The Role of Gender in Pay-What-You-Want Contexts

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ABSTRACT

This research highlights how gender shapes consumer payments in Pay What You Want (PWYW) contexts. Four studies involving hypothetical and real payments show that men typically pay less than women in PWYW settings, due to gender differences in agentic versus communal orientation. Men approach the payment decision with an agentic orientation and women with a communal orientation. These orientations then shape payment motives and ultimately affect payment behavior. Because agentic men are more self-focused, their payment decisions are motivated by economic factors, resulting in lower payments. Conversely, communal women are more other-focused, and their payment decisions are motivated by both social and economic factors, resulting in higher payments. The findings additionally highlight how sellers can use marketing communications to increase the salience of social payment motives and demonstrate that by doing so, marketers can increase how much men pay without altering how much women pay in PWYW settings.

Key Words: Pay What You Want, Gender, Agency and Communion Theory, Behavioral Pricing
Under Pay What You Want (PWYW) pricing (sometimes referred to as Pay What You Can/ Feel/ Wish/ Think It’s Worth, etc.), buyers can pay any price for a product, including zero, and the seller agrees to sell the product at that price. A surprisingly diverse set of industries have used this pricing strategy, including restaurants (Panera Bread©), gaming (Humble Indie Bundle), museums (Guggenheim), religious institutions (Temple Kol Ami), and even higher education (ASU Law School). Some businesses offer PWYW as a limited price promotion, while others make it their standard policy. Either way, its success can be uneven, in part because buyer payment behavior can be unpredictable.

Research shows that buyers pay less on average under PWYW than under fixed pricing (Kim, Natter, and Spann 2009, 2010; Riener and Traxler 2012; Schmidt, Spann, and Zeithammer 2015). As such, the commercial viability of PWYW relies on some customers paying at or above some reference amount (i.e., fixed costs, suggested price, etc.) to subsidize those who pay below it. For example, Metropolis Café in Santa Monica, CA, sells coffee under PWYW. Approximately 50% of customers pay what the fixed price used to be (there is no posted price, but some customers ask for this information), 25% pay more, and 25% pay less (Carroll 2018). Given the importance of buyers’ payment decisions to the success of PWYW, sellers must understand which customers are likely to pay lower versus higher prices and whether they can take action to influence how much they pay.

Prior PWYW research identifies buyer and seller characteristics associated with payment magnitude. From the seller side, sharing proceeds with a charity (Gneezy et al. 2010), providing a minimum or suggested price (Chen, Koenigsberg, and Zhang 2017; Johnson and Cui 2013; Soule and Madrigal 2015), being a monopolistic provider (Schmidt, Spann, and Zeithammer 2015), and having a positive reputation (Kim, Kaufmann, and Stegemann 2014) are all
associated with higher payments. For buyers, paying anonymously (Gneezy et al. 2012), sharing social responsibility with the seller (Gneezy et al. 2010), having higher levels of altruism, perceived fairness (Chen, Koenigsberg, and Zhang 2017; Gneezy et al. 2010; Jang and Chu 2012; Kim Natter, and Spann 2009), and customer satisfaction, lead to higher payments, as do higher income and lower price sensitivity (Kim, Natter, and Spann 2009).

We extend this body of knowledge by examining whether payment amounts also differ systematically between men and women, and if so, why. We focus on consumer gender for several reasons. First, while extant research on individual differences that influence PWYW payment behavior makes significant contributions, the characteristics most often explored are typically unobservable, so managers’ ability to leverage this research is somewhat limited. Second, gender is one of the most common demographic variables that firms use to segment their customer base (although typically this is actually biological sex) and is, therefore, a highly relevant variable. Finally, while prior research has shown numerous ways men and women differ in consumption domains, gender-related price-setting behavior in PWYW contexts has received comparatively little attention.

Our research makes several contributions. First, theoretically gender is an important construct in its own right that has been associated with a wide range of consumer-relevant attitudes and behaviors, including customer loyalty (Melnyk, van Osselaer, and Bijmolt 2009; Noble, Griffith, and Adjei 2006), advertising responsiveness (Chang 2007; Putrevu 2004), internet use (Hupfer and Detlor 2006), trust formation in online communities (Porter, Donthu, and Baker 2012), attitudes toward luxury brands (Stokburger-Sauer and Teichmann 2013), spending behavior (Kurt, Inman, and Argo 2011), price sensitivity (Gao, Mittal, and Zhang 2020), donation behavior (Winterich, Mittal, and Ross 2009), and tipping (Lynn and Latane
1984). Our work contributes to the existing literature by revealing another consumer-relevant behavior that varies with gender—deciding what price to pay in PWYW contexts. Next, we contribute to the PWYW literature by revealing how gender can help explain and add more texture to prior findings. For example, altruism, frequently cited as a reason consumers pay more than zero, has been linked to gender (Andreoni and Vesterlund 2001; Branas-Garza, Capraro, and Rascon-Ramirez 2018). Similarly, a sense of shared social responsibility with the seller increases payment, and gender is related to characteristics such as universalism (Schwartz and Rubel 2005), being part of a social network, and feeling responsible to help and contribute to that network (Ortmann and Tichy 1999). Finally, we make a substantive contribution by identifying the importance of gender on PWYW payment behavior and actions that sellers can take to positively influence consumer payment behavior.

Before proceeding, we must clarify our terminology. Meaningful distinctions exist between gender and sex, with the former culturally defined (Lerner 1986; Money and Ehrhardt 1972) and the latter biologically defined. However, as previous research on gender role theory (Eagly 1987; Eagly and Wood 1991, 1999) indicates, these constructs are related, as gender expectations are shaped largely by biological sex. We use the term gender to reflect differences between consumers who self-identify as male or female. However, we expect that our results generalize to biological sex.

The rest of this paper is organized as follows. We begin by summarizing the research on PWYW. We then examine how gender differences in agentic-communal orientations affect a range of consumer behaviors, including other voluntary payments. We next situate our work within this broader theoretical context, present our hypotheses, and discuss the results of four studies. We conclude with a general discussion and areas for future research.
Pay-What-You-Want Pricing

Three questions dominate the existing research on PWYW pricing. First, is it a viable pricing strategy for sellers? Second, when given a chance to pay any price (including zero) for a product or service, do consumers behave in utility-maximizing ways and pay zero? Finally, if not, then what factors explain how much consumers do pay?

Regarding viability, research shows that PWYW pricing can be as profitable (and more) as fixed pricing (Chen, Koenigsberg, and Zhang 2017; Gneezy et al. 2010; Kim, Natter, and Spann 2009, 2010; Mak, Zwick, and Rao 2010; Riener and Traxler 2012; Schmidt, Spann, and Zeithammer 2015). According to Chen, Koenigsberg, and Zhang (2017), profitable PWYW pricing requires at least one of the following: sufficient numbers of fair-minded consumers, low marginal costs, a highly competitive market, requiring or suggesting a minimum price, or a distribution of consumers skewed toward the low-end of the willingness-to-pay scale (since, particularly for low marginal cost goods, this brings more customers into the market but with reduced risk to the firm of freeloding). Mak et al. (2015) show that PWYW can be profitable when buyers and sellers engage in repeated interactions, consumers are forward-looking, the possibility of fixed prices (as an alternative to PWYW) is sufficiently high, adequate product demand exists, and continued PWYW is contingent upon prior seller profits. Park, Nam, and Lee’s (2017) field experiments revealed that PWYW pricing generated as much revenue for sellers as fixed price schemes when combined with a charitable giving component and a suggested price.

Regarding whether consumers will pay zero, ample evidence exists that consumers rarely
freeload under PWYW (Gneezy et al. 2010, 2012; Jung et al. 2014; Kim, Natter, and Spann 2009, 2010; Regner and Barria 2009; Riener and Traxler 2012; Schmidt, Spann, and Zeithammer 2015), which leads to the third question: why do people pay more than zero, and what factors influence how much they pay? Non-zero payments have been attributed to knowledge of prices paid by other consumers (Soule and Madrigal 2015), having a shared social responsibility with the seller (Gneezy et al. 2010), possessing high levels of fairness and altruism (Gneezy et al. 2010, 2012; Kim, Natter, and Spann 2009), self-signaling (Gneezy et al. 2012; Jang and Chu 2012), social norms (Reiner and Traxler 2012), reputational concerns (Kim, Kaufmann, and Stegemann 2014), customer satisfaction, and income (Kim, Natter, and Spann 2009, 2014). More recently, Stangl, Kastner, and Prayag (2017) showed that repeat customers paid more than new and potential customers for a high-priced service.

Although prior research provides a foundational understanding of consumer behavior under PWYW, important questions remain. First, some of the explanations did not generalize across settings. For example, in Kim, Natter, and Spann’s (2009) research, fairness was significantly (positively) correlated with payment in only one of three domains examined. Second, and perhaps more importantly, the current literature provides limited guidance to sellers concerning how to identify consumers who might pay higher versus lower amounts and how sellers might influence buyer payments. How can sellers recognize a “fair-minded” consumer? Who is “altruistic”? Who is inclined to pay less but can be influenced to pay more? We begin to answer these questions by developing a conceptual model centered around gender differences in agentic-communal orientations that explains payment behavior over a range of PWYW settings. We also identify ways sellers can affect those payments.
Agentic and Communal Orientations

The notion that men and women think and behave differently is rarely in dispute, and scholars point to fundamental differences in concern for self versus others as one source of this difference. Known conceptually as agency and communion (Abele and Wojciszke 2007; Bakan 1966), these dual motivations reflect value differences: agentic individuals value power, self-sufficiency, competence, status, dominance, and independence, and communal individuals value harmony, compassion, trust, cooperation, and connection. Agentics are competitive (Gebauer, Wagner, and Sedikides 2013; Zhang, Feick, and Mittal 2014) and see themselves as separate from others. Communals are caring and see themselves as connected to others.

Agency has been conceptualized as “masculine” and communion as “feminine” (Bakan 1966). Accordingly, marketing research theorizes that men’s and women’s opposing orientations affect their behavior in different consumption contexts. For example, Kurt, Inman, and Argo (2011) argue that the presence of a friend while shopping activates stereotype-consistent impression management motives in consumers. Stereotypically, agentic individuals focus on themselves and self-promotion while communal individuals are concerned with others. Therefore, when shopping with friends, agentic individuals exhibit self-focused behavior through higher spending, whereas communal individuals demonstrate other-focused behavior through lower spending. Notably, the authors used biological sex to operationalize agency and communion in two of their studies.

Similarly, Zhang, Feick, and Mittal (2014) illustrate how differences in concern for self versus others explain gender disparities in willingness to share negative word-of-mouth (NWOM). Because of their communal orientation, women think about how the recipient will benefit from the shared information; thus, they share negative information with close ties, despite
image impairment concerns. In contrast, because of their agentic orientation, men are concerned with themselves and associated image goals. Therefore, image impairment concerns, rather than how useful the information might be to the recipient, determines when men share NWOM.

Last, Winterich, Mittal, and Ross (2009) show that men’s and women’s respective self-versus other focus influences their behavior in charitable giving contexts. Women naturally show concern for in-groups, but a high moral identity expands their focus beyond in-groups to out-groups and increases their donations. In contrast, because men tend to be self-focused, possessing a high moral identity increases donations to in- rather than out-groups since men view in-groups as self-relevant.

Table 1 summarizes selected research on the link between gender and various behaviors, including voluntary payments like charitable donations and tipping, and other more general consumption behaviors like ad evaluation and price sensitivity. Research on voluntary payments shows that women are more likely to donate than men, donate larger amounts (Mesch et al. 2002), and give more frequently (Dvorak and Toubman 2012). However, tipping research reflects more mixed findings. While several studies show that men tip more than women (Crusco and Wetzel 1984; Gueguen and Jacob 2012; Lynn and Latane 1984), others have shown the opposite. Research also shows that men are more sensitive to buying social approval via tipping than are women (Boyes, Mounts, and Sowell 2004). Finally, studies also show that tip amounts vary with contextual factors including server gender (Banks et al. 2018; Gueguen and Jacob 2012, 2014).

Many of the gender differences observed in the research summarized in Table 1 center on men’s tendency to have a more self-focused orientation and women’s tendency to have a more
other-focused orientation. This difference in orientation, outlined next, is central to our hypotheses.

Hypotheses Development

The extant research on PWYW, while insightful, does not sufficiently examine the role of buyer gender in payment decisions, though research in other consumption contexts reveals how gender affects other consumption behaviors, including voluntary payments. We aim to close this literature gap by showing that PWYW payments vary systematically by gender and why. Specifically, we propose that men pay less than women when allowed to pay what they want. Building on prior research (Winterich et al., 2009; Zhang et al., 2014), we argue that this payment gap is due to gender differences in agentic-communal orientation. Like Gao, Mittal, and Zhang (2020), who made the same argument regarding price sensitivity, we propose gender differences in orientation also influence prices paid under PWYW. Men, agentic in orientation, see themselves as separate from the seller and are self-focused. Women, communal in orientation, feel connected to the seller, and focus on both self and seller. Thus, price-setting strategies differ by gender, with men motivated by “the deal” and women motivated by the seller’s welfare. Specific to these assertions, our hypotheses follow:

H1: Men pay less than women in PWYW contexts.

H2: Men approach PWYW contexts with a more agentic orientation and women with a more communal orientation.
We further assert that agency-communion differences subsequently affect buyers’ payment motives and drive how much they pay. While in most buying situations buyers focus on economic motives (e.g., paying a low price), specific business models and transaction types exist that uniquely activate both economic and social payment motives. For example, recent research on Peer-to-Peer (P2P) businesses shows that provider-focused (vs. platform-focused) marketing communications lead consumers to think about their purchases from the provider’s (vs. platform’s) perspective, which increases their willingness to pay (Costello and Reczek 2020). Similarly, we posit that in PWYW transactions, buyers may be socially motivated and consider what is appropriate to the seller in determining what to pay.

We argue that differences in orientation influence who is more likely to be both socially and economically motivated in PWYW contexts. Past research shows that men tend to be more concerned with personal gains while women tend to incorporate others into their decisions (He, Inman, Mittal 2008; Kurt, Inman and Argo 2011). We contend that men’s agentic orientation, leads self-driven economic motives to be more salient in deciding what to pay, which results in lower payments. Women’s communal orientation leads social motives to be more salient when deciding what to pay, which results in higher payments.

**H3:** Because of their agentic (communal) orientation, men (women) are driven by relatively stronger economic (social) payment motives, which leads to lower (higher) payment.

In summary, we propose a serial process model whereby gender influences payment amount through associated agentic-communal orientations. These orientations make economic or social payment motives more salient, leading to lower or higher payments.
The question then becomes: how can managers increase payments among those who naturally pay less (men) without decreasing payments among those who pay more (women)? Given the hypothesized relationships between gender, orientation, and payment motives, we assert that sellers can influence buyer payment behavior by making social payment motives more salient in the selling context. Specifically, because men are socialized to be agentic, they are less likely to recruit social motives on their own. As a result, economic motives dominate, and they pay less. However, if social motives are made salient in the PWYW context, men may be more likely to incorporate these new cues into their decision-making processes and pay more. In contrast, we expect women to consider both economic and social factors more naturally when making payment decisions. Consequently, increased salience of social payment motives affects them less because such considerations are already natural to their decision-making.

**H4:** Men pay less than women in PWYW settings when social motives are not made salient (H1), but men pay more, and the difference between women’s and men’s payments attenuates when social motives are made salient.

This conceptual argument is similar in spirit to those made by Winterich, Mittal, and Ross (2009) in explaining why and how moral identity moderates the effect of gender on donation behavior, as well as to empirical findings from the tipping literature showing that customers tip more when servers create more social environments (Crusco and Wetzel 1984; Garrity and Degelman 1990; Lynn and Mynier 1993; Seiter 2007; Tidd and Lockard 1978). Figure 1 depicts our proposed conceptual framework.
Note that we do not make predictions regarding gender differences in purchase likelihood. This is because it is not clear that men and women would purchase at different rates based on the extant literature. In fact, it may suggest that they should purchase at comparable rates, albeit for different reasons. Agentic men may purchase with greater frequency to take advantage of a good deal, while communal women may purchase more frequently to show empathy for the seller. For these reasons, our model is silent concerning purchase intentions, but we measure those intentions and report them in each of our studies.

STUDY 1

To provide initial evidence for our prediction that men pay less than women under PWYW (H1), we obtained payment data from an online retailer that offered a PWYW promotion in 2013 for an expensive consumer electronics product. The promotion was emailed from the company’s (male) CEO and stated that customers could pay what they thought the product was worth (see Web Appendix). The product’s standard retail price ($320.00) was not provided in the email but was readily available on the seller’s website. The firm broke down its sales data by gender and shared its aggregate findings. It did not share individual level data or data by gender on purchase incidence. This information allowed us to test H1, the relationship between gender and payment amount.

Consistent with H1, men paid significantly less on average than women ($M_{men} = $221.00, SD = $109.56 vs. $M_{women} = $287.00, SD = $69.34, t (95) = 3.63, p < .05). More details regarding
the payment data are shown in the Web Appendix. Table 2 provides a summary of these findings and those of all the studies that follow.

While Study 1 provides preliminary support for H1, it has several limitations. First, the study is correlational. Second, we have aggregated, not individualized, data, so we could not examine whether the observed differences were affected by outliers or the statistical results affected by deviations from normality in the data. Third, the data do not lend themselves to exploring the process underlying the relationship between gender and payment. Fourth, we could not examine—or control for—other factors that may have influenced prices paid by consumers, including seller gender, whether there was a relationship between buyer gender and purchase likelihood, or whether there was a correlation between buyer gender and the likelihood of receiving the email promotion. We address these limitations in our subsequent studies, beginning with Study 2, which was conducted online and designed to test our full conceptual model.

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STUDY 2

Participants were 598 U.S. mTurk adults (41% male, $M_{age} = 39.04$, SD = 12.44) who were paid $.25 for completing this study. We manipulated seller gender (male, female, unknown) since prior research shows that men pay female servers more (Lynn and Simons 2000; Xu, Martinez, and Smith 2020) and that cooperation between men and women can vary by gender of the task partner (Balliet et al. 2011).

Procedure
This study employed a 2 (participant gender: male, female) x 3 (seller gender: male, female, control) between-subjects design. Participants imagined they were running errands and stopped in a bakery for a quick snack where the cashier greeted them and explained that customers could pay what they wanted for two cookies (see Web Appendix for a copy of the stimuli and measures used in this and all the studies that follow). We randomly assigned each participant to one of three cashier conditions: a male cashier (with an image), a female cashier (with an image), or no gender (and no image). Participants then entered their purchase intentions (using continuous 1-7 and binary measures) and their stated payment for two cookies. Next, participants responded to an item related to their agentic-communal orientation using a bipolar scale: the extent to which they were trying to be cooperative (1) vs. competitive (9) with the seller when deciding on a price. We chose this measure since cooperation is a common communal characteristic (Helgeson 1994) and competitiveness a common agentic one (Brunel and Nelson 2000; Spence, Helmrreich, and Stapp 1974). We measured payment motives by asking participants to state their level of agreement with the following five statements: “When I was thinking of how much to pay, I thought…a) this is a chance to get a good deal, b) this is a chance to save money, c) this is a chance to help myself, d) this is a chance to help someone else, and e) this is a chance to do something nice for someone else.” The study concluded with a manipulation check, followed by demographic questions, including gender, and an instructional manipulation check.

Results

We excluded participants who provided payments more than three standard deviations above the mean, two participants who failed an attention check, and a single participant who was
under the age of 18. Stated payments after these exclusions ranged from $.00 (n=11) to $10 (n=2) and averaged $1.83 (SD = 1.32).

Manipulation Check. Six participants did not respond to the manipulation check question, so this analysis is based on 578 respondents. Participants accurately recalled the cashier’s gender: 91% of participants in the male cashier condition correctly identified the cashier’s gender, 80% did so when the cashier was female, and 88% did so when the cashier’s gender was unknown. Forty-six participants stated they could not recall the cashier’s gender. Participant gender did not affect recall accuracy ($\chi^2 (3) =3.94, p = .27$).

Stated Payment. Because the stated payment data were not normally distributed, for this and all remaining studies, we log-transformed them (after converting $.00 to $.01) and conducted our statistical analysis on the transformed variable. However, for ease of interpretation, we report the non-transformed means in what follows. The Web Appendix includes all study results for transformed and non-transformed data. An ANOVA on (log) payment with participant gender, cashier gender, and their interaction as IVs showed only the predicted effect of participant gender ($F(1, 567) = 4.98, p < .05$). Supporting H1, men, on average, stated they would pay less ($1.72$) than women ($1.97$). Neither the effect of seller gender ($F(2, 567) < 1, p = .75$) nor the interaction ($F(2, 567) = 1.10, p = .33$) was significant.

Agentic-Communal orientation and payment motives: An ANOVA on orientation with participant gender and cashier gender as predictors only showed a significant effect of participant gender ($F(1, 578) = 13.68, p < .0001$). As expected, men were more competitive (M = 4.61) and women were more cooperative (M = 3.96), which is consistent with agentic and communal orientations, respectively. Seller gender did not affect participant orientation ($F(2, 578) = 1.43, p = .24$) nor did the participant gender by seller gender interaction ($F(2, 578) < 1, p = .58$).
Before examining the proposed relationship between orientation and payment motives, we conducted a factor analysis on the five payment motive questions. Two factors emerged. The self-help, good deal, and save money questions loaded onto one factor and the help other and do something nice questions loaded onto a separate factor. We averaged the items that loaded onto the first factor to form an “economic motives” index ($\alpha = .86$) and those that loaded onto the second factor to form a “social motives” index ($\alpha = .94$). We conducted a separate factor analysis on the five payment motive questions and the orientation question to demonstrate construct independence between them. The results confirmed that orientation did not load onto either the economic or the social payment motives factors. The results of these factor analyses are in the Web Appendix.

Mediation Analysis. We next tested our full proposed serial mediation model (Hayes 2017, Process Model 6, see Figure 2) with log payment as the dependent variable, participant gender (-1 = women, 1 = men) as the predictor variable (collapsed across seller gender), and agentic-communal orientation, economic, and social payment motives as the serial mediators. The results supported H2. Gender significantly positively affected orientation ($\beta = .30$, $t(571) = 3.31, p < .001$), with men expressing a more agentic orientation than women. A more competitive (vs. communal) orientation was associated with both lower social ($\beta = -.20$, $t(569) = -5.88, p < .0001$) and higher economic payment motives ($\beta = .17$, $t(570) = 6.44, p < .0001$). Gender did not directly predict economic ($\beta = -.04$, $t(570) < 1, p = .48$) or social payment motives ($\beta = -.06$, $t(569) < 1, p = .36$), rather it did so only through orientation. When the model included all of the mediators, the impact of agentic-communal orientation on payment was significant ($\beta = -.04$, $t(568) = -2.68, p < .01$), as were the effects of economic and social payment motives ($\beta_{\text{econ}} = -.16$, $t(568) = -7.34, p < .0001$; $\beta_{\text{social}} = .11$, $t(568) = 6.13, p < .0001$). The effect
of gender on payment was eliminated, providing support for serial mediation ($\beta = -.05$, $t(568) = -1.59$, $p = .11$, CI (95%) = [-.1054, .0110], 5,000 bootstraps).

To ensure the relationship between agentic-communal orientation and payment motives operates in our proposed and not the opposite direction, we ran a second serial mediation model (Hayes 2017, model 80). Log payment and gender remained the respective dependent and independent variables, but economic and social payment motives became the first and second mediators and orientation the third mediator. Economic motives positively and significantly affected orientation ($\beta = .36$, $t(569) = 6.03$, $p < .0001$), social motives negatively and significantly affected orientation ($\beta = -.29$, $t(569) = -5.88$, $p < .0001$), and gender positively affected it ($\beta = .26$, $t(569) = 3.05$, $p < .01$). When all mediators were included in the model, economic motives, social motives, and orientation remained significant predictors of payment. Critically, though, the indirect effect of gender on payment through economic payment motives and orientation was not significant (95% CI = [-.0021, .0017]) nor was the indirect effect of gender on payment through social payment motives and orientation (95% CI = [-.0044, .0002]).

*Purchase Intentions.* Finally, we examined whether our independent variables influenced purchase intentions, both to observe whether gender differences in likelihood of buying emerge and to eliminate the alternative explanation that a disparity in purchase intentions drives the observed payment differences. An ANOVA on purchase intention with participant and seller gender and their interaction as independent variables revealed only a significant effect of participant gender ($F(1, 578) = 11.05$, $p < .01$). Women’s intentions were significantly higher ($M = 6.20$) than men’s ($M = 5.82$). The effects of seller gender ($F(2, 578) = 1.69$, $p = .19$) and the
interaction (F(2, 578) = 1.19, p = .30) were not significant. A logistic regression analysis on the binary intention measure showed no significant effects for any of the variables (βgender = -.04, Wald χ^2 (1) < 1, p = .94; βseller = .534, Wald χ^2 < 1, p = .41; βtxn = -.32, Wald χ^2 (1) <1, p = .45). We ran a separate ANOVA with the same variables as the payment analysis but included purchase intention as a covariate since the effect of gender on purchase intention was significant. The resulting pattern remained the same, and the effect of gender on payment remained significant (F(1, 566) = 6.71, p = .01). We therefore feel confident that differences in purchase intentions did not drive gender differences in payment.

Discussion

Study 2 provides further evidence that men pay less than women under PWYW (H1) and, most significantly, explains why. Differences in agentic-communal orientation (H2) make social (vs. economic) payment motives relatively less (more) salient for men, resulting in lower payments. A communal orientation leads to stronger social payment motives, resulting in higher payments by women (H3). Seller gender did not affect payments. In this study, and the studies that follow, we do not observe any consistent significant effects of gender on purchase intentions; and controlling for purchase intention differences did not eliminate gender-payment differences. These purchase intention results suggest that the observed difference in payment by gender are not due to women having greater purchase interest or product liking than men.

While this study provides process support for our proposed model, the evidence remains correlational. Another limitation is that we measured agentic-communal orientation with a single item. Therefore, in the next study we directly and independently manipulate orientation.

STUDY 3
We argue that the observed gender differences in payment are due to differences in agentic-communal orientation. If this is true, then manipulating participants’ orientation should change that relationship. Since our focus is on prompting consumers who naturally pay less to pay more, we experimentally induced a communal orientation to test whether this leads to higher payments by men and eliminates gender payment differences.

Procedure

We paid 499 Prolific U.S. participants (45% male, $M_{age} = 30.34$ years, $SD_{age} = 11.75$) $2.00 to complete this study and randomly assigned them to one of two writing tasks adopted from Diekeman et al. (2011). In the communal condition, participants read the following instructions, “Think about a time when you wanted to act communally— that is, you wanted to care for someone else, be kind, or be caring—but you were unable to do so. What was this situation and what did it feel like?” Participants then wrote a few sentences describing when they were unable to act communally. In the control condition, we directed participants to think about the furniture in the room and to write a few sentences describing one piece. The premise of this manipulation was to motivate participants to act more communally in subsequent tasks because they had not yet achieved a communal goal. Gender was measured, making this a 2 (orientation: communal vs. control) x 2 (gender: male, female) between-subjects design.

After the writing task, participants expressed their level of agreement with four statements: “My needs are the center of my focus,” “At this moment I am more focused on myself,” “Other people’s needs are the center of my focus,” and “At this moment, I am more focused on other people,” (Zhang, Feick, and Mittal 2014). The first two items reflect an agentic self-focused orientation, and the last two items reflect a communal other-focused orientation. Together they served as an orientation manipulation check. Participants then transitioned into an
ostensibly unrelated scenario that instructed them to imagine browsing online and seeing an ad from a pizza shop offering customers the opportunity to pay what they want for a large pizza. As in study 2, participants indicated their purchase likelihood, payment amounts and payment motives. The study concluded with demographic questions.

Results

We eliminated participants whose stated payments were more than three standard deviations above the mean, who failed the instructional attention checks, and those with unexpected financial hardship. We ran this study in Spring 2020 at the height of the first COVID-19 shelter-in-place orders. At this time, millions of citizens lost their jobs and experienced a significant reduction or complete loss of income and we worried that these factors might affect participants’ willingness to consider any form of nonessential payment. Therefore, we defined “unexpected financial hardship” as participants who had been furloughed (n=15) or who, through self-reports, indicated that their financial position was much worse after Covid-19 (n=41). The following analyses are based on the remaining 428 participants whose stated payments ranged from $0.00 (n = 3) - $20.00 (n = 10).

Manipulation check. We reversed-scored the two communal items and then averaged the four questions to create a self-other focus measure (α=.89), with high (low) scores representing more self-focus (other-focus). An ANOVA on self-other focus with gender, orientation, and their interaction as independent variables revealed a main effect of gender (F(1, 424) = 14.20, p < .0001). Men expressed a significantly higher self-focus than women (M_{men} = 4.52 vs. M_{women} = 4.07), as expected and consistent with prior work. A significant main effect of orientation (F(1,424) = 14.25, p < .0001) also emerged. Participants in the communal condition expressed

\footnote{The Web Appendix includes an analysis devoid of COVID-related exclusions. The pattern of results was the same, but the gender × orientation interaction was no longer significant.}
significantly higher other-focus than those in the control condition (\(M_{\text{communal}} = 4.07\) vs. \(M_{\text{control}} = 4.52\)), suggesting our manipulation was effective. The interaction between the two variables was not significant (\(F(1, 424) < 1, p = .39\)).

**Stated payment.** An ANOVA on (log) payment with participant gender, orientation, and their interaction as independent variables showed a marginal interaction effect (\(F(1, 424) = 2.79, p = .10\)). Supporting H1, in the control condition, men submitted marginally lower payments on average ($7.24) than women ($7.74) (\(F_{\text{contrast}}(1,424) = 3.12, p < .08\)). As expected, this difference was attenuated in the communal condition (\(M_{\text{men}} = $7.86; M_{\text{women}} = $7.87, F_{\text{contrast}}(1,424) < 1, p = .54\)). Men paid more on average in the communal orientation (\(M = $7.86\)) than in the control condition (\(M = $7.24\)), but the difference was not statistically significant (\(F_{\text{contrast}}(1,424) = 1.47, p = .23\)).

**Payment motives.** We ran a MANOVA on payment motives with gender, orientation, and their interaction as predictors. We report only the results of the variables of central interest here for brevity, but we include additional analyses in the Web Appendix. The effect of orientation on social payment motives was significant (\(F(1, 424) = 3.89, p < .05\)). Participants in the communal condition had stronger social payment motives (\(M = 3.53\)) than those in the control condition (\(M = 3.23\)). No other effects were significant.

**Mediation analysis.** Although we did not observe a significant gender by orientation interaction on motives, we conducted a moderated mediation analysis (Hayes 2017, Model 8, See Figure 3) to confirm that our second proposed mediator, social payment motives, mediates the effect of gender on payment behavior when orientation is manipulated. Log payment was the dependent variable, gender, the predictor, economic and social payment motives, the mediators, and orientation, the moderator (on both the mediators and payment). Orientation significantly
predicted social payment motives ($\beta = .30, t (424) = 1.97, p < .05$), with participants in the communal (vs. control) condition expressing higher social payment motives. When all variables were included in the model predicting payment, the effect of gender was marginally significant ($\beta = -.10, t (422) = -1.81, p = .07$), with men paying less than women. Economic payment motives had a marginal, negative effect on payment ($\beta = -.06, t (422) = -1.81, p = .07$) and social payment motives had a significant and positive effect on payment ($\beta = .08, t (422) = 2.84, p < .01$). This pattern of results is consistent with our assertion that a communal orientation boosts social payment motives, and these motives mediate the effect of gender on payment behavior.

----------INSERT FIGURE 3 ABOUT HERE-----

Purchase Intentions. An ANOVA on purchase intentions showed no significant effects of gender ($F(1, 424) < 1, p = .92$) or orientation ($F(1, 424) = 1.49, p = .22$) but their interaction was significant ($F(1, 424) = 4.11, p < .05$). Women’s purchase intentions were higher in the communal condition ($M_{control} = 5.52$ vs. $M_{communal} = 6.01, F_{contrast} (1,424) = 5.81, p < .05$) but men’s did not differ ($M_{control} = 5.81$ vs. $M_{communal} = 5.69, F_{contrast} (1,424) < 1, p = .59$). A comparable logistic regression on the binary purchase intention variable showed only the effect of condition. Participants in the communal condition expressed higher purchase intentions than those in the control condition ($\beta = .78, \text{Wald } \chi^2 (1) = 3.91, p < .05$). Since these results do not reflect the payment pattern, it is unlikely that the observed differences in payment were driven by differences in purchase intentions, but to confirm this we re-ran our payment analyses with purchase intention as a covariate. The interaction between gender and orientation remained marginally significant ($F(1, 423) = 3.13, p = .08$) and the overall pattern of findings did not
change. Thus, the payment results do not appear to be driven by differences in purchase intentions.

Discussion

We tested our process model in this study by independently manipulating communal orientation. After doing so, we observed the same pattern of means as in prior studies, though not all the contrasts were significant. For example, men paid marginally less than women in the control condition and directionally, though not significantly, more in the communal than in the control condition. As expected, however, the difference between men’s and women’s payment was attenuated in the communal condition.

Regarding process, the results generally supported our premise that a communal orientation makes social payment motives salient, which leads to higher payments. However, we expected to observe an interaction between gender and orientation, not just on payment amount, but also on the orientation manipulation check and on social motives. However, no interaction emerged because women’s communal orientation and social payment motives also increased under the communal orientation manipulation, which we did not anticipate. We revisit this outcome in the General Discussion and posit reasons for the weaker pattern of results.

Overall, the findings from Studies 2 and 3 show that social payment motives mediate the effect of gender and orientation on payment. We now discuss actions marketers can take to make social payment motives salient in PWYW settings. We test whether firms can take actions that increase payments among men without decreasing them among women. We do so in the next study using marketing communications (H4) to manipulate social motives. To ensure these effects occur for actual, not imagined, payments, participants in Study 4 also make actual purchases using real money.
STUDY 4

We recruited 240 adults (43% male, M_{age} = 34.29 years, SD = 16.82) from a research pool at a large northeastern university for a 90-minute experimental session. Participants were paid $20 upon completion of this and other studies. We used marketing communications to manipulate social payment motives and we measured gender, making this a 2 (marketing communication message: social vs. control) x 2 (gender: male, female) between-subjects design.

Procedure

Participants completed the study in two parts—a PWYW task involving actual payments and a computer section to measure other variables. For the PWYW task, we gave participants ten $1 bills, told them they could use the money to make a purchase in a pop-up bakery across the hall similar to one that would be opening nearby, and keep any unused funds. We randomly assigned participants to one of two marketing communication conditions designed to manipulate social payment motives. Marketing communications in the control condition referred to the bakery as “Cambridge Cookie Company” and its “Pledge to Customers” included ‘fast and efficient service’ and ‘good value for the money.’ Marketing communications in the social payment motives condition referred to the bakery as “Cambridge Community” and its “Pledge to Customers” included ‘warm and friendly service,’ ‘treated like family,’ ‘feeling at home,’ and ‘being cared about.’

We then told participants they could purchase two cookies from the pop-up store as a pre-opening promotion and pay any price they wanted using the $10. We directed them to one of two rooms that contained a tray of cookies and either the control or social motive signage, told them to write their payment on an envelope, place the money inside, and put the envelope in the cash box provided. Participants went into the rooms alone and made their payments privately. We
instructed those who did not want to purchase cookies to write “No Cookies” on the envelope. Upon exiting the room, participants answered the payment motives questions used in the prior studies, which served as a manipulation check.

Results

We did not remove any participants from this study. Payments from those who purchased cookies ranged from $0 (n = 71) to $6.00 (n = 1), with an average of $1.22 (SD = $1.28).

Manipulation Check. A MANOVA on social and economic payment motives with gender, communication, and their interaction as predictors showed our manipulation was successful. In the control condition (i.e., Cambridge Cookie), economic payment motives were stronger than in the social condition (i.e., Cambridge Community), (M_{control} = 5.01 vs. M_{social} = 3.93, F(1, 197) = 31.84, p < .0001). Similarly, social payment motives were stronger in the social condition than in the control condition (M_{control} = 3.45 vs. M_{social} = 4.35, F(1, 197) = 18.76, p < .0001). The effect of gender was not significant (F_{control} (1, 197) < 1, p = .44; F_{social} (1, 197) < 1, p = .69), nor was the communication x gender interaction (F_{control} (1, 197) = 1.98, p = .16; F_{social} (1, 197) < 1, p = .45).

Payment behavior. We were only able to match gender, communication condition, and payment envelopes for 190 participants, which the subsequent payment analyses reflect. An ANOVA with log payment as the dependent variable, and gender, communication, and their interaction as independent variables, showed no main effect of gender (F(1,186) = 1.83, p = .18) or of communication (F(1,186 < 1, p = .56). As expected, however, their interaction was significant (F(1,186) = 4.04, p < .05). In the control condition, men paid significantly less ($ .76) than women ($1.46 (F_{contrast} (1, 186) = 6.06, p < .05), supporting H1. However, in the social condition, men paid marginally more than they did in the control condition ($1.16, F_{contrast}
(1,186) = 2.68, \( p = .10 \)), attenuating the difference between men’s and women’s payment ($1.35, \( F_{\text{contrast}}(1,186) < 1, \ p = .65 \)) and supporting H4. See Figure 4a.

**Moderated Mediation Analysis.** Note that although we designed our motives measures in this study to serve as manipulation checks, we also conducted a moderated mediation analysis (Hayes 2017, Model 5, see Figure 5) to determine if the observed gender (-1=female, 1 = male) x communication (1=social, -1= control) effect on payment was explained by social payment motives. Communications that made social motives salient significantly reduced economic motives (\( \beta = -.56, \ t(188) = -5.90, \ p < .0001 \)) and increased social payment motives (\( \beta = .48, \ t(188) = 4.66, \ p < .0001 \)). When gender and payment motives were added to the model predicting log payment (in addition to communication), the results showed that the gender x communication effect was mediated by social (\( \beta = .43, \ t(184) = 3.55, \ p < .001 \)), and not by economic payment motives (\( \beta = .06, \ t(184) < 1, \ p = .67 \); See Figure 4b).

----------Insert Figures 4a and 4b Here----------

**Purchase Incidence.** A logistic regression on purchase incidence was not significant for gender (Wald \( \chi^2(1) < 1, \ p = .32 \)), communication (Wald \( \chi^2(1) = 1.16, \ p = .28 \)), or their interaction (Wald \( \chi^2(1) = 1.30, \ p = .26 \)).

**Discussion**

In an incentive-compatible experimental design, men paid less than women when marketing communications did not make social payment motives salient. But when communications made social payment motives salient, men paid higher amounts—attenuating the difference between their payment and women’s payments. Our analysis also suggests that
men were differentially sensitive to the social communication and that social payment motives mediated the moderating effect of gender and communication on payment. Note that we gave participants $10 cash in this study, making the (economically rational) decision to keep all of it attractive, which makes this a conservative test of our model. Even so, the predicted pattern of payments emerged. This study shows that sellers can influence consumers’ payment motives through a low-cost intervention that makes the selling environment more social.

**GENERAL DISCUSSION**

**Summary of Findings**

This research examines the role of buyer gender in consumers’ payment decisions in PWYW settings. Four studies demonstrate that men typically pay less than women in these contexts. This pattern emerges because of their agentic-communal orientation differences. Because of their agentic orientation, men emphasize benefits to themselves, and because of their communal orientation, women consider benefits to others in addition to themselves. This difference in orientation subsequently affects consumers’ payment motivations. Agentic, self-focused orientation increases the relative salience of economic motives, resulting in lower payments, and communal, other-focused orientation increases the relative salience of social motives, resulting in higher payments.

**Theoretical Contributions**

This research contributes to the gender differences and PWYW literatures. While a large body of work has examined gender differences in varying consumption-related domains, including other voluntary payment behaviors, no prior work to our knowledge has systematically examined how gender affects price-setting in PWYW contexts. Thus, this research contributes to
the gender differences literature by demonstrating that men and women differ in how much they pay in PWYW settings due to differences in their agentic-communal orientation. Importantly, we also show that the effect of these orientations on subsequent payment motives is critical. Specifically, an agentic (communal) orientation makes social motives less (more) salient in the PWYW environment, thus driving payments down (up).

The link between agentic-communal orientation and payment motives is a new contribution to the PWYW literature and may help to explain past findings. For example, Kim, Natter, and Spann (2009) found that total revenues under PWYW were lower than under fixed prices at a cinema, but higher at a deli and buffet. It is likely that at the cinema social payment motives between the buyer and seller were less salient, leading to lower average payments by men. In contrast, the more social deli and restaurant environments may lead to social payment motives being more salient if customers establish social connections with servers/proprietors. This may have led men to make higher payments, increasing the overall average. Additionally, the interplay between gender, agentic-communal orientation, and payment motives might provide context to the finding that altruism, fairness, satisfaction, and loyalty positively affect payments. Gender and agency and communion have both been associated with many of these factors (Bem 1981; Eckel and Grossman 1998; Melnyck, van Osselaer, and Bijmolt 2009; Spence, Helmreich, and Stapp 1974). Regarding fairness, in the Kim, Natter, and Spann (2009) experiments, men may have been concerned with setting a fair price for themselves, due to their agentic orientation, making economic motives salient and driving prices down. Women, alternatively, are more cooperative due to their communal orientation, and may have had more salient social payment motives during their pricing decisions, causing them to set a price fair to both themselves and the theater, thereby driving payments up. In contrast for the deli, if social
payment motives were salient for both men and women, this might explain why altruism explained payments. Our findings are also consistent with Gneezy et al. (2010), who demonstrated the role of shared social responsibility in predicting payments. When firms share proceeds with charities, they likely make social payment motives more salient, leading to higher payments among men.

Our findings parallel those in the voluntary payment literature, that show that women pay more than men in charitable donation settings. It has been argued by some that consumers’ agentic-communal orientations and payment motives drive contribution decisions in those settings (Winterich, Mittal, and Ross 2009). Indeed, the nature of charitable donations relies in part on donors’ consideration of others. According to our proposed model, this consideration leads to higher social payment motives and donations and may explain more generally why women donate more money and more often to charities than men (Mesch et al. 2002). Dvorak and Toubman (2013) propose that men donate for prestige and recognition reasons, whereas women donate for selfless reasons, a rationale consistent with agency-communion.

Notably, our results differ from some findings in the tipping literature (e.g., Lynn and Latane 1984) that show men tip more than women. We believe that agency and communion could also explain some of these differences. Specifically, agency and communion shape self-presentation strategies (Kurt, Inman, and Argo 2011; Paulhus and Trapnell 2008). Agentic individuals tend to adopt status, power, and self-confident presentation styles, and communal individuals tend to adopt cooperation, kindness, and concern for other self-presentation styles. Kurt, Inman, and Argo (2011) showed that in the presence of others, agentic individuals tend to spend more (to demonstrate status), and communal individuals do not (to demonstrate social connection). Given that much of the literature on tipping examines behavior in the context of
restaurants, where diners are usually in the presence of others, men’s agentic orientations may induce them to leave larger tips. Supporting this premise, Boyes, Mounts, and Sowell (2004) found that men were more sensitive to obtaining social approval via tipping than women. In short, agency and communion could still operate in the tipping context, albeit through impression management rather than our proposed economic versus social payment motivation pathway.

*Managerial Implications*

Our research has marketing implications for firms that use or are contemplating using PWYW pricing. Since women naturally pay more than men, PWYW pricing may be more advantageous for products and services primarily purchased by women or sold in inherently social contexts. For more general products, our findings suggest that, if feasible, marketers should tailor their marketing communication messages to the individual, based on gender. Women naturally pay more than men in PWYW contexts, so communications to women could focus on aspects of the product or promotion valued by women. For men, it is crucial to make salient the social aspect of the buying context. Since our findings show that making the social aspects of the buying context salient increases payment for men but does not decrease it for women, there is no down-side in targeting communications with this message to all consumers.

*Future Research Opportunities*

Although this research sheds new light on consumer payment behavior in PWYW contexts, opportunities for future research remain. First, we found that gender systematically affects payment amounts but not purchase incidence. These findings help us rule out alternative explanations for the observed effects of gender on payment, including self-selection into buying decisions and overall attitudes toward the product. Future research should continue to examine whether males and females differ in their overall attitudes toward PWYW and willingness to buy
using this pricing mechanism.

Second, in Study 4, we demonstrate one way firms can make social motives salient in marketing communications: by highlighting their values. Future research should identify other ways firms can make social motives salient in their customer communications.

Third, this research focuses primarily on men’s payment behavior but it also raises questions regarding factors that would negatively affect women’s payments. Our studies show that women’s payments are relatively stable but do not imply that women’s payments will always be stable. In the Web Appendix, we report a study in which we manipulated the perceived deservedness of the seller and saw that women paid less on average when they perceived the seller to be less deserving. Additionally, in Study 3, our communal orientation manipulation increased both men’s and women’s social payment motives but only increased men’s payments. These data suggest that the process underlying men’s and women’s payments is more complicated than our research indicates. We encourage future scholars to explore these questions.

Fourth, contextual factors outside the selling environment may affect consumers’ orientations, motives, and payment amounts. For example, Study 3 ran during the early days of the COVID pandemic. Concerns about social responsibility and personal financial stability during the crisis may have affected participants’ economic and social motives and their willingness to pay for discretionary purchases. The impact of outside contextual factors on payment behavior in PWYW contexts is worthy of future research.

Finally, we welcome further examination of our proposed process in broader contexts such as purchases involving gender-fluid consumers, repeat interactions, and countries and cultures outside the U.S.
REFERENCES


## TABLE 1

A SAMPLE OF RESEARCH ON GENDER DIFFERENCES, AGENCY-COMMUNION, AND RELATED CONSTRUCTS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Author(s)</th>
<th>Dependent Variable(s)</th>
<th>Main Finding</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Dvorak and Toubman (2012)</td>
<td>Donation Behavior</td>
<td>Women are more likely to donate to their college and to donate more frequently than are men.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mesch, Rooney, Chin, and Steinberg (2002)</td>
<td>Donation Behavior</td>
<td>Women are more likely to donate than men and donate larger amounts.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Winterich, Mittal, and Ross (2009)</td>
<td>Donation Behavior</td>
<td>High moral identity increases donations to out-groups (in-groups) but not in-groups (out-groups) among donors with a feminine (masculine) identity due to differences in self versus other focus between men and women.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Boyes, Mounts, and Sowell (2004)</td>
<td>Tipping Behavior</td>
<td>Both men and women free-ride in their tipping behavior, but men are more sensitive to buying social acceptance or approval via tipping than are women.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cruscio and Wetzal (1984); Gueguen and Jacob (2012); Lyin and Latane (1984); Parrett (2006); Stillman and Hensley (1980)</td>
<td>Tipping Behavior</td>
<td>Men tip more than women.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gueguen and Jacob (2012, 2014)</td>
<td>Tipping Behavior</td>
<td>Men (but not women) tip waitresses who wear red lipstick or red clothing more than waitresses who do not.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Additional Consumption Behaviors

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Author(s)</th>
<th>Dependent Variable(s)</th>
<th>Main Finding</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Brunel and Nelson (2000)</td>
<td>Ad Attitude, Ad Preferences</td>
<td>Women prefer a charity appeal containing caring orientations. Men prefer a charity appeal conveying more justice-oriented themes of self-help. This is due to gender differences in moral worldviews (e.g., cooperative vs. competitive orientations).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gao, Mittal, and Zhang (2020)</td>
<td>Price Sensitivity</td>
<td>Price sensitivity varies with gender and global vs. local identity. Males (females) with a global (local) identity are more price sensitive. This is due, in part, to differences in gender norms regarding interpersonal connections with smaller vs. larger groups.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>He, Inman, and Mittal (2008)</td>
<td>Financial Risk Taking</td>
<td>Men are sensitive to issue capability in decisions involving gains and women are sensitive to issue capability in decisions involving losses due to their differences in agentic (i.e., self) and communal (i.e. other/social) orientations.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Helgeson (1994)</td>
<td>Psychological and Physical Well-Being</td>
<td>Sex differences in well-being can be attributed to specific personality traits, which reflect agency and communion.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kurt, Inman, and Argo (2011)</td>
<td>Spending</td>
<td>Men (but not women) spend more when shopping with friends. Because men are agentic they focus on the self, and are less sensitive to the presence of others. Conversely, women are communal, focus on self and others, and are less sensitive to the presence of others.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nelson et al. (2006)</td>
<td>Ad Attitudes, Personal and Government Obligation to Help Others</td>
<td>Men preferred a self-focused ad and women preferred an other-focused ad in individualistic masculine cultures. However, the opposite results were found for men and women in an individualistic, feminine culture, consistent with sex-role ideology.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zhang, Feick, and Mittal (2014)</td>
<td>Negative WOM Transmission</td>
<td>The effect of image-impairment concern on NWOM transmission was stronger for weak ties than for strong ties among women due to their concern for others. Men were equally likely to transmit NWOM regardless of tie strength, due to their concern for self.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### TABLE 2

**SUMMARY OF CELL MEANS, DVS, MODERATORS, MEDIATORS, AND PREDICTORS BY STUDY**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Study</th>
<th>Data source</th>
<th>Total Sample</th>
<th>Payment Range</th>
<th>Mediators</th>
<th>Moderators</th>
<th>DV</th>
<th>Male/Female Breakdown</th>
<th>Cell Means (SD)</th>
<th>F-stat/t-stat</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Secondary sales data</td>
<td>97</td>
<td>$1 - $320</td>
<td>None</td>
<td>None</td>
<td>Actual Payment</td>
<td>Male = 58, Female = 39</td>
<td>$221.00 ($109.56)</td>
<td>$287.00 ($69.34)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>mTurk (U.S.)</td>
<td>573</td>
<td>$0.00-$10.00</td>
<td>Agentic-Communal orientation, Economic payment motives, Social payment motives</td>
<td>Seller gender (male, female, control)</td>
<td>Stated Payment (overall)</td>
<td>Male = 232, Female = 341</td>
<td>$1.72 ($1.26)</td>
<td>$1.97 ($1.34)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Prolific (U.S.)</td>
<td>428</td>
<td>$0.00-$20.00</td>
<td>Economic payment motives, Social payment motives</td>
<td>Communal orientation vs. Control</td>
<td>Stated Payment (overall)</td>
<td>Male = 195, Female = 233</td>
<td>$7.53 ($4.20)</td>
<td>$7.81 ($3.71)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Control Communal Orientation</td>
<td>Control Male = 105, Female = 113</td>
<td>$7.24 ($4.21)</td>
<td>$7.73 ($3.63)</td>
<td>3.12+</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Male = 90, Female = 120</td>
<td>$7.86 ($4.19)</td>
<td>$7.87 ($3.80)</td>
<td>0.38</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>lab study</td>
<td>190</td>
<td>$0.00 - $6.00</td>
<td>Economic payment motives, Social payment motives</td>
<td>Social Payment Motives</td>
<td>Actual Payment (overall)</td>
<td>Male = 72, Female = 118</td>
<td>$.96 ($0.94)</td>
<td>$1.41 ($1.47)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Control</td>
<td>Male = 41, Female = 56</td>
<td>$0.76 ($0.86)</td>
<td>$1.46 ($1.38)</td>
<td>6.06*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Social Message</td>
<td>Male = 31, Female = 62</td>
<td>$1.16 ($1.00)</td>
<td>$1.35 ($1.56)</td>
<td>0.20</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes: Total Sample refers to the total number of participants who submitted payment amounts/payments and are included in the payment analyses. This figure may differ from participant samples included in other analyses due to missing values. Payment range is after data exclusions in Studies 2-4. F-stat/t-stat reflects the results of the statistical analysis on log payment as the dependent variable. * Denotes p < .05 significance, + denotes p < .10 significance.
FIGURE 1

PROPOSED CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK

Gender (1) → Social Orientations (agentic vs. communal) → Payment Motives (Economic vs. Social) → Payment

Marketing Communications (Social Payment Motives salient vs. not)
FIGURE 2
STUDY 2: THE EFFECT OF GENDER ON PAYMENT IS MEDIATED BY ORIENTATION AND PAYMENT MOTIVES
FIGURE 3
STUDY 3: THE MODERATING EFFECT OF COMMUNAL ORIENTATION AND GENDER ON PAYMENT IS MEDIATED BY SOCIAL PAYMENT MOTIVES

Gender (-1=F, 1=M)

Communal Orientation

Economic Payment Motives

Social Payment Motives

Payment

* p < 0.10
** p < 0.05
FIGURE 4a
STUDY 4: THE EFFECT OF GENDER AND MARKETING COMMUNICATIONS ON PAYMENT AMOUNT

FIGURE 4b
STUDY 4: THE MODERATING EFFECT OF MARKETING COMMUNICATIONS AND GENDER ON PAYMENT IS MEDIATED BY PAYMENT MOTIVES