Research Paper No. 1591

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October 1999

RESEARCH PAPER SERIES

GRADUATE SCHOOL OF BUSINESS

STANFORD UNIVERSITY
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AN ANALYSIS OF THE SOCIAL FUNCTIONS OF EMOTIONAL EXPRESSION IN NEGOTIATIONS

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Accepted pending revisions ROB, comments appreciated
Abstract

Behavioral research on negotiation in recent years has been dominated by the decision making research paradigm, which accords a relatively narrow role to emotions. Decision making researchers have considered emotions primarily in terms of how an individual’s positive or negative affect impacts (and usually impedes) his or her information processing. Drawing on recent advances in psychology and other fields, we propose an alternative perspective that highlights the social and functional aspects of emotional expression in negotiation. We conceptualize emotions as interpersonal communication systems that are triggered in response to basic problems in relationships. Emotions are viewed as strategies in that they are evoked by specific relational problems that arise in negotiations and their behavioral components often have consequences on a negotiation counterpart that that resolve the relational problem. From this social functional perspective, we draw insights concerning: a) the influence of specific emotions upon negotiation-related cognition and behavior; b) the transitions between qualitatively different phases within negotiations; and c) the ways in which negotiations are shaped by contextual variables such as culture and communication media.
Mid 20\textsuperscript{th} century scholarship on conflict and negotiation was defined by field studies of bargaining in contentious labor conflicts, fierce legal battles, and tense international disputes (e.g., Douglas, 1962; Schelling, 1960). These early writings portrayed negotiations much in the same way as Hollywood directors of their era in films such as \textit{Casablanca} or \textit{Twelve Angry Men}—as interactions propelled by powerful emotions that shift dramatically as process unfolds. Negotiation interested film-makers and social scientists for many of the same reasons. Not only an individual’s logical cunning but also his or her emotional range is tested by the need to initiate relationships, assert one’s will, seek cooperation, and seal commitments. And while high-stakes negotiations are dramatic, intense, unusual interactions that few people engage in, the ways emotions work in the negotiation predicaments were of interest because they resonated with emotional performances required by the more mundane conflicts that all people face in everyday interactions. An interest in how emotions work in negotiations remains in contemporary cinematic portrayals, such as \textit{Glengarry Glen Ross} or \textit{The Negotiator}. Yet emotions have nearly disappeared in the last decade from scholarship on negotiation. The dominant picture of negotiations has been of a cognitive puzzle, a sequence of informationally complex decisions.\textsuperscript{1}

An initial goal of this paper is tracing the ascent of the decision making approach to research on negotiations and its implications for attention to emotions. The heart of this approach is describing cognitive heuristics used to make judgments and computations concerning rational decisions about what to give and take. Tendencies in negotiation traditionally associated with emotional dynamics have been interpreted in terms of limitations in information processing. When emotions have been incorporated into this research program, researchers have attended primarily to how a given individual’s emotional valence impacts that individual’s information
processing tendencies. We argue that this affect-and-cognition approach to emotions misses the key issue of how emotions work in an interaction. Consider the ability of some individuals (e.g., Bill Clinton) to use emotions to negotiate their way out of seemingly any predicament. The key is not how Clinton’s emotions impact Clinton’s cognition; it is how Clinton’s emotional expressions impact an audience’s cognitions and emotions.

In this paper, we propose a different approach to incorporating emotions into negotiation research, which accords a larger role to emotions in negotiation, more like that portrayed in early scholarship and in the movies. Drawing on recent advances in psychology and other fields, we suggest that many insights can be gleaned by attending to the social functions of emotion in an interaction. By social, we emphasize the consequences of emotion, not so much within the individual, but rather between people who are observing and responding to each other’s emotions. By functions, we emphasize that emotions are triggered by particular problem in social relations. Further, the consequences of emotional expression often help resolve or change the relational problem. The point is not that emotions always help, but that emotional expression can “do work” in negotiations. As we shall see in many specific examples, the expression of emotion can have an impact by providing information to the other person, by evoking complementary emotions in that person, and by creating incentives or deterrents affecting that person’s future behavior. Our approach therefore differs from the affect-and-cognition approach by shifting the focus from the intrapersonal dynamics of subjective emotion biasing an individual’s decision making to the interpersonal dynamics of emotional expression between interacting individuals.

Before detailing our approach, we first review the paradigm changes in negotiation research that have been associated with the decline in emphasis on emotions. We then turn to the
field of emotion, laying out some conceptual distinctions between the affect-and-cognition approach and our approach that highlights the social functions of emotions. We next develop a framework, drawing on findings from social psychology, field studies of emotional expression in organizations, anthropology, and ethology, that specifies how emotions are triggered by and solve relational problems in negotiations. As we shall see, the social functionalist perspective has the advantage of elucidating several problems that negotiation researchers have struggled over, such as why do negotiators transition between qualitatively different phases of bargaining?, why do some aspects of emotion in conflict differ across cultures and some do not?, and, finally, why do communication media impact the outcome of negotiations?

1. PARADIGMS IN NEGOTIATION RESEARCH

A brief review of the paradigms that have structured negotiation research sets the stage for understanding the decline (and eventual renaissance) of interest in emotion. Early studies of negotiation were guided by the principles of the sociological field study. In descriptions of negotiation in collective bargaining contexts and other settings, considerable attention was devoted to emotions and expressive behavior. Researchers focused on the emotional fireworks of contention between opposing negotiators as well battles within negotiating teams (Douglas, 1962). For many scholars, emotional displays were best understood in terms of the dramaturgical metaphor of role theory, which highlighted the performative, script-based nature of emotional expression (Goffman, 1959). Emotional expression, from this perspective, is strategic, informative, and essential to the course of negotiations – themes we will return to in this essay.

Early social psychological theorists likewise viewed emotions and conflict resolution as inextricably linked. Lewin (1951) suggested that resolving conflicts depends greatly on the
specific emotions evoked. Early research programs on conflict by Deutsch and colleagues followed these theoretical leads by focusing on emotions in crucial moments of negotiation, such as the formation of trust (Deutsch, 1960) and responses to threat (Deutsch & Krauss, 1960). For example, research suggested that threats succeed when they induce fear yet backfire when they induce anger (for a review, see Rubin & Brown, 1975). These scattered observations about the role of emotion in negotiation, however, never amounted to a systematic study of different emotions in negotiations. Researchers were constrained by the lack of tools for reliably measuring distinct emotions, particularly for measuring them in the stream of ongoing social interaction. Also, such research existed under the shadow of proclamations by behaviorists that emotions were not amenable to scientific investigation.

Another longstanding paradigm in the study of negotiation is the game-theoretic analysis of rational strategy in interdependent relationships. This tradition of formal economic analysis describes what perfectly rational agents do in abstract conflict situations. A key idea is that one’s best move depends on the other person’s best move. In a labor negotiation, for example, if management can see that a union has no better decision alternative than to concede to a given level, then management will wait for wait for this level of concession before settling. Several ideas from the game-theoretic analysis have been successfully adapted into theories of actual behavior in negotiations (Walton & McKersie, 1965). Although game theory itself offers little analysis of emotion in negotiations, theorists inspired by the game theoretic tradition offered various observations about the roles that emotions might play in negotiation. Schelling (1960), for example, argued that bargaining behaviors send signals to the counterpart. Emotional outbursts were discussed as a potential signal of willingness to act in an irrational manner, a signal that would reduce one’s predictability to the opponent. In this way, a negotiator in a weak
bargaining position, such as a union leader facing a strong management, might use emotional displays to break down the opponent's confidence in the chances that the opponent would concede. We will return to the idea that emotions signal negotiation relevant information later.

In sum, the classic paradigms in negotiation scholarship share certain assumptions. Relying upon field study methods, social psychology experiments, and game theoretic analysis, early negotiation researchers all recognized that emotions were a central part of the process of negotiation. And, importantly, in all these traditions, researchers drew attention to emotions that arise in response to the counterpart, emotions that are part of the interpersonal communication between the two negotiators. These early research programs on negotiation, however, would eventually give way to the emergence of a new and influential perspective in the social sciences, one that shifted the focus away from emotions and the interpersonal level of analysis.

With the spread of the "cognitive revolution" through psychology and related disciplines in the 1960s, interest in emotions and social communication waned. Researchers acquired more precise tools for modelling thought processes. By implication, attention shifted to the individual level of analysis, and more specifically, what happens inside the individual's head. Previously, bounds on individual rationality had been conceptualized as arising from limited consideration of decision options (Simon & March, 1954). Yet deeper departures from rationality were identified by researchers of cognition (Tversky & Kahneman, 1974), suggesting that decisions are not made through computations but rather through simple heuristics prone to errors. These information-processing errors were advanced as mechanisms to explain phenomena traditionally seen as emotion-driven (e.g., Kahneman, Slovic, & Tversky, 1983; Nisbett & Ross, 1991). Ultimately the analysis of cognition in decision making tradition spread to negotiation research. A catalyst was Raiffa's (1982) theoretical synthesis of descriptive findings about fallibilities of cognition
with the pre-existing tradition of prescriptive, game-theoretic decision analysis. Raiffa’s (1982) "asymmetrically prescriptive” analysis suggested that prescriptions for rational negotiation decisions should be conditioned on an accurate description of a counterpart’s (often irrational) tendencies. Bazerman, Neale, Thompson and others drew upon behavioral decision research to identify systematic departures from rationality in negotiators’ decision making (for reviews, see Bazerman & Carroll, 198x; Neale & Bazerman, 1991; Thompson, 1990). For example, the anchoring heuristic makes negotiators’ estimates inappropriately influenced by an opening offer (Northcraft & Neale, 1987). The availability heuristic leads negotiators to overestimate their side’s strengths and to overconfidence in the likelihood of prevailing (Bazerman & Neale, 1982). Armed with notions of heuristics and cognitive biases, researchers reinterpreted tendencies in negotiation that had been formerly interpreted in terms of emotional dynamics. The tendency of parties to enter costly strikes and lawsuits that they have no chance of winning, for example, had been tied to pride and face-saving motives. The decision-making paradigm suggested an alternative interpretation in terms of the availability heuristic and its tendency to make negotiators overconfident in their chances of prevailing.

The behavioral decision making paradigm dominated earlier more-emotion-centered paradigms because (a) the specific cognitive processes could be more reliably measured and manipulated than specific emotions and (b) because cognitive explanations dovetailed with a prescriptive approach by providing necessary information on the impediments to individual rationality. Soon the decision making perspective on negotiation had become so influential that the study of negotiation had come to resemble merely another branch of behavioral decision research, and critiques of this state of affairs began to mount. In reviewing negotiation research, Neale and Northcraft (1991) concluded that emotion was one of the least studied areas.
Sociologically oriented critics raised the general issue of whether negotiation behavior can be modeled as decision tendencies abstracted from the contexts in which negotiators meet (Barley, 1991). Although cognitive shortcuts may be the primary determinants of outcome variance in hypothetical negotiations in role-play experiments, one can question whether cognitive biases are the primary determinants in real negotiations embedded within real relationships? From the perspective of role theory, scholars argued that distinct negotiating roles have institutionalized patterns of emotional expression (Kolb, 1985) and that social roles, such as gender, also determine emotional patterns (Kolb, 1993).

As critiques raised certain questions about the decision-making paradigm, other organizational researchers became increasingly interested in emotional expression and its consequences. Whereas many organizational researchers had long emphasized internal emotional experience such as stress and job satisfaction, a new wave of researchers turned to studies of expressed emotion (Rafaeli & Sutton, 1989). Field studies of service and sales occupations noted the use of expressed emotions to influence other persons in an interaction. Salespersons, store clerks, and bill collectors (Cialdini, 1989; Rafaeli & Sutton, 1987; 1991; Sutton, 1991) follow rules in displaying emotions to navigate transactions, that while not involving a formal contract, are negotiations involving the give and take of resources. Other studies focused on the consequences of expressed emotion in the workplace for the person who expresses the emotion. The potential strain of continually engaging in role appropriate emotional displays or “emotional labor” has become a topic of its own (Hochschild, 1983; Rafaeli & Sutton, 1989). Studies of how individuals negotiate their relationship to impose changes in organizational culture have similarly focused emotional expression and its consequences for self and others (Van Maanen & Kunda, 1989). In sum, at the same time that negotiation researchers
were drifting away from the topic of emotion, other organizational behavior researchers were identifying important roles of emotions in workplace interactions.

The combination of theoretical calls for attention to emotions and compelling description of emotions in workplace interactions have spurred an effort, primarily in the last five years, to bring emotions back in to negotiation research. We now turn to this emotion literature, ultimately to derive a new analysis of emotions in negotiations. In doing this, we present general background issues, we review one way emotions have been linked to negotiation in recent years, and then ultimately propose a different, complementary approach for doing so.

2. CONCEPTUALIZING THE ROLE OF EMOTIONS IN NEGOTIATIONS

A wave of recent research has attempted to re-incorporate emotions into models of negotiator behavior. We will analyze the dominant conception of emotions underlying this research and suggest reasons why it fails to capture the full role played by emotions. We then propose a different and potentially complementary conceptualization. The contrast between these approaches is best appreciated in light of a few basic distinctions between theoretical approaches to emotion.

Background: Some Key Conceptual Distinctions in Emotion Theory

Emotions are evanescent, nebulous phenomena; they can be studied at different levels of analysis and with different methods. Few scientific approaches to emotions capture all of their characteristics. For this reason, a researcher’s conception of emotions greatly affects what the researcher will observe. Different theoretical expectations lead one to look for emotions’ consequences in quite different places and perhaps to observe different kinds of consequences. Emotion theorists diverge in the positions they take on several key issues. Three issues in
particular are relevant to the work on emotion in negotiations.

The first distinction is between focus on general affective states, such as positive or negative moods, or more specific emotions, such as anger or embarrassment. Researchers who focus on general affective states tend to give explanatory emphasis to general variables such as the valence (i.e., positive or negative) or intensity of the state (Tellegen, 1985). Affective valence is a powerful variable that describes stable temperament dispospositions (Watson & Clark, 1984) and moods as well as specific, acute emotions. Moods differ from acute emotions in being less intense and less centered around a specific object (Nowlis, 1966). In contrast, other researchers concern themselves with more specific, discrete emotions, such as anger, embarrassment, or liking, which are intense, short-term reactions to particular stimuli in the environment and within the individual (Ekman, 1992; Plutchik, 1980). For many specific emotions, researchers have found that the triggering stimulus is usually an interaction with another person (Averill, 1982; Babad & Wallbot, 1986).

A second distinction is between emphasis on intrapersonal versus interpersonal characteristics and consequences of emotions. Until recently, the majority of emotion researchers have been interested in the intrapersonal characteristics of emotion. These theorists have studied the physiology of emotion, internal emotional experience, and the consequences of moods and emotions that play out within the mind of the person feeling the emotion (Isen, 1991). In contrast, other theorists see emotions as a means of communication in interpersonal interactions. This perspective directs attention to shared emotion (McDougal, 1923) and to external, observable expressions of emotion (Ekman, 1982; Rafaeli & Sutton, 1987, 1989) and how they influence other people.

Finally, theorists diverge in their assumptions about whether emotions have specific
functions or not in guiding social behavior. In psychology and other disciplines, emotion theory has alternated between two contrasting positions. At one pole, theorists assume (often implicitly) that emotions are primarily impediments to adaptive action. According to this view, emotions disorganize or interrupt current thought and disrupt ongoing social interactions. Emotion-related thought processes are seen as lacking the direction and principled orderliness of reason (e.g., Dewey, 1895; Hebb, 1946; Mandler, 1984). Emotional behaviors, from passionate displays of anger to proclamations of love, are seen as reflecting the more primitive, uncontrollable side to human nature that threatens the social order.

At the other pole, theorists have assumed that emotions function in organized, useful ways. Emotions are reliable guides to action and help sustain the harmony and continuity of social interactions. Emotions prioritize and organize ongoing behaviors in ways that optimize the individual's adjustment to the demands of the physical and social environment (Barrett & Campos, 1987; Darwin, 1872; Ekman, 1992; Lazarus, 1991; Plutchik, 1980; Rosaldo, 1984; Trivers, 1971). According to this view, emotions help people respond to the basic problems presented by social living and thus help sustain the social order.

We have drawn three distinctions about emotion that are logically independent. The varying positions vis-à-vis these distinctions allow for many possible theoretical stances, yet the actual approaches to emotions relevant to negotiation fall neatly into two camps. The prevailing view of emotion in negotiations that emerges out of the decision making tradition takes the first position on all three issues. Thus, this view, which will refer to as the affect and cognition perspective, focuses on general affect, an intrapersonal level of analysis, and an expectation that emotions primarily impede adaptive action. By contrast, our proposed approach involves the opposite position on each issue; that is, we focus on specific, acute emotions, an interpersonal
level of analysis, and an expectation that emotions serve identifiable functions in interactions.

These two approaches to the role of emotions in negotiation involve asking very different questions of the world. It is quite possible, of course, that the emotions involve different dynamics at different levels of analysis. Hence, these are potentially complementary approaches rather than mutually exclusive approaches. Let us examine the intellectual roots and basic assumptions of each approach.

The Role of Affect in Negotiator Cognition

The prevailing approach to emotion in negotiation has been to study how a negotiator’s mood affects his or her judgment and decision tendencies. This research stream draws on the research program in psychology known as “affect and cognition” (e.g., Isen, 1984). Working within this tradition, researchers examine the intrapsychic effects of emotion, and drawing upon advances in the study of human cognition, how emotions shape, direct, or guide internal thought processes. Some even view emotions as a special class of cognitive processes (e.g., “hot cognitions”) that shape attention, thought, memory, and judgment in systematic ways. To understand this research program, let us review its theoretical and empirical contributions.

Hypotheses about Mechanisms

Researchers working within the affect and cognition tradition have identified at least three mechanisms that account for the relations between affect and cognition. According to some, emotions are “nodes” in semantic networks of the mind (Bower, 1991), which when activated trigger related associations that feed into other cognitive processes. Thus, when a
negotiator is angered in the context of a negotiation, he or she will be disposed to recall other anger producing events. Another view is that emotions are units of information that contribute directly to judgment (Schwarz, 1990). In our example of the angry negotiator, he or she will rely on momentary feelings of anger, both relevant and irrelevant to the negotiation, to evaluate the fairness of the counterpart’s actions. A more recently explored view is that affective states involve different levels of arousal, and are therefore associated with different information processing modes, for example, prompting more controlled or automatic social judgment (e.g., Bodenhausen, Sheppard, & Kramer, 1994). Again returning to our example, the angry negotiator would be more likely to process negotiation relevant information (e.g., proposals, concessions, promises) in relatively unsystematic, superficial ways.

**Accounting for Empirical Regularities**

Research on affect and cognition has a strong record of identifying the profound effects of affect upon cognitive processes. The primary research method involves manipulating affect in experiments. Sometimes researchers manipulate mood prior to the negotiation with such techniques as gifts (Isen & Levin, 1972; Carnevale & Isen, 1986), exposure to emotionally evocative films (e.g., Kramer, et al. 1991), or exposure to pleasant scents (Baron, 1990). These manipulations have profound effects upon diverse cognitive processes (see Forgas, 1995). Studies of autobiographical recall indicate that the positive or negative content of memory is shaped by current mood (Bower, 1991). Similarly, studies of satisfaction with work, personal life, marriage, political leaders, and consumer goods find these evaluations are influenced by current mood (Baron, 19xx; Brief, Butcher, & Roberson, 1995; Keltner, Locke, & Audrain, 1995).
1993; Oliver, 1993; Schwarz & Clore, 1993; Schwarz, 1991). In social judgment, tendencies to stereotype others as opposed to evaluating them as idiosyncratic individuals is shaped by current mood (Bodenhausen et al., 1994; Forgas, 1995). In decision making under uncertainty, the willingness to take risks or avoid them is influenced by whether one is feeling happy or not (Isen, 1991; Johnson & Tversky, 1983). Many of these experimental findings have been corroborated with a different method, the correlation of outcomes to individual differences in affective disposition (Watson, Clark, & Tellegen, 1988). In findings that parallel those with manipulations of affect, researchers have linked dispositional affectivity to job satisfaction (Brief et al, 1995; Staw, Bell, & Clausen, 1986) and to certain job skills (Staw, Sutton, & Pelled, 1994).

Negotiation researchers have extended the literature on affect and cognition in a number of ways to document how affective influences on cognitive tendencies determine negotiation outcomes (Barry & Oliver, 1996). For example, given the effects of mood upon memory, one can easily imagine that a negotiator’s state of negative affect would color the way they recalled the history of interactions with the counterpart, thus justifying an enduring sense of pessimism and an aggressive or defensive strategy. This would reduce trust and the likelihood of learning about the counterpart’s interests in order to create value. Indeed, research has found that negotiators put in a negative mood attained less accurate impressions of their counterparts’ interests (Allred, Mallozzi, Matsui, & Raia, 1996). Consistent with findings that negative affect leads to “seeing the glass as half empty,” one can imagine that it would make negotiators more likely to reject offers. Indeed, participants were more likely to reject ultimatum offers (that economically dominated their alternative option) when they were in a negative mood (Pillutla & Murnighan, 1996). In sum, the findings about effects of negative mood inductions are consistent with the psychological findings and the general notion that emotion distorts good judgment and
impedes adaptive action.

The pattern of findings from inductions of positive affect in negotiation experiments is a bit more complex. Positive affect should lead to “seeing the glass as half full” or in this case seeing the counterpart as trustworthy and his or her offers as good enough to accept. Consistent with this, negotiators in positive moods engage in fewer competitive behaviors and are more willing to make concessions (Baron, 1990). While in some issue structures this would lead to lower individual outcomes; in other issue structures it leads to value creation and the attainment of high outcomes for both counterparts (e.g., Carnevale & Isen, 1986). Some other negative consequences of positive mood have been identified. For example, negotiators in positive moods had an illusory sense of having performed very well in the negotiation (Kramer, Newton, & Pommerenke, 1993), and hence may not learn from mistakes. Overall, although positive mood can be associated with cooperation and high joint outcomes, the empirical studies more generally indicate that positive moods distort negotiators’ perceptions in ways that make them vulnerable to several negotiation-related problems.

Limitations

The extension of affect and cognition research to negotiation has been successful and influential. These studies have illuminated how emotions, even those unrelated to the participants and content of the negotiation at hand, can shape the course and outcome of negotiations. Notwithstanding these important advances, there are several limitations to this work. We will suggest three directions needed in order to have a fuller picture of what emotions do in negotiations.
A first limitation springs from the reduction of emotions to positive versus negative affective valence. Although valence is a basic dimension of mood and emotion (e.g., Smith & Ellsworth, 1985), valence based perspectives fail to specify whether different emotions of the same valence, such as anger and fear, differentially influence cognition and behavior. In fact, given the centrality of valence to affect, a valence perspective strongly suggests the prediction that emotions of similar valence, such as anger, fear, sadness, and guilt, would influence cognition in the same ways. This general prediction is undermined by intuitive counterexamples. For example, one would certainly expect to negotiate differently if one were facing an angry counterpart as opposed to a fearful counterpart. Recent research has also highlighted how emotions of the same valence, such as fear and anger, have opposite effects upon cognitive processes, such as judgment as risk perception and preference (Lerner & Keltner, in press) and attribution (Keltner, Ellsworth, & Edwards, 1993). Approaches that solely focus upon general positive or negative moods thus sacrifice precision in the name of parsimony.

A second limitation springs from the lack of attention to how emotions respond to the context of real social interactions, and in terms of our present interests, the process of negotiating. With few exceptions, researchers have examined the effects of low intensity mood states. Further, researchers have almost exclusively focused on the effects of incidental moods, that is, moods that are elicited by events that are unrelated to the negotiation (e.g., by watching a film clip or receiving a gift prior to the negotiation). In many studies, the negotiators may not have even been aware of the actual cause of their moods. To a large extent, this focus on incidental rather than integral affect was required by methodological and conceptual considerations. Some believe that affect is most likely to influence judgments when the cause of the affect is distinct from the object of judgment (e.g., Schwarz, 1990). To isolate the “pure”
effects of affect upon negotiation-related cognition or behavior, it is important that the source of affect not be semantically related to the negotiation. Yet these studies do not speak to the question of how emotions produced in the context of negotiations influence negotiators’ cognition, behavior, and outcomes and context may matter greatly in how people respond (Barley, 1991). Nor do previous studies illuminate how moods and emotions might exert similar or different effects upon negotiation at different stages of the negotiation, a matter discussed at length by Barry and Oliver (1996).

Third, research on affect and negotiation has been guided by the methodological individualism of this cognitivist tradition (Sampson, 19xx). The search for the consequences of affect has focused on what happens within one individual’s mind, because the individual mind is the unit at which systems are conceptualized. To the extent that the functions served by emotions extend beyond the individual mind, they will not be discovered by studying one individual at a time but only by studying interpersonal interactions. Proceeding with the individual as the unit of governs considerations that enter into prescriptions and normative evaluations, as well. In terms of individual agents, self-interest is maximized in games such as the Prisoner’s Dilemma by a strategy of not cooperating. However, if we think in terms of the collective agent represented by the pair of Prisoners, then self-interest is maximized through the cooperative strategy. Considerations such as these have led to the suggestion that tendencies that appear irrational from the individual perspective may be rational from the perspective of the dyad (Bazerman, Gibbons, Thompson, & Valley, 1998). This may be true of certain negative emotions in ways that past research has not elucidated. For example, displays of anger may momentarily threaten the negotiation relationship, but promote greater joint outcomes in the long run.
In sum, the prevailing view of affect and negotiation has looked at the effects of broad positive and negative mood states elicited by events unrelated to the negotiation upon the individual negotiator’s cognition, behavior, and outcomes. In the section that follows we present a view of emotion in negotiation that complements this affect and negotiation tradition. This view of emotion highlights how different positive and negative emotions that are relevant, if not central, to the course of negotiation, directly influence the dyadic interactions of negotiators at different stages of the negotiation.

**The Functions of Emotion in Social Interactions?**

As an alternative to the affect and negotiation tradition, our focus in this paper is on how emotions work, that is what they do in social interactions. This perspective has roots in early studies of the instrumental uses of specific emotional displays, as in ingratiation (Jones & Pittman, 1982), as well as studies of the social consequences of spontaneous displays of emotion (Clark, Pataki, & Carver, 1996; Keltner & Kring, 1998). Several developments suggest that the time is especially right to consider how emotions are strategies that solve relational problems in negotiations. Emotion researchers have begun to document the interpersonal origins of different emotions (e.g., Averill, 1980; Keltner & Buswell, 1997; Miller & Leary, 1992), and how relatively automatic, rapid behavioral manifestations of emotion structure interpersonal interactions (Hazan & Shaver, 1987; Lutz & White, 1986; Nesse, 1990; Johnson-Laird & Oatley, 1992). Emotional expression, for example, plays an important role in the resolution of problems in relationships between parents and children (e.g., Bowlby, 1969), siblings (Dunn & Munn, 1985), and romantic partners (Levenson & Gottman, 1983). Naturalistic observations of people
around the world have further illuminated how emotional expressions guide social interactions such as courtship and appeasement rituals (Eibl-Eibesfeldt, 1989). Interestingly, researchers investigating the sociocultural construction of emotions have hit upon a similar level of analysis, being interested in how different relational problems yield different emotional patterns (e.g., Frijda & Mesquita, 1994; Keltner & Haidt, in press).

These converging research traditions indicate that emotions serve social functions. The view is that the consequences of emotions are best examined in light of the recurrent problems in interpersonal and group relations, such as allocating resources fairly, honoring personal contracts, or maintaining friendships (e.g., Averill, 1980; Eibl-Eibesfeldt, 1989; Ekman, 1992; Lutz & White, 1986). This involves a teleological stance that assumes that emotions can be seen as having functions—not because they were designed but because they have been selected for on the basis of their adaptiveness, both at the biological level for their contribution to individual fitness, and at the cultural level for their contribution to individual and group functioning (see Keltner & Haidt, in press). To say that emotions resulted from biological and cultural evolution does not mean, however, that they serve an actor well all or most of the time that they occur. In terms of negotiation, an approach that focuses on social functions of emotion does not amount to a prescriptive or normative stance toward emotional negotiating; rather, it is descriptive stance that directs ones attention to exploring particular kinds of consequences.

Another way of introducing the social functional (SF) approach is to describe the steps researchers take in analyzing the social functions of emotions. First, researchers identify the diverse contexts that elicit a particular emotion and look for a theme that unites these diverse contexts. Motivated by this aim, researchers have found that emotions are elicited by fairly specific interpersonal problems or opportunities that are united by specific themes (e.g., Lazarus,
1991; Shaver, Schwartz, Kirson, & O'Connor, 1987). The theme uniting the triggering contexts for an emotion suggests the relational problem to which this emotion may provide a solution. For example, anger can be produced by myriad events, including: a biased performance appraisal, inconsiderate interruptions in a meeting, an unprovoked parking ticket, a mugging, to name just a few. Uniting these diverse contexts is the experience of injustice, which defines the core theme of anger (e.g., Smith & Ellsworth, 1985).

Researchers interested in providing evidence for the functions of an emotion then consider how emotion-related behavior helps the individual or the dyad respond to the problem in the interaction. Research has documented that emotions involve several kinds of responses, including specific courses of action (Frijda, 1986), a physiological response that supports specific kinds of behavior (Levenson, Ekman, & Friesen, 1990). For example, an angry individual may show: several facial cues (furrowed brow, narrowed eyes, tightened and pressed lips); postural changes (e.g., head shaking sideways, expansive chest); gestures (e.g., clenched fists, obscene hand movements); a deep, forceful tone of voice; hostile comments; and actions such as storming out the room. Importantly, a social functions view then looks to how these expressive behaviors have predictable effects on other persons in an interaction and the triggering problem. In the case of anger, SF research would explore whether it works to reduce injustice in relationships.

Obviously, not all behaviors expressing anger have the impact of reducing injustice (i.e., anger might prompt a bout of house cleaning or drinking binge). As Figure 1 illustrates, an SF analysis does not assume a neat, lock-and-key relationship between relational problems and emotions. There may be several alternative emotions that could be triggered by the same relational problem. Also, emotions are not the only solutions to these problems. At times
emotions fail to solve particular problems, in particular when they are too intense or they are triggered by an incorrect perception of the problem, as when a manager angrily charges the wrong person with a mistake.

Hypotheses about Mechanisms

The crux of the SF approach is that emotional expressions “do work” in an interaction. Emotions, in this sense, are strategies that move individuals towards the resolutions of problems of interpersonal and group relations. In this vein, theorists have described emotions as embodied relationships (de Rivera, 19xx; Lutz & White, 1991). The mechanisms of interest are not intrapsychic; rather they are the interpersonal processes by which one person’s emotional expression in an interaction impacts both persons and the relationship.

Research motivated by this perspective first identifies the observable behaviors that express emotions. Emotion is much more than the private feeling an individual consciously experiences. Other aspects of emotion include facial muscle actions, such as the furrowed brow, glare, and tightened and pressed lips of anger (e.g., Ekman, 1993), that co-occur reliably in emotion-specific configurations that reliably convey the emotion to others. Emotions are associated with gaze and head activity, such as the averted gaze and head movements down and to the left (which exposes the neck) that is associated with embarrassment (Keltner, 1995). Emotional expression includes important postural behaviors, such as the slumped posture of shame or the expanded chest of pride. Emotions involve a rich variety of vocalization cues as well (Scherer, 1986). And emotions involve a variety of symbolic social behaviors, such as when the angry individual storms out or sulks silently (Shaver et al., 1987). Many of these kinds of
expressive behaviors associated with different emotions are believed to be universal (Ekman, 1993; although see Russell, 1994). Thus, although negotiators of different cultures may not speak the same language, they will influence each other in similar ways in their emotionally expressive behavior (we take up this theme in a section towards the end of the paper). Moreover, many of these expressive behaviors are very brief, lasting 1 to 5 seconds, and often beyond the control of the individual (e.g., Ekman, 1992).

The next step is considering how one person's emotionally expressive behavior impacts other people. First, emotional expressions provide information to help individuals know others' emotions, beliefs, and intentions. Emotional expressions convey information to receivers about senders' current emotions (Ekman, 1993; Scherer, 1986), their social intentions, (Fridlund, 1992), and their orientations towards the relationship, for example as a trustworthy or antagonistic (Knutson, 1996). Emotional expressions also convey information about objects in the environment, for example whether an object is dangerous and to be avoided or safe and to be trusted (Klinnert et al., 1983; Mineka & Cook, 1993). Finally, even though much of emotionally expressive behavior only briefly appears in the stream of interaction, recent studies indicate that people are quite able to detect the meaning of emotional expressions (e.g., Keltner & Ekman, in press). Thus, emotional expression helps individuals solve one of the basic problems of social interaction: reliably knowing the thoughts and feelings of others. A negotiator's brief expression of anger signals the individual's feelings about the issue at hand, whether it be a proposal or counterproposal, it conveys likely courses of action, and it conveys a sense of dominance and power vis-a-vis the other negotiator or negotiators.

Second, emotional expressions evoke complementary emotions in others. People respond emotionally to others' emotional expressions, even when those displays are presented
subliminally and the perceiver cannot tell you what he or she has seen (Esteves, Ohman, & Dimberg, 1994). For example, if someone flashes a brief expression of anger to another who fails to consciously recognize the anger, he or she will still respond with elevated arousal. In turn, emotions evoked in others are associated with behaviors such as avoidance, helping, affiliation, and soothing, which help individuals respond together to significant social events. To cite two examples, displays of embarrassment evoke forgiveness in others, which helps individuals restore social relations following norm violations (Keltner, Young, & Buswell, 1997). Anger displays elicit fear-related responses in observers, even when those displays are presented subliminally (Dimberg & Ohman, 1996), which helps one individual deter another from a course of action that would damage the relationship, as when parents flash anger to their children to dissuade the child from undesirable behavior. By evoking emotional responses and concomitant behavior in others, emotional expression is often the starting point for complex interactions. When a negotiator expresses anger towards a counterpart, this is likely to lead to the other negotiator to respond with certain emotions, such as anger and fear, and to pursue actions based on those emotions.

Third, emotional expressions operate as incentives reinforcing other individuals’ behavior (Klinnert et al., 1983). Positive emotional expression rewards desirable courses of action or states of affairs; negative emotional expression punishes undesired behavior. Laughter and smiling, for example, encourage a wide variety of behaviors in others, including shifts in attention and conversation and more specific goal directed behaviors that are specific to the interaction at hand (Provine, 1993; Tronick, 1989). Parents smile to keep their children on the right course. A flirtatious smile encourages the efforts of a potential suitor. The expression of anger, on the other hand, punishes and discourages the other’s behavior.
Accounting for Empirical Regularities: Past Research on Family Interactions

In making our initial case that the SF approach is a useful research strategy for the study of negotiation, we note that, in addition to plausible hypotheses about mechanisms, the SF approach has a track record of accounting for empirical regularities. An SF approach has helped uncover what emotions do in family interactions. In the case of some emotions, a SF analysis has been applied successfully to document relatively intuitive outcomes of emotional expression. For example, research has found that romantic love is associated with a variety of behaviors, from gift giving to intimate prose, that promote closeness and long term interactions with a potential mate. And in general, these behaviors will help romantic partners form and maintain romantic relationships (e.g., Frank, 1988; Hatfield, 19xx).

In other instances, a SF analysis has led researchers to document regularities and benefits associated with emotions that were previously believed to be disruptive or even destructive. For example, embarrassment was long viewed as a chaotic, disorganized state of little benefit to the individual, and often disruptive to the dyad. A SF take on embarrassment documented, instead, that embarrassment often followed social transgressions and involved expressive behavior that, much like the appeasement displays of other species that it resembled, led to forgiveness (Keltner & Buswell, 1997).

The insights gained by a SF analysis are perhaps even more apparent in its application to jealousy, which is intuitively regarded as a debilitating emotion, one that more healthy individuals transcend. From the perspective of the individual, it is hard to see what benefits jealousy might bring about, what problems it might solve. In fact, if anything, on the surface jealousy seems to bring about more problems than it solves. Yet recent social functional analyses
of jealousy highlight how the emotion reduces interest in potential rivals, and is an important
display of commitment and devotion, and in this way promotes more stable intimate relationships
(Buss, 199x; Wilson & Daly, 199x). Table 1 summarizes the insights gained in this domain.

Accounting for Empirical Regularities: Proposal about Negotiation Interactions

Negotiations present a number of relational problems to negotiators, and according to our
analysis, are therefore likely to involve several different emotions. These include the problem of
initiating an exchange with a stranger, the problem of protecting oneself from exploitation, the
problem of claiming value, the problem of creating value through efficient trades, the problem of
locking in commitment to a settlement, and so forth. Negotiation theorists (Kelley & Thibaut,
1969; Lax & Sebenius, 1986; Pruitt & Rubin, 19xx) have often described this multiplicity of
problems in terms of dilemmas that negotiator, because overt solutions to one of these problems
often has unwanted side-effects of inhibiting the solution of another of these problems. We will
suggest that these relational problems may trigger distinct emotions and these emotions may
often provide the most graceful solutions to the problems.

Scholars working in different theoretical traditions have speculated about how emotions
might solve problems like those that negotiations pose. For example, in his discussion of
reciprocal altruism, Trivers highlighted the role of anger and sympathy in promoting cooperative
alliances, a critical element of stable, long term relationships (Trivers, 1971). The economist
Robert Frank has argued that all transactions, be it a business partnership or marriage, require
that individuals remain committed to the relationship and its agreements when self-interest
would lead to other courses of action (e.g., embezzling from a business partner, cheating on a
spouse) (Frank, 1988). The solution to the “commitment problem,” Frank contends, lies in how
certain emotions, such as love or guilt, convey commitment to others and motivate the self to transcend self-interest when necessary to preserve the relationship. And Nesse has recently speculated about how emotions help negotiators cooperate and avoid defection within interpersonal contexts that have the reward structure of the prisoner’s dilemma game (Nesse, 1990). These observations converge on the theme of this paper: that specific emotions shape the negotiation of organizational relations. In Table 1 we summarize how emotions help individuals solve specific problems related to organizational relationships. The specific problems that negotiators face, which we detail below, are most closely related to this kind of relationship (as opposed to romantic or parental bonds, for example), and there most informed by considering emotions relevant to organizational bonds. Clearly, other emotions play an important role in organizational relationships, and in our analysis of negotiations, we will see that other emotions are important as well (e.g., interest, empathy). Table 2 is illustrative rather than comprehensive.

The synthesis offered in Table 2 follows a now familiar approach: we consider what general problems individuals in organizational relationships face, what emotions may regularly occur in contexts defined by those problems, and what emotions do to help individuals solve those problems. One problem individuals face in organizational relationships is cooperation (e.g., Kramer, 1991). Organizational relationships at their core are cooperative alliances that are dependent upon mutual trust and reciprocity (Kramer & Tyler, 1996). Certain emotions are important to the formation and maintenance of cooperative alliances (see Nesse, 1990). For example, liking motivates the initiation of cooperative bonds, and we will see plays a critical role in the opening stages of negotiations. Gratitude rewards others for engaging in cooperative behavior. Cooperative alliances are obviously vulnerable to competition, greed, and defection. Certain emotions act as safeguards against those threats to cooperative alliances. For example,
anger occurs in response to others’ actions that undermine the cooperative alliance, such as openly competitive behavior or the inappropriate use of resources, and often motivates restitution (e.g., Averill, 198x; White, 199x). Expressions of pain and distress upon being cheated likewise motivate others to engage in cooperative behavior (e.g., Eisenberg, et al., 1989). And guilt motivates individuals to restore cooperative bonds when they themselves have violated the terms of a cooperative relationship (e.g., Keltner & Buswell, 1996). In the section that follows we will elaborate upon how many of these emotions shape the course of negotiations.

Organizations also require that individuals distribute resources and the allocation of work, as do negotiations. Status hierarchies and social norms provide heuristic solutions to the problems of distributing resources, such as mates, food, and social attention, and the labor required of collective endeavors (Fiske, 1990; de Waal, 1986, 1988). Certain emotions justify individuals' claims to specific resources (e.g., Clark, 1991; Kemper, 1993). Emotions related to dominance, such as contempt and variants of anger, convey strength vis-a-vis others, and certain rights to resources. We shall see in the ensuing section that the displays of dominance are an important part of the process by which negotiators communicate the specific nature and importance of their preferences and positions. Other emotions, such as embarrassment and shame, convey submissiveness, and in the context of human interactions often serve as apologies or appeasement gestures, prompting reconciliation following actions that disrupt social relationships (Keltner & Buswell, 1996; Miller & Leary, 1992). The broad array of displays of submissiveness, we shall see, also play a critical role in negotiations, when negotiators have encountered difficulties and attempt to create opportunities for increasing value.

In sum, we have argued that emotions help humans solve many important problems of interpersonal and group life. Many of these problems, theorists have long argued, are central to
negotiations. By implication, emotions should actually influence the course of successful negotiations by coordinating the behavior of negotiators in the ways that we have described. We now turn to an application of these ideas to different stages of negotiation.

3. INSIGHTS FROM A SOCIAL FUNCTIONS ANALYSIS

A social functionalist analysis has illuminated the importance of emotions in a variety of interpersonal contexts, and we have proposed that it can be applied to negotiations. We believe this approach sheds light on three longstanding problems in negotiation research. First, descriptions of negotiation in many different arenas have identified transitions between phases of qualitatively different styles of interaction. For example, the opening moments of negotiations tend to involve a constellation of sentiments, gestures, and actions that are unlike those that occur at other points in a negotiation. Although researchers have converged in their observations, the reasons for these patterns have remained unclear. We will argue that the different behaviors negotiators engage in at different phases of the negotiation—as well as the temporal sequence of phases—arise because of the specific relational problems involved and the social emotions these trigger. By implication, negotiators should show different emotions at different stages of the negotiation, and these specific emotions should be associated with fairly specific outcomes.

Second, negotiation research has sought ways of understanding the impact of culture. Too often hypotheses about culture have suffered from the same lack of nuance as hypotheses about affect. That is, just as there is questionable utility in context-general predictions about effects of emotions, context-general effects of culture are also dubious. The framework for understanding the functions served by emotions in negotiation is useful in that it suggests the kinds of emotions that may be used for the same purpose in different cultures.
Finally, studies of negotiation have long found that communication media can impact negotiation outcomes. Many studies have found, for example, that face-to-face conversations result in higher joint outcomes than do exchanges of written notes. Yet these effects do not appear across all kinds of negotiation tasks, and research focusing on attributes of the media per se have not uncovered the crucial mechanisms and boundary conditions. We will argue that the impact of communication media on negotiation outcomes can be understood in terms of how communication media enable or impede certain emotional dynamics and the extent to which these dynamics are required to solve the problems that a conflict presents.

A. Temporal Phases of Negotiation

A recurrent theme in research on negotiation—both laboratory experiments and field studies—is that the way negotiators interact changes over the course of the resolution of a deal or dispute. Influential models of the phase-structure of project group interactions and the dynamics underlying this structure have been developed recently (Gersick, 1992). However, studies have found that such models of group interaction phase structure do not extend to negotiations (Lim, 1994). Yet the possibility for a model of negotiation phase-structure is suggested by striking parallels in the observations of different conflict researchers.

Several qualitatively distinct phases have been distinguished in a number of literatures. First, the opening moves of an interaction have been highlighted by experimental psychologists modeling conflict with repeated play games, who suggest that negotiation success depends on cooperation in opening rounds (Rubin & Brown, 1975). Similar observations have been made by ethnographers studying dispute resolution, who describe ritualized ways of initiating the
negotiation conversation (Gulliver, 1979). Once the “ice has been broken” negotiators enter a phase of contentious moves or positioning. A key transition later in a negotiation is from this aggressive interaction to a more collaborative interaction of problem solving. This transition has been observed in ethnographic observation of labor-management conflict (Douglas, 1962) as well as in studies of conflicts between students and administration at a university (Pruitt & Rubin, 1985). Negotiation researchers have also pointed out the unique aspects of the closing moments or the endgame. An aggressive tone returns the conversation as ultimatums and threats are delivered. Kochan (1980) suggests that the final phase of collective bargaining involves signaling that one cannot make more concessions. A similar emphasis in the endgame has been described in works on individual bargaining (Lewicki, Hiam, & Olander, 1996).

Although negotiation scholars have long referred to negotiation phases and transitions, no one has yet offered a cogent account of the order, forms, and functions of these phases. Contemporary negotiation theorists have increasingly articulated why the “value claiming” strategy of positioning and the “value creating” strategy of problem solving arise in the same negotiation (Lax & Sebenius, 1986; Bazerman & Neale, 1992). Yet these scholars have devoted less attention to the question of why these strategies arise in separate phases of the negotiation.

In the collective bargaining literature, the phases of negotiation were often linked to political needs of representatives to engage in aggressive grandstanding to impress constituencies of their toughness before being free to work collaboratively with the counterpart (Stevens, 1963). For example, experienced union representatives know they stand to lose their positions unless they protect against the impression that they have “sold out.” Yet this account doesn’t explain why the same patterns are seen in laboratory experiments where representatives are not accountable to constituencies (Morley & Stephenson, 1977). Still other scholars have explained the phase
transitions in negotiations in terms of ritualized roles rather than rational calculations (Goffman, 1959). For instance, Friedman (1994) claims that “when negotiators do improvise, they still maintain their roles—their comments display anger and distrust toward the opponent, as well as solidarity with their teammates” (p. 5). Perhaps the roles in such negotiation scripts are so culturally pervasive that they guide participants in experiments as well as professional negotiators. Yet role explanations beg the question of why these roles are similar across different cultures (Gulliver, 1979; Pye, 1982). What underlies this structure?

We will argue that the phase structure of negotiations arises because negotiations present a series of specific relational problems and these problems trigger distinct social emotions. Our analysis, summarized in Table 3, distinguishes the following phases: Opening moves, Positioning, Problem solving, and Endgame. While the precise division of phases is, of course, somewhat arbitrary, we will propose a framework delineating the relational problems and emotional solutions that arise in these four phases of a negotiation encounter. For each phase, we will review the observations of previous researchers, examine the problem that this phase presents, and then speculate about how these problems may tend to trigger particular emotions that organize the regularities observed in negotiators’ behaviors, intentions, and strategies. In considering how the consequences of emotions may serve individual or dyadic interests, we will pay particular attention to how emotional expression enables emotions to work between negotiators, through information, evocation, and incentives.

1. Opening Moves
Let us review the distinctive qualities of the opening moments of a negotiation interaction. A key finding in psychology experiments simulating negotiations is the crucial importance of the first impressions that opposing negotiations make on each other. In the early literature, negotiation was operationalized as a multiple-round Prisoner’s Dilemma game. Rubin and Brown (1975) reviewed a number of findings that suggested that mutually beneficial cooperative patterns emerge only when some signs of cooperativeness are conveyed in the “opening moves.” Rubin and Brown suggested that the opening moves in a negotiation have the primary role of conveying a party’s general intentions and character in order to set a climate for negotiation. If a negotiator is competitive at the start, this is reciprocated, and a “lock-in” effect ensues (Pilisuck and Rapoport, 1964). Although these findings are suggestive it is hard to extrapolate from Prisoner’s Dilemma games, where players have only two behavioral options, to a conversation, where the options are myriad. From a purely rational standpoint it is curious that players care so much about cooperation in the opening rounds. Most likely it is only weakly diagnostic of whether the counterpart will cooperate in later rounds.

An answer to the puzzle of why opening moves matter so much may be found in ethnographic studies of conflict resolution across cultures (Gulliver, 1979). Anthropologists have suggested that cultures vary in the greeting rituals with which strangers initiate a conversation. Of course, North Americans shake hands, Europeans kiss cheeks, East Asians exchange bows, and the subtleties of these gestures vary in more fine-grained ways. Yet these rituals occur reliably at the outset of attempts at conflict resolution. Implicit in comparing these gestures is a notion that they serve some common role or function. What is that role?

In considering the social emotions involved in the opening moments of a negotiation encounter, we begin by asking what relational problems confront a pair of negotiators at this
moment? Embarking on a negotiation with any new counterpart may bring a settlement of high value, but it is also potentially quite costly. Negotiation takes time and energy. Initiating talks with one counterpart sometimes mean lost opportunities to settle with others. Moreover any earnest negotiation requires revealing information about one’s goals, interests, and alternatives, and these revelations can undermine one’s bargaining position for the future. Hence, the dilemma of whether to give it a shot with a counterpart can be called the initiation problem. A negotiator asks: Is it worth the gamble of trying to negotiate with this person? Is this person entering the process in an insincere way, negotiating “in bad faith”? If one knew the answers to this question, one could either walk away or launch into the negotiation. But just as one cannot learn to swim without getting wet, one cannot figure this out without beginning to negotiate. The problem can be seen in terms of individual and dyadic interests. From that standpoint of the individual negotiator, there are two problems: deciding whether the other is worth talking to and (so long as this decision has not been answered in the negative) conveying to the other that one is worth talking to. From the standpoint of the dyad, the problem is of how to “break the ice” and establish forward momentum in a conversation.²

In Table 3 we posit that two emotions are triggered by the events related to the initiation problem. The first is liking, which is a rather general term that refers to the attraction and affiliative intent one feels towards potential companions (Hatfield & Rapson, 19xx). Ethological studies of both humans and nonhumans have shown that liking, broadly defined, is associated with a variety of expressive behaviors, some of which are listed in Table 2 (for full reviews, see Gonzaga, Keltner, & Smith, 1999; Hatfield & Rapson, 19xx). These behaviors include certain facial displays, such as pleasurable smiles, head nods and mutual gaze, postural asymmetry and relaxation, increased physical proximity, and affiliative hand gestures, such as open palms.
Sociologists (e.g., Goffman, 1969) have observed that these markers of liking play essential roles in interactions as individuals initially enter into cooperative relations. Ethologists (e.g., Eibl-Eibesfeldt, 1989) have identified the same behaviors in the opening moments of interactions between primates who are not well acquainted (Eibl-Eibesfeldt, 1989). Studies of the contagion of smiling and laughter (e.g., Provine, 1993) suggest that these behaviors call forth matching behavior from the other person. Cialdini (1989) reviews extensive experimental evidence that liking induces compliance. This dovetails with field study evidence that smiles and good cheer are used by service employees to control customers, an observation first made about waiters (Whyte, 1946) and since extended to milkmen (1972) and cocktail waitresses (Tidd & Lockard, 1978). From the standpoint of the individual, these expressions of liking make the other person open to negotiation. From the standpoint of the dyad, liking displays are strong triggers of reciprocity.

We contend that related expressions of interest also help negotiators solve the initiation problem. Interest can be expressed by simple behaviors such as a forward lean or a cocked head, which are seen across cultures and in nonhuman primates (e.g., Izard, 1977). Interest can also be displayed through more subtle facial expressions, such as the widening of the eyes and the raising of the eyebrows. Interest can by displayed in words by asking personal questions. Expressing interest serves the individual’s need to appear to be a worthwhile candidate as a negotiation counterpart. Yet it not only functions by providing information, it is also functions by evoking emotions in the other person. Interest is flattering and hence begets a positive mood. Experiments have found that pedestrians who were gazed at were more likely to accept a pamphlet from a researcher than those not gazed at (Kleinke & Singer, 1979). In this way,
interest displays are beneficial to the displayer. Also they benefit the dyad by steering the two negotiators toward issues that the two parties care most about.

In sum, we have argued that the initiation problem faced by negotiators upon first meeting is worked through by emotional interactions generated by the behavior related to liking and interest. In our studies of executive negotiations (Morris & Keltner, 1998), negotiators often begin their negotiations with a host of interaction rituals that set the stage for the experience and expression of liking and interest. These interactions include greeting rituals, gift giving, and the casual yet vital talk about family, friends, and shared acquaintances and experiences. These interactions are not incidental to the negotiation; rather, through their evocation of liking and interest and the coordinated interactions that ensue, they lubricate and set in motion the process of negotiation. These emotional displays are strongly evocative of responses and hence create momentum for a dyad that carries into the harder work of exchanging concessions on issues. Having solved this first problem of initiating the interaction, negotiators make the transition to a new stage of the negotiation, where they must stake out their interests, where they may feel less of the low of liking and interest and more confrontation. Yet, as we shall see, other emotions may play an important role in this next stage of the negotiation.

2. Positioning

In descriptions of how negotiations change after the somewhat ritualized opening moves, many scholars have referred to a period of contention and positioning early in the process. One literature where this has been observed is the study of collective bargaining over labor contracts. Early in the process, negotiators often make shows of toughness and intransigence. It is generally
understood that most negotiations involve both a dimension of claiming value and creating value and that there is a tension between these two strategies (Lax & Sebenius, 198x). It is hard for negotiators to pursue both ends simultaneously. Research suggests that negotiators typically pursue value claiming for a period of time before moving on to value creation. In thinking about why this might be the case, we will analyze the context in terms of the social emotions involved. Consider the predicament of one who has initiated a negotiation with a counterpart. They have embarked on a process that will consume time and energy and so it is important to ensure that the settlement reached will at least provide that party with their most crucial points. The context is one of straight haggling or distributive bargaining. The problem inherent in this moment is one of asserting one’s preferences on a point, which often requires dominating the counterpart. The problem of dominance exemplifies a point made earlier that there are many solutions to the same relational problem. This problem can trigger one of several distinct emotions, each of which involves behaviors that potentially play a role in redressing the problem.

A first example of an emotional response to the problem of dominance inherent in the positioning phase in early-middle negotiations is anger. Studies of people’s espoused reasons for displaying anger have found that people express anger to change other’s behavior or extract a favor (Averill, 1982) and in negotiation specifically to induce a concession (Adler, Rosen, & Silverstein, 1998). Although the negotiation of most routine business contracts does not occasion vivid subjective feelings of anger (as in contentious divorce or strike), negotiators often do evince the behavioral signs of anger. Indeed, expert negotiators are often surprised after seeing videotapes of bargaining sessions at how angry they appear. What are the signs of anger in a negotiation? The empirical literature has identified many markers of anger, some of which we summarize in Table 2. The role of aggressive glaring stares in intimidating an opponent have
been documented in bargaining studies (Lewis & Fry, 19xx) as well as in field studies of professions, such as police interrogators, who engage in contentious bargaining (Arther & Caputo, 1959). Anger is also expressed in speech. For example, the president of a firm undergoing bankruptcy reports meetings with an angry creditor’s representative who endured glaring, sneering, and verbal jabs, such as responding to explanations by saying “quit making excuses for your incompetence” (Sutton & Callahan, 1987, p. 13). In more tempered settings, negotiators reveal anger through more indirect verbal aggression. Hostility to a person is often expressed by critiquing their ideas or affiliations (Freud, 1913/1959). Tone and volume of voice express anger. Gestures come into play as well. Statements are punctuated not with flowing gestures that reveal palms but with thrusting back-handed gestures, rather than the fluid, palm-exposing gestures of affiliation posture (Keating, 1985). Also angry negotiators, like angry primates, engage in postural expansion (Keating, 1985). Postures expressing anger and dominance involve shoulders thrown back and hands on hips or arms akimbo (Dovidio & Ellyson, 1985). The most celebrated chapter of Wolfe’s (1999a) novel A Man in Full provides elaborate descriptions of such nonverbal dominance tactics used in the “workout room” of an overextended bank to extract concessions from debtors. Wolfe (1999b) reports that this chapter is based closely on real examples studied in his field research in banks.

Displays of anger, through whichever channel, can have consequences on ones’ counterpart. There are several ways that anger has consequences. Anger displays convey information that a negotiator cares deeply and may be prone to rash action, such as abandoning negotiation and taking alternative measures (e.g., Schelling, 1960). Studies have found that anger-expressing people are seen as dominant (Clark, 1994) and worthy of status (Tiedens, 1999). Anger also evokes complementary emotions in the counterpart such as fear and guilt.
(e.g., Ohman, Esteves, & Dimburg, 19xx). Fear can lead a negotiator to cave in, to avoid courses of actions that could offend or upset the other. Ethnographic studies of poker players indicate that emotional expressions of aggression and hostility cripple some opponents. Hayano (1982) describes players who express hostility by talking “in the idioms of power and dominance” and nonverbally by “splashing chips and money around” and can succeed by “frightening and intimidating opponents who are too confused to defend themselves” (p. 57). Sometimes the reaction is not fear but guilt, and this most likely depends on the power differential. Yet the counterpart’s guilt that his or her actions have caused offense may motivate restitution in the form of concessions. Even if they do not induce fear or guilt, anger displays can influence through incentives by punishing the counterpart. Over a longer time span, the influence of anger displays may be a deterrent effect on the counterpart’s demands about an issue. Hence, from the standpoint of the individual negotiator, anger displays can function to reduce the problem of needing to dominate. From the standpoint of the dyad, anger displays can help the dyad find issues where negotiators have very strong preferences, anger signals deal-breaker issues that need to be accommodated in order to find joint gains on other issues.

A different emotional response that can be triggered by a dominance context is Contempt. Contempt involves a quite different set of behaviors than those involved in anger. If anger signals a latent aggressive challenge toward the counterpart, contempt signals that the counterpart is not worthy as a rival. In speech contempt is not likely to be expressed in a direct statement but rather through not responding to the counterpart or responding in dismissive tone. Or, a sneering expression can convey the essential point that the other has become unworthy—see Figure x (face pictures). Also, contempt is powerfully expressed through gaze patterns. Targets of contempt are unlikely to be looked at, especially when they are speaking and would like attention
(Ellyson & Dovidio, 1985). Again, it is worth emphasizing that whereas negotiators rarely report intense feelings of contempt, in our analysis of videotapes we have found that they manifest the behavioral signs of contempt quite frequently in the positioning phase of negotiation (Morris & Keltner, 1998).

When a negotiator displays contempt in the positioning phase of a negotiation, this emotion does social work in the standard ways. First, it conveys information. Tiedens, Ellsworth, & Mesquita (2000) have found that observers infer status from emotional displays. Actors who display emotions related to contempt such as pride and anger are judged to be of high status. Also contempt may work by evoking complementary emotions. That is to the extent that the counterpart internalizes the message of low regard, he or she may feel somewhat ashamed and demoralized. The counterpart may become cowed and drop his or her claim to an issue. Or the counterpart may make concessions in order to win back the approval that they have lost. As with anger, we can conclude that contempt expressions have consequences that solve the relational problem of dominance. From the individual’s standpoint, the problem is solved because the counterpart has been shamed into submission. From the dyad’s standpoint, contempt may have solved the problem of inducing critical concessions without the risks of overt anger.

Importantly we are not claiming that the consequences of anger and contempt are always beneficial. Nor are we arguing that these emotions are beneficial most of the time when these emotions are triggered by the problem of dominance. In fact, research on romantic partners solving conflicts finds that anger and contempt often lead to conflict spirals and in the long run, marital dissolution (e.g., Goffman & Levenson, 1983). Rather we are positing that displays of anger and contempt provide important information about negotiators’ preferences, positions, and concerns. Further, these displays should prompt counterparts, in general, to avoid particular
courses of action that would be damaging to the course of the negotiation. Interestingly, our perspective suggests that anger and contempt are most likely to have these benefits when they occur during the positioning phase of the negotiation, and after a successful opening moves phase, when negotiators have solved the initiation problem. Displays of anger and contempt, in an attempt to convey dominance, we have observed, when the occur at the outset of negotiations or when negotiators try to re-establish rapport are particularly problematic.

3. Problem Solving

Researchers describe a transition to a collaborative or problem solving phase of negotiation refer to a period in the conversation characterized by free discussion, exchange of information about priorities, mutual brainstorming of options and mutual evaluation of these options (Pruitt & Rubin, 19xx; Lewicki et al, 1996). The opposing negotiators who had been assertive and domineering when pushing for their key points have now let down their guards. Each is trying to find ways to help make the settlement better for the other one. Observers of negotiations have long been interested in how negotiators make this transition. In some classic studies of negotiation, this transition was described as something of a mystery in that the transition itself was not explicitly discussed. Consider Peters’ (1952) account of a transition to cooperarotin in a labor -management negotiation that had been stuck on a contentious wage issue:

Frazier and Turner looked each other in the eye. Somewhere a communication established itself without a word between them. The question in each other’s eye was, “If I move to 9 cents will you move to 9 cents?” …Frazer said “Well we are willing to give it some consideration…” Turner nodded his acquiescence. The tension was gone. (p. 18)
Somehow a nonverbal message is conveyed and the contentious interaction is transfigured into a cooperative, problem-solving interaction. In analyzing what social emotions might help bring about such transitions, we start by asking what relational problem is presented by the context. What kind of relationship do negotiators need in order to move forward at this stage in the negotiation? Assuming for the sake of simplicity that a negotiation has marched through the ideal-typical phases, the negotiators have initiated a relationship and then strained it by engaging in a dominance contest in their initial positioning. Often they have discovered that unless they try collaborating, neither will be able to obtain the outcome hoped for. To do so they have to move beyond a relationship of openness to each other to a relationship of trust.

Which social emotions may be triggered by this predicament? One emotion that often occurs when one realizes one may have pushed too hard with an audience whose impression matters is embarrassment. Yet to increase their level of trust they may have to first repair the damage caused by the positioning phase. A social emotion that may help do so is embarrassment. Embarrassment incorporates a complex set of behaviors, including: averted gaze, a slight shrug, a subtle bow, a self-conscious smile (e.g., Keltner, 1995). These behaviors, interestingly enough, resemble many of the appeasement displays seen in other species (Keltner & Buswell, 1997), and serve an appeasement function. Namely, displays of embarrassment, or related behaviors like those associated with politeness and modesty (Keltner, Young, & Buswell, 1997), lead others to forgive and trust. Embarassment provides a credible signal of the wrongdoer’s regret—more credible than even a sincere apology—and helps bring about reconciliation (Keltner & Buswell, 1997).
Although embarrassment helps repair the damage, it does not bring a relationship all the way forward to trust. Another social emotional process that may be triggered as negotiators stop their positioning efforts and seek a way toward trust is rapport. Although rapport has always figured prominently in the popular literature on negotiation (Brooks, 1991; Ury, 1993), there has little scientific evidence for rapport or its consequences until recently (DePaulo & Bell, 1990). Research on the relationship between clients and medical professions has made refined and operationalized rapport (see Blanck, Buck, & Rosenthal, 1986; Harrigan & Rosenthal, 1986). For these researchers, rapport is a state of mutual positivity and interest that arises through convergence and resonance of expression (Tickle-Degnen & Rosenthal, 1990). In fact, the level of rapport in an interaction can be reliably judged from videotapes without a sound track from the convergence of non-verbal displays, such as nodding, leaning, and gesturing (Bernieri, 1988; Bernieri, 1991; Bernieri et al., 1994). Theorists have suggested that rapport serves the function of enabling social coordination or cooperation (Argyle, 1990). The link between rapport in negotiation and mutual cooperation has been established in a number of studies by Morris and colleagues (Drolet & Morris, 1999; Moore et al, 1999; Morris & Drolet, 1999). Studies have found that visual access to each other’s non-verbal communication of emotion is a critical catalyst to the development of rapport (Drolet & Morris, 1999), albeit rapport can be created over non-visual media, such as email, so long as convergent expression of positive emotions occurs.

In sum, the moment in negotiation when positioning can go no further presents a problem to negotiators: They need to move to a higher level of trust in order to make progress. Two social emotions may be triggered by this predicament: embarrassment on the part of a negotiator who has been overly demanding and rapport between the negotiators as they discuss their
common fate. The work done by these emotions may go a long way towards explaining the miraculous transitions in negotiations that have been observed by conflict researchers.

4. Endgame

The final phase noted by many observers of negotiation involves a shift away from the fully cooperative stance of problem solving. In this phase, the value creation possibilities have been reaped and negotiators turn again toward more contentious tactics aimed at bringing the opponent to commit to a given settlement. Reviewing evidence from labor-management negotiations, Kochan (1980) noted that counterparts will not fully accept a settlement until convinced that one will not make further concessions. Hence, negotiators find themselves having made many concessions and yet being asked for more by a counterpart who has not fully committed to the settlement; in other words, the end of negotiations often involves the problem of binding one’s counterpart to a settlement. Qualitatively different ways of interacting commence; the cooperative, problem-solving tone replaced by exasperation, accusation, and ultimatums.

What social emotions might be triggered by this problem? An emotion often expressed in the final moments of the negotiation is pain. A negotiator making final concessions can often be seen screwing up his or her face in agony and heard making complaints “C’mon...No more...I’m bleeding all over the floor.” Expressions of pain may help a negotiator in that they induce sympathy or make it credible that the negotiator would take his or her alternative rather than making a further concession.

Other emotions play off the fact that closer relationship formed during problem solving carries with it increased expectations of good behavior. The problem of facing an indecisive
counterpart will often trigger exasperation at indecision, indignation at attempts to back out, and
general accusations of “bad faith”--all quickly replaced by expressions of gratitude and
congratulations upon the counterpart’s final act of commitment.

In sum, a social functional analysis of emotions helps us understand the patterns of
qualitative difference in how people interact at different phases of negotiation. Different
temporal points in negotiation present distinct relational problems; these problems tend to trigger
particular social emotions which then guide interactions, sometimes resolving the problem so
that negotiators can advance to the next one.

**Novel Predictions from Phase Framework**

Thus far we have emphasized how long-noted observations about phases and their
sequential order can be understood in part as arising from social emotions. However, it is worth
spelling out that our proposal points to a variety of straightforward, empirically testable
predictions concerning when specific negative and positive emotions are likely to occur during
the course of the negotiation. Specifically, we suggest that emotions will be observed as
negotiators confront the different problems of negotiation, and be less frequent once those
problems have been met.

This same rationale also makes more specific predictions concerning when emotion will
shape negotiation-related cognition, which has been the focus of the study of affect and
negotiation thus far. For example, anger is associated with increased blame upon others (Keltner
et al., 1993) and increased risk seeking (Lerner & Keltner, in press). We would expect to
observe these specific patterns of cognition as negotiators are in the positioning phase of the
negotiation. Thus, our model not only provides a basis for making emotion specific effects upon
negotiation-related cognition; it also suggests at what stage these effects are most likely.

A more innovative set of predictions that flow from our analysis are those centering on dependent variables other than negotiation outcome. Too often, research on conflict is based on experiments that, in essence, “assume” a negotiation mutually understood to include a given set of issues. In reality, of course, one important dependent variable is whether one chooses to seek a negotiation at all? And, if at all, with whom? Over which set of issues? Our analysis allows predictions about these dependent variables. For instance, liking and interest upon meeting a person should predict whether one chooses to negotiate at all. Displays of anger should predict getting one’s way on the issues where one cares the most. Rapport should be predict a dyad having a high joint outcome through collaborative seeking of optimal settlements.

Another set of predictions concerns emotions occurring in orders other than the one we have described. Here there are some leads to pick up from early research on reaction to concession patterns. The primary transition from positioning to problem-solving corresponds to the tough-then-soft concession pattern whereas the opposite transition would correspond to the soft-then-touch pattern. Research indicates that negotiators respond more positively to the tough-then-soft or “reformed sinner” pattern than to the soft-then-tough or “lapsed saint” pattern (Harford & Solomon, 1967). As these labels suggest, to the extent that negotiators implicitly read the reformed sinner pattern as an expression of repentance, the psychology of embarrassment and appeasement may be driving this classic finding. Further evidence that this effect hinges on participation in the communication system of social emotions may be the long intriguing findings that clinically paranoid participants differ from otherwise matched clinical populations in their lack of preference for the reformed sinner pattern (Harford & Solomon, 1969). In sum, our emotions-based interpretation of the phase structure of negotiation yields a number of novel
hypotheses. Now let us examine how the phase framework helps us understand two other important and perplexing factors affecting negotiations: culture and communication media.

B. Understanding Cultural Influences on Negotiation

There is a great deal of interest among negotiation researchers in the role of culture. However, negotiation theory, like other areas of social science, has struggled with dilemmas of how to conceptualize the influence of culture (see Gelfand & McCusker, 2000). From fields such as ethnography come traditions of studying conflict resolution as a ritual that differs in arbitrary ways based on historical and cultural contingencies. Yet from fields such as economics come traditions of depicting negotiation as guided by a strategic logic that applies everywhere. The dilemma is particularly sharp in the case of emotions. On the one hand, salient cultural differences in expressive behavior can be observed. Rafaeli and Sutton (1989) describe differences in norms about appropriate emotions at the workplace as function of national culture as well as of occupational and organizational cultures. For example, in American society a smile is obligated in a service encounter; in Israel it is not; and in some Muslim countries, it is avoided because it would constitute a sexual advance. Many of the expressive behaviors we have discussed differ or differ in how they are enacted as a function of display rules. Americans shake hands and make eye contact, whereas Japanese bow and avert their eyes. On the other hand, it easy to understand that handshaking and bowing play parallel roles in the social interactions that occur in each culture. Hence, it is often the case that one can abstract away from difference in concrete behavior to identify parallel functional relationships.

The framework for viewing phases of negotiation as involving a basic relational problem
offers a way to hypothesize about the most likely ways that emotions in conflict would differ across cultures. Our framework suggests that there are several emotional paths to the same destination. A first expected type of cultural difference is differences in how a given emotion is expressed and communicated. We have highlighted that the subjective feeling is but one of many manifestations that a person is in an emotional state. Just as no verbal language utilizes all of the phonemes in the world’s languages, no culture’s “body language” utilizes all of the gestures and expressions. Social emotions that involve a matching response on the part of the audience seem particularly likely to become tuned to a particular frequency. Consider for example how an interaction characterized by rapport looks in Latin versus East Asian cultures. Studies of Latin societies have emphasized that social interactions are characterized by outward displays of warm emotion. Even in workplace interactions, a person creates a harmonious feeling through warm, expressive behavior, a tendency referred to as simpatia in Latin America (Diaz-Guerrero, 1967; Lindsley and Braithwaite, 1996; Sanchez-Burks, Nisbett, and Ybarra, 1998; Triandis, Marin, Lisansky, and Betancourt, 1984). This obligation of emotional expressivity contrasts sharply with observations about expressive displays in many other highly collectivist societies. For example, in the Chinese virtue of jen (Hsu, 1985) or the Japanese tradition of amae (Doi, 1962) harmony is created through restraint, passivity, subdued sensitivity rather than reactivity, expressivity, and extraversion. Hence, although rapport involves matching expression of positive affect and interest, the way these are behaviorally enacted differs somewhat.

Our framework also suggests that cultures may differ in which of two functionally interchangeable emotions are triggered by a relational problem. For example, we have suggested that anger and contempt are two alternative emotions that are triggered by the problem of
positioning. It is hard to simultaneously express anger and contempt toward a counterpart in a conflict because, to some extent, anger indicates an involvement with the other person whereas contempt conveys that the other is not worthy of one's involvement and anger. In a culture that discourages overt emotion, contempt will be preferred. For example, it may be that the occupational cultures of management negotiators encourage contempt whereas their union counterparts are free to express anger. Jackall (1988) argues that that managers “need to exercise iron self-control and to have the ability to mask all emotion and intention behind bland, smiling, and agreeable public faces …[outburst are] seen as irrational, unbefitting men or women whose principle claim to social legitimacy is dispassionate rational calculation” (p.47-9).

Similarly the issue of whether anger or contempt will be deployed in positioning attempts most likely varies across organizational cultures. Morrill (1995) conducted one of the few ethnographic studies of conflict among high-level executives. Morrill compares the handling of conflicts at two firms that differed sharply in communication patterns and culture, firms described, respectively, as atomistic and interactive cultures. In the bureaucratic organization, a consulting firm, norms prohibited overt acts of aggression and dominance, so positioning in meetings over contested issues was largely conducted through behaviors expressing contempt. As one aging manager complains:

"It's not like some of the scenes I've watched at some of my clients: people raising their voices to one another, threatening each other. It's not at all like that here. No sir. It's deadly silent. You notice at meetings that when you speak, people look out the window, light their pipes, get called away to another meeting all the time [emphasis by the informant]. After a while, no
amount of money can keep your sanity in a place like that. (p. 163)

In the interactive matrix organization, a toy company, norms encouraged positioning through
direct confrontations at meetings. Morrill reports on meeting concerning a decision on which the
preferences of two managers I.M. and P. conflict. Here we see that negotiators to not ignore each
other’s statements but, instead, show direct involvement in words and gestures suggesting
violence and dominance.

“M. waited several minutes until P. had finished her complaints about his
reactions to the plan. He then stood up and, in his words, "threw her a couple
of hand grenades by looking her in the eye and saying that [he] would not allow
her to kill every idea he brought up in public." P. then stood up and said,
"If you want a war, we'll give you a war."

In the interactive culture, it is not as though status had no impact. As is generally the case,
contempt was more likely from a manager of relatively higher status. Also, perhaps because of
the occupational pressure, the level of anger was lower with higher level managers. In contests
between two low-level managers, things got quite ugly: In this example the ethnographer
reports observation of the phenomena at meetings known in the culture as a “meltdown”:

“Two weeks after the initial incident, at another team meeting, Ingle
interrupted Pound loudly again and Pound responded by raking his hand across the burgundy teak meeting table, pushing his and two other colleagues’ materials to the carpet. Pound and Ingle then had a meltdown, pushing each other and swinging their fists. The meltdown lasted several minutes, spilling out into the hallway, where a security guard watched for two or three minutes before breaking it up....Pound commented in the aftermath that he "couldn’t let that dick get away with pretending not to listen to me again." (p. 207).

Interestingly, the incendiary behavior was a contempt display, perhaps an attempt at signalling a status difference. Contempt by senior managers seemed to govern their intervention or lack thereof in the meltdowns of low status managers. They do not intervene "because of the same trepidation one would have, an executive noted, in intervening in a fight between rabid dogs." (P. 212).

In sum, the framework for linking sets of emotions to phases of negotiation offers a way to understand the likely ways in which culture affects emotions in negotiation. By locating points of cultural contingency within constraints of a strategic logic, the framework offers a way to reconcile purely historicist and functionalist views of negotiation. That is, cultures differ in the emotional paths selected to reach strategic ends.

On a practical level, cultural differences can pose challenges in negotiation. Emotions as communication systems can break down just as verbal language as a communication system breaks down when the sender and receiver are working in a different code. In a study of Chinese negotiating styles, Pye (1982) describes a number of ways in which American negotiators might send the wrong signal to a Chinese host. However, to the extent that our phase model description
holds across cultures, it might serve as an abstract interpretive frame that negotiators can use to interpret the other parties likely meaning. It may be that cultural differences, rather than pointing to limitation of the usefulness of the phase model, are a reason why it is useful to conceptualize negotiation at a level more abstract than the concrete norms and behaviors in a given setting.

C. Understanding Effects of Communication Media on Negotiation

Finally, studies of negotiation have long found that communication media can impact negotiation outcomes. Thus, one way negotiators can potentially influence a negotiation is through their choice of communication media (for reviews, see Poole, Shannon, & DeSanctis, 1992; Bazerman, Curhan, Moore, & Valley, 1999). Different communication media, such as face-to-face, video conference, telephone, and electronic mail, differently impact negotiators’ interpretation of negotiation and its rules (e.g., Valley & Keros, 1999). Researchers suggest that the effects of communication media on negotiation is due to inherent differences in their so-called "richness", that is the amount of information which can be conveyed through a (Poole et al., 1992). Many studies have found, for example, that face-to-face conversations result in higher joint outcomes than do exchanges of written notes. Yet these effects do not appear across all kinds of negotiation tasks. Research focusing on attributes of the media per se have not uncovered the crucial mechanisms and boundary conditions. We will argue that the impact of communication media on negotiation outcomes can be understood in terms of how communication media enable or impede certain emotional dynamics and the extent to which these dynamics are required to solve the problems that a conflict presents.
On the one hand, research has shown that face-to-face communication improves negotiated outcomes. For example, Valley, Moag, and Bazerman (1998) found that face-to-face negotiation was associated with less deceit and higher joint gain. And, Drolet and Morris (1999) revealed that participants who communicated face-to-face versus on the telephone were more likely to cooperate in a mixed-motive conflict. In both the Valley et al. and Drolet and Morris studies, the positive effects of face-to-face communication may be linked to the nonverbal (e.g., facial and postural) rather than the verbal cues transmitted through the medium. Drolet and Morris suggest that exposure to these nonverbal cues to emotion leads to a shared feeling of rapport between negotiators.

On the other hand, research has also shown that under certain conditions face-to-face communication leads to adverse joint outcomes. For example, Lewis and Fry (1977) show that face-to-face contact enables dominance tactics. In their study, individualistically-oriented negotiators used more pressure tactics, were more likely to impasse, and obtained lower joint profit when they negotiated face-to-face versus when they could not see each other. Findings from studies that have oriented participants to define their task competitively have found that negotiators in a face-to-face condition obtain lower collective outcomes than negotiators in a condition where visual access was blocked by a barrier (Carnevale, Pruitt, & Seilheimer, 1981; Lewis & Fry, 1977). Process measures in these studies suggest that negotiators in the barrier condition visually attended to their issue information and this enabled a problem-solving dynamic. By contrast, negotiators in the face-to-face condition were more likely to engage in nonverbal dominance tactics, such as staring at their opponent, and this accentuated a competitive dynamic. Likewise, Carnevale, Pruitt, and Seilheimer (1981) found that face-to-face communication enhances bargaining tension through its effect on dominance behavior. As with
the positive effects, the negative effects of face-to-face communication on negotiation have been linked to medium's conveyance of nonverbal behaviors. In the Carnevale et al. study, face-to-face negotiators engaged in aggressive staring that, for some, led to an escalation of competitive motives. In contrast, communication media that prevent exposure to nonverbal cues may impede dominance tactics.

To summarize, the dynamics of emotions work in negotiations is crucial not only for understanding emotions and their direct consequences but also because these emotional dynamics are an important mechanism through which more remote variables—such as culture or communication media—have influences on negotiation processes and outcomes.
Footnotes

1 In the ever-swelling popular literature on negotiation, the classic emphasis on emotions can still be found in the form of dictums about emotional intelligence and body language (Rosci, 1981). Yet popular treatments that are closest to the academic literature and most influential take a predictably rationalistic stance that negotiation always proceeds best through dispassionate discussion of principles (Fisher & Ury, 1981). On this view, emotions should be “checked at the door” when entering a negotiation.

2 In a negotiation between two individuals who already know each other well, this first problem may be minimized. However, we would contend that the problem exists most of the time. First, negotiations are generally required when conflicts arise outside of a close relationship. Second, even if counterparts know each other from one domain of life, they may not know each other’s intent and capabilities in the negotiator role. Hence, they still face an initial dilemma concerning whether or not to embark on a negotiation.

3 The authors conduct such an exercise as part of the Advanced Negotiation Program in the Stanford GSB Executive Education Curriculum.
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Table 1. Example: A social functional analysis of emotions in family relationships

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>PROBLEM</th>
<th>EMOTIONS</th>
<th>SPECIFIC FUNCTION</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ensuring</td>
<td>Sexual desire</td>
<td>Increases likelihood of sexual contact</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Procreation</td>
<td>Jealousy</td>
<td>Fosters vigilant guarding against rival suitors</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Protection of children</td>
<td>Filial love</td>
<td>Ensures parental care for offspring</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Sympathy</td>
<td>Leads others to help vulnerable young</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table 2. Proposal: A social functional analysis of emotions in organizational relationships

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>PROBLEM</th>
<th>EMOTIONS</th>
<th>SPECIFIC FUNCTION</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Maintaining</td>
<td>-Gratitude</td>
<td>-Rewards other for cooperating</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reciprocal</td>
<td>-Anger</td>
<td>-Punishes other for defecting, motivating restitution</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cooperation</td>
<td>-Guilt</td>
<td>-Spurs own efforts to repair the harm one has done</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maintaining</td>
<td>-Shame</td>
<td>-Signals to group a transgressor’s awareness and regret,</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Group Norms</td>
<td></td>
<td>reducing the likelihood of needless sanctioning</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maintaining</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hierarchies</td>
<td>-Contempt</td>
<td>-Reduces the status of the other, usually a subordinate</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table 3. A phase model of negotiation problems and emotional solutions

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Negotiation phase:</th>
<th>OPENING MOVES</th>
<th>POSITIONING</th>
<th>PROBLEM SOLVING</th>
<th>ENDTGAME</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Interpersonal problem:</td>
<td>Initiative</td>
<td>Influence</td>
<td>Trust</td>
<td>Binding</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Relevant emotions and means by which they are expressed:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Openness</td>
<td>Anger</td>
<td>Embarassment</td>
<td>Pain</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Eye contact, show of palms, close interpersonal distance</td>
<td>Hostile criticism of other’s point, furrowed brow, postural expansion, chopping gestures</td>
<td>Apologies, blushing, submissive posture</td>
<td>Wincing at one’s own final concession, cringing posture</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Interest</td>
<td>Contempt</td>
<td>Empathy</td>
<td>Exasperation</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Personal questions, Eyebrows raised, Cocked head, Forward lean</td>
<td>Dismissive tone, look away from other when other is speaking</td>
<td>Synchronous positivity, e.g. simultaneous smiling, nodding, laughter</td>
<td>Surprise and anger at other’s reluctance to reach final settlement</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Figure 1. Diagram illustrating the assumption of the SF approach that emotions are triggered by relational problems and that emotions involve many distinct behaviors, each of which has a variety of consequences, some of which may solve the problem from the standpoint of the individual’s interest, some of which may solve the problem from the standpoint of the dyad’s interest, and some of which are irrelevant to the relational problem. In short, we do not assume that all aspects of emotions are adaptations.