves. Given that moral hypocrisy is typically portrayed as a fundamental and deep-seated phenomenon (Valdesolo & DeSteno, 2007, 2008) this effect is surprising. We do note, however, that the hypocrisy-effect (among high-power participants) appears to be markedly stronger than the hypercrisy-effect (among low-power participants). After all, the size of the latter effect was only statistically significant in Experiments 3 and 4. Also, in the overall
analysis the hypocrisy effect size (among high-power participants) was much larger than the hypocrisy effect size (among low-power participants). This might be caused by the fact that by default people tend toward hypocrisy, because of self-interest and motivated reasoning (Batson & Thompson, 2001). If the experience of decreased power makes people less critical on others and more critical of the self, it first needs to overcome this base-line tendency. In contrast, the effect of elevated power builds on an already existing difference. Hypercrisy is therefore probably a less common effect than hypocrisy. Yet when it occurs, it mainly occurs among the powerless or when the powerful clearly lack legitimacy.

Social Inequality

As a rule, human societies are unequal (Leavitt, 2005; Magee & Galinsky, 2008). Even egalitarian democracies are made up of a large group of powerless have-nots and a small group of powerful haves (Mills, 1956). A question that lies at the heart of the social sciences is how this status-quo is defended and how the powerless come to accept their disadvantaged position. The typical answer is that the state and its rules, regulations, and monopoly on violence coerce the powerless to do so (Weber, 1948). But this cannot be the whole answer: Social order rests on more than fear of the law’s reach (Arendt, 1951).

One explanation is that there exists a general acceptance for inequality among social groups, not only among the powerful, but also among the powerless, in order to produce social harmony (Sidanius, Levin, Federico, & Pratto, 2001). Working class people embrace ideologies that seem fair but actually reinforce the status-quo (Gramsci, 1971). Members of low-status groups show outgroup favoritism and hold negative stereotypes about their own group’s abilities (Jost & Banaji, 1994). All these and others findings show that the protection of social inequality is not something necessarily imposed by one group and resisted by the other. Rather, the stability of the system comes from within, in the sense that even the victims
of that system contribute to its acceptance (Foucault, 1979/1991; Jost, Banaji, & Nosek, 2004).

Our findings support these notions that the powerless collaborate in reproducing social inequality. The powerful impose more normative restraints on others, but believe they themselves can act with less restraint. The less powerful, in contrast, are less inclined to impose norms on others, but more rigidly follow these themselves. This means that people with power not only take what they want because they can do so unpunished, but also because they intuitively feel they are entitled to do so. Conversely, people who lack power not only fail to get what they need because they are disallowed to take it, but also because they intuitively feel they are not entitled to it. Further, we found these effects even after minimal, unaware lexical priming manipulations. This suggests that these inequality reinforcing processes may be at least partially automatic.

Our last experiment, however, found that the spiral of inequality can be broken, if the illegitimacy of the power-distribution is revealed. One way to undermine the legitimacy of authority is open revolt, but a more subtle way in which the powerless might curb self-enrichment by the powerful is by tainting their reputation, for example by gossiping (Keltner, Van Kleef, Chen, & Kraus, 2008). If the powerful sense that their unrestrained self-enrichment leads to gossiping, derision, and the undermining of their reputation as conscientious leaders, then they may be inspired to bring their behavior back to their espoused standards. If they fail to do so, they may quickly lose their authority, reputation, and— eventually—their power.
References


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Figure 1. Results of Experiment 1. Bars show means +/- 1 Standard Error. Dark bars and the left Y-axis indicate judgment scores (whether it is morally acceptable to cheat), light bars and the right Y-axis indicate behavior (whether participants do cheat). The bars show the means for judgment and behavior between conditions, using the unstandardized means.
Table 1. Overview of results of Experiments 2 - 4. Indicated are means in judgment frame and behavior frame conditions, after priming with low or high power. Hypocrisy (in bottom rows) is computed as the difference between judgment and behavior. Comparisons within judgments and behavior frame conditions are made horizontally and indicated with sub- and superscripts.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Experiment 2</th>
<th>Experiment 3</th>
<th>Experiment 4</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Manipulation:</strong></td>
<td>Power roles</td>
<td>Experiential priming</td>
<td>Concept priming</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Dilemma:</strong></td>
<td>Speeding on highway</td>
<td>Tax dodging</td>
<td>Keeping a stolen bike</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Condition:</strong></td>
<td>High power</td>
<td>Low power</td>
<td>High power</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Own transgression</td>
<td>7.63 (0.92)</td>
<td>7.23 (1.24)</td>
<td>7.57 (1.08)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Others’ transgression</td>
<td>6.33 (1.43)</td>
<td>7.33 (0.87)</td>
<td>6.63 (1.64)</td>
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<td><strong>Difference:</strong></td>
<td>Δ = 1.30</td>
<td>Δ = -.10</td>
<td>Δ = .94</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>t(38) = 2.40</td>
<td>t(38) = -.20</td>
<td>t(84) = 2.21</td>
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<td></td>
<td>p = .02</td>
<td>n.s.</td>
<td>p = .03</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Hypocrisy:</strong></td>
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Table 2. Results of Experiment 5. Indicated are means in judgment frame and behavior frame conditions, after priming with low or high power, that is socially entitled or unentitled. Hypocrisy (in bottom rows) is computed as the difference between judgment and behavior.

<table>
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<th>Legitimacy:</th>
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<th>Illegitimate</th>
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<tr>
<td>High power</td>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Low power</td>
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<tr>
<td>High power</td>
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<tr>
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<tr>
<td>Own transgression</td>
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<td>4.38 (2.22)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Others’ transgression</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Δ = 1.81</td>
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<tr>
<td>Difference:</td>
<td>t(97) = 1.87</td>
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<td></td>
<td>p = 0.06</td>
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</tbody>
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Table 3.

Mediation model for Experiment 5. Values indicate β’s and p’s (indicated with asterisks)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>Direct Effect</th>
<th>Indirect and Mediation</th>
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<td>.20</td>
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<tr>
<td>Legitimacy</td>
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<td>.05</td>
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<td>Target (own vs. other behavior)</td>
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<td>.31</td>
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<td>Power*Legitimacy</td>
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<tr>
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<td>Measured Legitimacy</td>
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<tr>
<td>MPower<em>MLegitimacy</em>Target</td>
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</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

All variables standardized. * p < .05, ** p < .01
Footnotes

1 We did not measure feelings of power in Experiment 4 because this semantic power prime operates outside conscious awareness (Chen et al., 2001).

2 We only used a single item measure of moral acceptability.

3 From hyper (too much) and kritein (being critical, h.l. on oneself). The term hypercrisy does not generate any hits in psychological databases.