Strategic Interaction across Countries and Multinational Agglomeration: An Application to the Cement Industry.

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Agglomeration in FDI is typically attributed to location-specific characteristics such as natural resource advantages or production-related spillovers between multinational firms. The increasing collocation of the largest global firms in the cement industry since the 1980s is not easily attributed to either of these explanations. This paper draws on theories of multimarket contact to test whether strategic interaction across national markets has influenced the successive market entry decisions generating the observed agglomeration. We first establish that there is indeed non-random agglomeration of the six largest cement firms. We next show that pre-existing cross-market interaction with current incumbents helps predict which firm will enter a given market and also the choice of market entered for a given firm. The association does not appear to be due to strategic convergence or mimicry of recent entry events and cannot be explained by production-side effects, which depend only on local conditions. The findings are consistent with multimarket contact models where collocation allows firms to sustain higher prices in all markets. This latter inference is also supported by evidence of an association between global firm market share and local cement price. The paper suggests that pricing spillovers can serve as an alternative motivation for FDI agglomeration.

Key words: FDI, Agglomeration, MNEs, Multimarket Contact.


1. Introduction

The phenomenon of agglomeration of industrial activity has been widely studied. A subset of this literature examines whether Multinational Enterprises (MNEs) tend to collocate in certain countries or spread out across locations. Recent contributions on this topic include Alcacer’s 2006 study of location choices in the cellular handsets industry, and Gimeno et al. [2005] who examine the international expan-
sion of US Telecommunications firms. Agglomeration of industrial activity of any kind is typically attributed to effects that are specific to given locations, such as natural advantages arising from factor endowments or to production-side spillovers between agglomerated firms. These effects are described in Ellison and Glaeser [1997] and Head et al. [1995]. Agglomeration of foreign direct investment (FDI) may also reflect strategic interaction of another kind between individual firms – pricing spillovers. The goal of this paper is to look for evidence that pricing spillovers due to softened price competition among colocated firms can serve to motivate FDI agglomeration.

A separate literature illustrates how multimarket contact can reduce price competition. Bernheim and Whinston [1990] and Spagnolo [1999] formalize the intuition that the threat of retaliation in all markets can serve to sustain collusion in each market if firms have a large enough market share to jointly determine price in each market. These models have at least two different sets of implications. First, firms in a collusive equilibrium sustained by multimarket contact set higher prices than in a competitive equilibrium and generate correspondingly higher profits. Second, the ability to sustain the collusive equilibrium is affected by the extent of current multimarket contact and determines the relative attractiveness of new market entries. Pre-existing multimarket contact, hence, introduces cross-market dependencies into the decision about whether or not to enter new markets. The small number of cross-border competition and regulatory authorities perhaps renders international cooperation of this kind feasible.

There is some empirical evidence of price softening due to multimarket contact, mostly within a single country. There is also empirical work on the impact of multimarket contact on entry and exit; either across products in the same geography, or across segmented local markets in the same product. Theory predicts that firms may choose to enter markets in order to increase or to decrease multimarket contact. Baum and Korn [1996 and 1999], Haveman and Nonnemaker [2000], and Stephan et al. [2003] explain why there may be an inverted-U shaped relationship between the extent of multimarket contact and sub-

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1 Edwards [1955], as cited in Scherer [1980], provides perhaps the first description of this type of competitive interaction in the context of the potential competitive advantage of large conglomerates when present in many different
sequent entry. Multimarket contact can generate more entry due to reduced uncertainty about competitors in new markets and/or the desire to strengthen mutual footholds. If, however, an entry move is perceived as an aggressive act, the fear that entry will trigger retaliation in other markets can outweigh this positive association and high levels of multimarket contact elsewhere then deters subsequent market entry. The literature on the relationship between market entry and multimarket contact also tends to focus on national markets, either across products in the same geography, or across segmented local markets in the same product.

We investigate the possibility that entry decisions and the resulting worldwide agglomeration of FDI in the global cement industry are associated with strategic firm interaction across international markets. There are two main reasons why this industry provides a good setting for this investigation. First, despite the fact that cement is considered a local industry, a surge of FDI since the second half of the 1980s has significantly increased the concentration of global capacity and production in the hands of a few MNEs. The existence of MNEs in this industry is somewhat of a puzzle in itself as it meets none of the traditional necessary conditions for horizontal MNEs set out in Caves [1996], such as a high level of R&D or advertising intensity. Indeed, while MNEs may well embody relatively superior process or technology management, cement is viewed as a homogeneous product produced with a standard technology. Our focus here, however, is on the additional puzzle that entry decisions have lead to the agglomeration of MNE activity. The industry technology provides little opportunity for knowledge or production-side spillovers across global firms nor are there significant natural production advantages found only in a subset of national markets. We describe a mechanism through which MNE agglomeration is nonetheless the result of profit maximizing entry choices in a world without information asymmetry.

The second reason for our choice of industry setting is that FDI has been overwhelmingly in the form of acquisition, with global firms acquiring existing cement assets worldwide rather than investing in greenfield sites. This feature means that entry by a foreign firm changes the structure of the local market product markets. Hymer [1976] foresaw a world in which MNEs capture value by changing the nature of competi-
only through changes in existing asset operations and owner behavior rather than also leading to an increase in the number of local competitors. As will be discussed in Section 4, this fact allows us to narrow in on particular predictions for prices post-entry. Pricing spillovers may well motivate agglomeration in other industries but be harder to identify due to the confounding effects of lower prices when entry increases the number of competitors.

The six largest cement MNEs in 2000 were Lafarge, Holcim, Cemex, Heidelberg, Italcementi, and Blue Circle Industries, each of which still had clearly identifiable national origins and controlled leading shares of their respective home markets. However, each also operated production facilities in anywhere between a dozen and several dozen countries around the world. Throughout the paper, we refer to these firms collectively as the Big 6. Although FDI by the two largest MNEs — Lafarge and Holcim — pre-dated World War II, interregional FDI remained insignificant until the 1970s. It really took off, in terms of new countries entered by the major firms and their share of worldwide capacity, in the late 1980s. The Big 6 made 115 new entries between 1988 and 2000, but only 19 between 1970 and 1988.

We adopt a three-stage empirical approach to explore the role played by cross-market strategic interaction in FDI activity. First, we devise a test to establish that foreign ownership of cement production is indeed agglomerated. To do this, we compare the actual concentration of ownership to a benchmark distribution of foreign ownership where the benchmark represents randomly assigned Big 6 ownership within a geographical region. This test draws on the intuition developed in Ellison and Glaeser [1997]’s “dartboard” analytical index of US manufacturing concentration, but uses an empirical simulation method similar to the approach taken in Alcacer [2006]. We find that ownership of cement assets by the Big 6 cement firms in 2000 is more agglomerated than one would expect at random in the majority of world

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2 In some cases, such as the Philippines, international firms entered through acquisition and subsequently consolidated several small operations. Many models of local industry structure suggest that this consolidation activity would tend to further decrease local price competition. Greenfield entry is more likely to increase the degree of local market price competition.

3 As a case in point, Cemex, which had become the third largest MNEs by the early 2000s, as well as consistently the most profitable, did not make its first investments in production capacity outside its Mexican home base until 1992.
regions given the number of cement plants and firms in each country. That is, historical entry decisions have led to FDI agglomeration.

In the second stage of the empirical work, we investigate whether successive entry decisions are influenced by cross-market strategic effects rather than by the local market effects typically discussed. In particular, we want to study whether multimarket contact elsewhere is related to entry choices. The predicted direction of the effect depends on the industry context (as in Baum and Korn [1996]). We show that the average collocation worldwide of potential entrants with current incumbents is associated with the likelihood of market entry. There is a U-shaped relationship between a potential entrant’s probability of entry and its pre-existing collocation levels with incumbent firms. Separate tests suggest that, conditioning on the fact that a firm will make at least one entry move in a year, a firm’s choice of market is positively associated with its worldwide collocation with current incumbents. Firms’ entry decisions reinforce existing collocation patterns and, hence, increase the extent of FDI agglomeration. There is no evidence of the inverse U-shaped relationship identified in other industry contexts.

We conduct some further tests to examine whether the positive association between collocation and subsequent entry choices is due to mimicry of entry strategy. We find some evidence that cross-firm similarity in entry moves cannot explain the established association between collocation and subsequent entry. To do this, we distinguish between the role played by collocation, resulting from all prior entry moves, and the role played by the subset of this data which relates to recent entries. We then discuss how our results relate to existing theory on this topic. One way to reconcile our findings with previous empirical work is to note that entry through acquisition, as we see in this industry, is less likely to be interpreted by rival firms as an aggressive move which serves to trigger retaliation in other markets. This moderates the mechanism generating the downward slope of the relationship between multimarket contact and entry predicted at high levels of collocation in previous papers.

4 An online supplement provides more detail about the entry events and changes in Big 6 collocation over time.
Our hypothesis is that firms in the cement industry enter new markets to increase multimarket contact in order to raise prices, and/or to soften price competition in their existing markets. This mechanism, if at work, has direct implications for cement prices and firm profitability as well as indirect implications for successive entry choices. The third stage of our empirical investigation turns to evidence on prices and performance. The analysis in this section is somewhat limited since price information is hard to come by and the predictions not always straightforward. For example, multimarket contact may lead to higher prices or enable firms to maintain current high prices. Nonetheless, we present two sets of evidence in this section. First, we look at a country cross section of data from analyst reports and show that the share of local cement production capacity operated by Big 6 firms is positively associated with local cement prices. Moreover, the interaction of worldwide collocation of incumbents and their joint market share is positively associated with higher prices in each market. We note that neither of these variables is associated with lower costs. Second, we look at time series data from six countries which have either a very high cement price in 2000 or had at least three new Big 6 entries between 1988 and 2000. Since entry often occurs in times of local recession, we might expect the cement price to rise post-entry in the absence of any strategic behavior by the new entrants. For this reason, we examine the cement price relative to the price of other building materials. There is a tendency for the relative price of cement to increase in the wake of Big 6 entry and expansion.

The paper contains three distinct empirical sections, and we present the hypotheses, data, estimation approach and results of each section in turn. Section 6 of the paper contains a discussion of the implications of the analysis taken as a whole and then concludes.

2. Measuring Multinational Firm Agglomeration

Before we investigate the various reasons for dependencies in MNE location choice, we turn to examine different measures of the extent of agglomeration in the context of the global cement industry. First, we construct a pairwise measure of firm collocation across markets. It resembles the measures developed
in Alcacer [2006] in his study of cellular handsets, and we will use it as a key independent variable in much of our upcoming analysis.

**Firm-pair level collocation.** For each pair of firms \((i, j)\) drawn from the set of Big 6 global cement firms, the collocation measure for firm \(i\) with firm \(j\) is the number of markets in which both firms are present divided by the total number of markets in which firm \(j\) is present. It measures the extent to which firm \(i\) is present in firm \(j\)'s markets. The extent of collocation of firm \(j\) with firm \(i\) has the same numerator and is divided by the number of markets in which firm \(i\) is present. That is, we measure pairwise collocation as follows:

\[
C_{i,j,t} = \frac{\sum_{x} (1 \times x_{i,j,t})}{\sum_{y} (1 \times y_{j,t})}, \quad C_{j,i,t} = \frac{\sum_{y} (1 \times x_{i,j,t})}{\sum_{y} (1 \times y_{i,t})}
\]

(1)

where \(x_{i,j,t}\) is an indicator equal to 1 if both firms \(i\) and \(j\) are present in market \(x\) in year \(t\) and 0 otherwise, \(y_{i,t}\) is an indicator equal to 1 if firm \(i\) is present in market \(y\) in year \(t\). ⁵

These cross-sectional measures do not tell us whether the surge in FDI in the industry since 1985 has led to more or less foreign ownership agglomeration. While there are more positive pairwise observations, the index decreases for some firm pairs over time. ⁶ Furthermore, a certain amount of increase in pairwise firm collocation is to be expected in the context of industry multinationalization due to the fixed number of national markets. This means that collocation measures for any one year could well reflect random agglomeration across countries. Before we look at whether existing agglomeration may have arisen due to strategic motives, we need to establish that firms are indeed agglomerated to a greater extent than that which could have been expected if entry moves were random.

A similar question is tackled by Ellison and Glaeser in their 1997 paper about industrial activity agglomeration across US states. They construct an industry level index based on the sum across states of the

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⁵ Figure 2 in the online supplement reports these indexes for each possible pairing of the Big 6 cement firms in different years.
squared differences between the share of an industry’s employment in a given state and that state’s share of total employment. We want to know if Big 6 ownership of cement plants, rather than industry employment or the location of cement production, is more agglomerated than could be expected at random. There is no straightforward analytical equivalent to Ellison and Glaeser’s adjustment that can be applied to our context. Instead, as in Alcacer [2006], we use their “dartboard” intuition to develop an alternative approach. Alcacer [2006] tests whether the observed market location choices of firm subsidiaries of different types are agglomerated. He compares the observed location choices to a simulated distribution of agglomeration where location choice is based solely on market level characteristics. Rather than focus the choice of market by each firm, we take the number of plants and firms in each market as given, and examine whether Big 6 ownership is agglomerated. The key contribution of our approach here is that holding the overall distribution of cement plants fixed in the simulated distribution of random Big 6 ownership allows us to control for market level characteristics that determine the overall number of cement plants in a country.\(^7\)

**Agglomeration of Big 6 ownership.** We construct an empirical distribution of the extent of Big 6 ownership agglomeration we expect to see if ownership were randomly allocated across plants within a geographic area, holding fixed the total number of plants in each country. We then compare the observed level of agglomeration to the distribution under this null. Similar intuition is given in Scott [1982] in his study of US manufacturers operating in different product markets. If the observed level is sufficiently different from the mean level estimated under the null of no non-random agglomeration, we infer that Big 6 ownership of cement plants is agglomerated in that geography. We use data from the industry trade association Cembureau to construct a list of cement firms and plants for each country worldwide\(^8\). The data is

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\(^6\) For example, three firms - Lafarge, Cemex, and Heidelberg - go from operating in a subset of Holcim’s markets to also operating in markets where Holcim is not present, hence the collocation observations with Holcim as firm \(i\) decrease for these three firms.

\(^7\) This method does not control for market level factors that appeal particularly to multinational firms which may make all Big 6 firms more likely to enter the same market regardless of any strategic interaction. Separating these two determinants of observed agglomeration is the challenge addressed in Section 3.

\(^8\) China was excluded from this analysis, as were the former Soviet States, Botswana, Mauritania, Swaziland, Palestine and Kosovo, due to limited data availability.
from 2002 as this year provided the most comprehensive data set closest in time to the other data sets used in the paper. Using the firm name, we match Big 6 subsidiaries to their relevant parent. This gives us the total number of cement plants and firms per country, and the total number of these plants and firms that are controlled by one of the Big 6 firms. More detail about the estimation process is given in the online supplement.

**Results.** Table 1 presents the results of the analysis at the plant and at the firm level. The plant level results indicate significant non-random agglomeration in all of the nine regions except Australasia. In other words, in all regions except Australasia, the observed extent of Big 6 agglomeration is more than two standard deviations greater than the mean level of agglomeration under the null hypothesis of random agglomeration. Since some firms consist of several plants, the mean level of agglomeration under the null that all agglomeration is random is higher in the firm level analysis. Nonetheless, the firm-level results also indicate non-random agglomeration of Big 6 firms within Africa, North and South America, Asia, and Western and Eastern Europe. This tells us that Big 6 firms have tended to enter the same countries within these regions rather than spreading out across different countries.

<<Table 1 about here>>

We have established that there is non-random agglomeration of ownership but, as in Ellison and Glaeser’s equivalent measure, we cannot use this type of test to find out why firms have chosen to locate together. In their paper, they note they can’t tell apart natural advantages and spillovers. Cross-market concerns and pricing spillovers are not applicable to their context of cross-industry variation. We aim to evaluate whether some of the non-random agglomeration we observe in the cement industry is in fact due to cross-market effects.

### 3. Entry location choice

To establish whether new entry choices are related to existing cross-market interaction, we need to distinguish between the traditional reasons for agglomeration examined in Head et al. [1995] and Alcacer [2006] and the cross-market effects which are the focus of this study.
**Specification 1.** We first test whether the extent of collocation with incumbent firms in other markets helps identify who the next entrant will be to a given market, conditioning on the fact that at least one Big 6 firm enters the market in a given year. Starting with all the firms already present in a market which is soon to be entered by a new Big 6 firm, we find the extent of average collocation across all other markets with the current incumbent firms for each of the potential new entrants. We ask whether there is an association between the likelihood a firm is the next entrant and the extent with which the firm interacts with the incumbent firms elsewhere. If entry were driven only by market conditions in the country in question, or by spillovers specific to that market, there would be no reason to expect the likelihood of entry to be associated with the extent of cross-market interactions elsewhere.

Like Head et al., [1995], we use a conditional logit model for this specification but, unlike in their approach, we control for market level factors by conditioning on the fact that at least one new firm enters that market in a given year. The within-market factors are implicitly assumed to affect the attractiveness of market entry to all potential entrants equally. In this specification, each potential entrant either enters the market in year $t$ or does not, generating a binary dependent variable equal to 1 if firm entry occurs. Data on all new Big 6 firm entries from January 1988 to February 2000 indicate 115 new entries altogether, and 102 different country-year groups with entry events (since, on occasion, more than one Big 6 firm enters the same market in the same year). For each country-year group there are a number of different potential entrants. All together, we have 549 observations, 164 of which are associated with an entry into a market with incumbent Big 6 firms. Each of the Big 6 firms makes between 6 and 31 entries over the time period. By 2000, 91 countries featured at least one of the Big 6 firms.9

We construct the average collocation index in year $t$ for each potential Big 6 entrant, $j$, with each of the other $i$ Big 6 firms that are already present in market $m$ in that year. This variable, and its square, are the

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9 It is not the case that firms are simply “running out” of new markets to enter, leading to an inevitable association between entry and collocation. There are many countries where none of the firms are present and many where only one or two of the firms are present in 2000.
key independent variables in this section. The averaged index is the mean, across all markets other than \( m \), of the share of firm \( j \)'s current markets in which each firm \( i \) is already present.

\[
\text{Coloc}_{j,m,t} = \frac{\sum C_{i,j,t} \times I_{i,m,t}}{\sum I_{i,m,t}}
\]

where \( i \) indexes the five Big 6 firms other than firm \( j \), and \( I_{i,m,t} \) is an indicator variable equal to 1 if firm \( i \) is present in market \( m \) in year \( t \). \( C_{i,j,t} \) is defined in equation 1 and measures worldwide collocation between firms \( i \) and \( j \). For all pioneer entries, this variable is missing because the absence of incumbents means there is no firm \( i \) with which to measure each firm \( j \)'s worldwide collocation. Unlike factors relating only to market \( m \), this collocation measure varies across potential entrants since they differ in the extent to which each shares existing markets with the set of incumbent firms. The mean collocation level of potential entrants with the incumbents is 0.22 and the standard deviation is 0.16.

Let \( y_{m,t} \) be a series of 1s and 0s representing whether or not we observe entry of each firm \( j \) into market \( m \) at time \( t \). We want to find the probability that we see the observed series, given the total number of entries into that market in that year (the sum of vector entries related to that market-year group). So, for each market year group, we estimate \( \Pr(y_{m,t} | \sum y_{m,t}) = F(\delta_{i,j,m,t}, \gamma_{m,j}) \) where \( \delta \) is the vector of collocation measures for each potential entrant with the firms already present in market \( m \). \( \gamma \) is a vector of control variables which attempt to control for fact that certain firms may be more likely to enter particular countries, due to gravity model type concerns – distance and language. These controls vary across potential entrants; for example, Cemex originates in Mexico so may be more likely than other firms to enter Spanish-speaking countries. Also included in \( \gamma \) are firm fixed effects to control for the possibility that some

\[\text{Coloc}_{i,m,t} \] is the key independent variable employed in both the first and second conditional logit specifications. For the first specification, the data is grouped by country and year and the coefficients are identified using variation within-group across potential entrants, \( j \). In the second specification, the data is grouped by firm and year, and identification comes from variation across the countries, \( m \), potentially entered by a given firm \( j \) in year \( t \).
firms are always relatively more likely to make an entry in a given year. \(^{11}\) Table 2, Panel A, presents summary statistics about the data set used in the analysis. \(^{12}\)

*Specification 2.* We next estimate an alternative specification which is similar to the approach taken in Head et al., [1995]. We condition on the fact that a given firm makes at least one entry in a given year, and ask whether the choice of market(s) entered is associated with the entering firm’s worldwide collocation with the current incumbents. Since the choice set for each firm is now all countries in which it is not already present, there are many more observations per entry event. In this specification, \(y_{jt}\) is a series of 1s and 0s representing whether or not we observe entry of firm \(j\) into each possible market \(m\) at time \(t\). Summary statistics for the dependent and independent variables in this alternative specification are given in Table 2, Panel B. The key independent variable, collocation, is defined for market \(m\) in equation 2, where \(j\) identifies the entering firm. This variable is found for each potential entry location, \(m\). Collocation varies across countries for the same entrant because there is variation in the identity of current incumbents. We estimate \(\Pr(y_{jt} | \Sigma y_{jt})=F(\delta_{j,i}, \gamma_{jm})\) where \(\delta\) is the vector of pre-existing collocation measures for firm \(j\) with the \(i\) firms present in each market \(m\) in year \(t\). \(\gamma\) is a vector of control variables.

It is likely that country level natural endowments and spillovers across MNEs within market are correlated with both the likelihood of entry and collocation. Country fixed effects would control for invariant market factors such as natural endowments, but the large number of countries prevents their inclusion. We present a model which includes region dummies and some country level characteristics that are expected to be correlated with the level of market appeal for any one entering firm: distance from firm HQ, a shared language dummy variable, total cement usage, and cement usage per capita. \(^{13}\) The effect of

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\(^{11}\) In this analysis, we condition out whether the market being entered is the home market of one of Big 6 or whether it has long been a stronghold for any of the incumbent firms. These variables are constant across all potential new entrants.

\(^{12}\) Of the 41 new entries into markets where incumbent firms are already present, 2 are made by BCI, 7 by Cemex, 7 by Heidelberger, 7 by Holcim, 8 by Italcementi, and 10 by Lafarge. (This data is omitted from Table 2).

\(^{13}\) The data for the last two variables are from the Cembureau World Statistical Review [2000] and are for 1997.
within-country spillovers among MNEs on the production side is expected to be correlated with the number of current incumbent MNEs. Hence, we also include this variable.

*Results of the two conditional logit specifications.* Table 3 shows the results of the specification 1. Column 1 shows that a Big 6 non-incumbent firm is significantly more likely to be the next entering firm when it is more collocated elsewhere with the incumbent Big 6 firms. The extent of cross market collocation with incumbent firms is significant at a greater than 1% level in a one-tailed t-test. The second column includes the square of the collocation measure as an independent variable. The coefficient on the squared term is positive and significant, suggesting that collocation matters more as a predictor of the likelihood of entry as its level increases. Columns 3 and 4 show the results when firm-market controls are included. The positive coefficient on the collocation variable remains significant but when the square of this measure is included, the coefficients for collocation are no longer significant. Distance tends to have significantly negative effects on the likelihood of entry and a shared language is associated with an increased likelihood, as predicted by prior gravity-based work.

<<Table 3 about here>>

The next four columns of Panel A of Table 3 introduce firm fixed effects. While columns 5 and 7 show a weak negative relationship between collocation and the likelihood of firm entry, columns 6 and 8 reveal the presence of a U-shaped relationship. The likelihood that a potential entrant actually enters is highest for firms with low and high levels of pre-existing collocation with incumbent firms. There are instances of firm entry at collocation levels on both sides of the inflection point implied by these coefficients.

The results of specification 2 are given in Table 4. Column 1 shows that collocation with incumbents firms is positively correlated with market entry, controlling for several market level controls and region fixed effects intended to capture natural endowments. Column 2 provides no evidence of an inverted-U shape relationship in this industry. Column 3 presents evidence that the total number of incumbents is also positively correlated with the likelihood of market entry, perhaps because of positive production-side
spillovers between MNEs. In column 4, however, we see that collocation continues to be positively associated with market choice when the total number of market incumbents is included.

<<Table 4 about here>>

Our results so far suggest that pre-existing collocation across markets – that is, cross-market effects – play a significant role in determining entry choices. Specifically, the association between worldwide collocation and subsequent market entry suggests firms enter markets in a manner that serves to increase the extent of collocation when pre-existing worldwide collocation is either low or high. In addition, when firms enter markets in which incumbents are present, firms are more likely to enter markets where they already meet the incumbent firms in other world markets. We find no evidence of the inverted-U shaped relationship between MMC and entry discussed in Baum and Korn [1996 and 1999]. In the following section we discuss our results and try to reconcile them to the previous findings about multimarket contact and entry. We also conduct further tests to address alternative explanations of the relationship between collocation and subsequent entry.

4. Discussion of the cross-market effects, and further tests.

Discussion. Bernheim and Whinston [1990] provide an analytical model which allows them to isolate the conditions under which multimarket contact can facilitate collusion between firms across markets. In a model with two firms and two countries, they show that when markets differ in size, when there are scale economies, or when firms have differing costs (for example, each has a cost advantage in their home market), collusive prices can be maintained in each market. Spagnolo [1999] shows that risk aversion generates the same result even when firms and markets are symmetric.14

Later studies discuss the relationship between multimarket contact, competition levels, and market entry. Baum and Korn [1996 and 1999] clearly set out the intuition behind the different mechanisms affect-
ing this relationship. Stephan et al. [2003] summarizes the paradox at the heart of this debate. In order for multimarket contact to arise and act as a deterrent to competitive behavior, firms must enter each other’s markets “which is just the kind of action that the deterrent is supposed to limit”. Haveman and Nonnenmacher [2000] motivate their observed inverted-U shape relationship between level of multimarket contact among firm and entry as the result of a trade-off between these competing influences.

Our results are consistent with a framework in which the benefit from increasing multimarket contact is highest when pre-existing contact is low or high. We suggest this may be due to the nature of the industry context. Firms with low pre-existing collocation could well be entering to create mutual interdependence with competitor firms, and firms with high pre-existing collocation could be entering to strengthen their relative position in a context of established mutual interdependence. All else equal, incumbent firms may prefer to coexist in each market with firms in which it competes in many markets if the alternative situation is to compete with a local firm. Models of multimarket contact show how it is easier to maintain collusive pricing with a firm it also meets elsewhere. In the cement industry, entering a market through acquisition of existing assets is not necessarily an aggressive move. Unlike other industries, such as the Californian airlines industry studies by Baum and Korn [1996 and 1999], entry involves the acquisition of local firms and is therefore less likely to trigger multimarket retaliation in prices. Our results suggest Big 6 cement firms’ entry decisions increase their mutual interdependence and their own ability to retaliate against other firms, without the concern that their entry will be interpreted as a competitive threat.

Nonetheless, to show that pricing spillovers among the Big 6 have prompted the observed agglomeration we need to show more than just that cross-market effects are associated with increased likelihood of a given firm’s entry. We want to know whether these cross-market effects are “strategic” in the sense that they affect profits in each market. To do this, it is important to address the possibility that there may be variables, other than market level effects discussed in Section 3, that are correlated with both collocation elsewhere and likelihood of entry. In particular, firms could be mimicking each other’s entry strategies or
footprint, generating a relationship between collocation and entry since firms mimicking each other in the past will naturally end up collocated and, if they continue to mimic each other, they are more likely to enter new markets in quick succession. This would mean that firm $j$ is also likely to be the next entrant to a market where firm $i$ recently entered and is now an incumbent. An alternative possibility is that firms independently arrive at the same internationalization strategy, leading to a similar sequence of entry moves. Lieberman and Asaba [2004] and others describe reasons why firms may imitate each other’s strategies explicitly. Knickerbocker’s much studied 1973 hypothesis illustrates how, in a loose-knit international oligopoly, when one MNE enters a market other MNEs will follow it in lest they find themselves at a disadvantage in subsequent interactions.

Further Tests. To partially address the possibility that one of these effects is driving the results in Section 3, we ask whether the identity of the subsequent entrant to a given market can be predicted by the similarity of each potential entrant’s recent entry strategy in other markets with the firms that have recently entered the market in question. The common feature in models of mimetic behavior is that the degree of recent entry strategy similarity of all potential entrants with the previous market entrant will predict who the next entrant will be. We use our data on the timing of entry moves to test whether this holds. The collocation variable constructed in Section 3 is based on the stock of all prior entry events of all current incumbents and potential entrants, whereas the key independent variable in this section is the similarity in recent entry events between each potential entrant and the most recent prior entrant incumbent firm. If recent entry strategy is associated with subsequent entry, then the observed agglomeration could be the result of strategic imitation or of some other omitted variable.

For this test, we reduce the data set analyzed to include only country level observations where two or more firms enter the country for the first time over a certain three year period and, further, we focus on all but the first entry event. This gives us a total of 38 events and 127 observations since we have an obser-

\footnote{The choice of a three year time period reflects a trade off. Too narrow a window limits the size of the data set and makes it more difficult to infer significance from the similarity measure. Too large a time window, on the other
vation for each potential subsequent entrant. We condition on the identity of the previous entrant and on
the fact that (at least) one more Big 6 firm will enter the country in the same year or during the following
two years. Possible predictors of the identity of the next Big 6 entrant are then examined.

The key independent variable in this analysis is the pairwise degree of previous market entry similarity
for each potential entrant (firm $j$) and the previous entrant (firm $i$). This is calculated for each year by
counting the number of times both firms in a pair have both entered the same new market over the three
years preceding the year of this particular entry event, year $t$. This number is then divided by the total
number of market entries that firm $j$ has made in the same time period. The measure of similarity is thus
how often, when it makes a new entry, firm $j$ enters a market that firm $i$ has just entered or is also enter-
ing. That is, we measure the pairwise similarity of recent market entries between potential entrant $j$ with
previous entrant $i$ as follows:

$$S_{i,j,t} = \frac{\sum_x(t \cdot x_{i,j,t})}{\sum_y(t \cdot y_{i,t})}$$

where $x_{i,j,t}$ is an indicator equal to 1 if both firms $i$ and $j$ have entered market $x$ within the last three years
up to and including year $t$ and 0 otherwise. $y_{i,t}$ is an indicator equal to 1 if firm $i$ entered market $y$ in the
last three years. Both the denominator and numerator are summed over all markets, excluding the market
which is the subject of this entry event. For each observation, we calculate this measure for the previous
entrant and all potential entrants $j$ at time $t$. For the 127 observations, the mean level of $S_{i,j,t}$ is 0.212 and
the standard deviation is 0.358. There are values equal to both 1 and 0, corresponding respectively to ob-
servations where firms $i$ and $j$ have only entered markets together over the last three years, and to ob-
servations where firm $j$ has entered none of the same markets as firm $i$ over the last three years. This data is
hand, leads to potential collinearity between the collocation and similarity variables in cases with only one incum-
bent firm. We chose three years in the light of industry conditions. Under the assumption that firm $j$ is mimicking
firm $i$’s entry moves, three years is the arguably the longest time in which would take firm $j$ to make an acquisition (given
that there are assets for sale, which must be the case since there is at least one new subsequent entry in the next three
years) once the announcement of firm $i$’s acquisition is made. The results, however, are robust to using longer or
shorter time periods as the definition for entry occurring within a two or a four year time period.
summarized in Table 2, Panel C. The pairwise correlation between $S_{ij,t}$ and $Coloc_{ij,t}$ in this smaller subset of observations is -0.0467, suggesting that the measure of recent entry similarity uses only a subset of the information embodied in the collocation measure based on the stock of all past entries.

Results. The results of this second set of tests, for whether cross firm similarities in recent entry strategy are leading to the agglomeration of Big 6 ownership observed in Section 2, are reported in Table 5. The first column shows that recent entry similarity with incumbent firms is not significantly associated with an increased likelihood of market entry. It remains insignificant when gravity-type controls are included in column 2, and when firm fixed effects are included with and without the gravity-type controls in columns 3 and 4. Columns 5 and 6 include collocation and then collocation and its square. In this subset of entry events, collocation remains positive and significant, and the U-shape is observed once more, although neither coefficient is significant. Finally, columns 7 and 8 include both similarity and collocation measures as dependent variables. While the similarity of recent entry moves remains insignificant, the estimated coefficient for collocation remains positive and significant. The U-shaped relationship for collocation does not survive the inclusion of the similarity of recent entry events, but this could be due to data limitations which also prevent us from including firm fixed effects together with recent entry similarity, collocation, and collocation squared.

<<Table 5 about here>>

While is still feasible that mimicry of existing footprint may play some role in the observed association of collocation and entry, the similarity of recent entries does not help predict the next entrant’s identity. This finding casting doubt on the possibility that the cross-market dependencies identified in Section 3 are a by-product of deliberate or coincidental similarity in internationalization strategy.

5. Multinational Presence and Average Prices and Profitability

The results so far suggest there is a firm level interaction across markets so that firms enter new markets to increase multimarket contact and facilitate less intensive price competition. To strengthen this inference, we now turn to look directly at the performance implications of collocation for the Big 6 firms. In
single country studies, multimarket contact has been shown to generate uncompetitive pricing.\textsuperscript{16} Our hypothesis that worldwide collocation allows firms to sustain higher prices across markets requires that multinational presence is associated with higher prices and profitability in local markets. It has no implications for a relationship between multinational presence and costs. In contrast, most variants of the idea that collocation is the result of strategy convergence or imitation do not imply higher prices. For example, Knickerbocker-style behavior to reduce risk should presumably depress average prices and (risk-unadjusted) profitability in local markets for at least some time after bunched entry. Most of the traditional explanations of local agglomeration have implications for lower costs, rather than higher prices. Hence, investigating the relationship between multinational presence and prices or profitability complements our earlier analysis.

\textit{Cross-sectional analysis of prices, costs, and Big 6 presence.} We begin by looking at the correlation between cement prices and costs and the presence of Big 6 MNEs using data from an analyst report issued by ING Barings on average long-run ex-plant prices and operating costs per ton of output in twenty five of the largest national markets. These data were combined with data on the share of total capacity controlled by Big 6 firms in each country, as summarized in Ghemawat and Matthews [2000]. Data from the 2000 Cembureau World Statistical review about country-level demand conditions were once again used as control variables. Since we are interested in the relationship between supply conditions and price, we instrument for the effect of demand (production relative to total capacity) by using measures of construction activity in each country from Euromonitor’s Global Market Information Database. This is a suitable instrument because cement is a small fraction of total construction cost. We also control for the share of cement sold in bags in smaller volumes since this is expected to impact price through average cost per

ton. While this is a limited data set, the twenty five countries in the analysis account for more than 50% of each of the Big 6 multinationals’ total capacity footprint in the year 2000, and for more than two-thirds of capacity for each firm except Holcim. Table 2, Panel D shows that there is significant variation in per ton price and cost across countries.

Table 6 presents the results of IV regressions of the independent variables related to Big 6 share on per ton price, cost and a measure of per ton margin – which ING Barings terms EBITDA, and is found by subtracting cost from price. The regressions reported in the first three columns of the table indicate that the share of total capacity in a country accounted for by the Big 6 multinationals had a significant positive effect on average price per ton. The results suggest that an increase in the share capacity controlled by Big 6 firms of one standard deviation (31.5 percentage points) was associated with an 11.8 dollar increase in price per ton. Interestingly, the cost equation estimated in Table 6 indicates a positive but statistically insignificant effect of the share of capacity controlled by the Big 6 on average operating costs per ton, after the inclusion of controls. This does not square with the suggestion that high margins for collocated Big 6 firms are driven by greater efficiency and lower unit costs.

<<Table 6 about here>>

To tie this analysis more closely to the idea that it is worldwide collocation between firms that is leading to higher prices in markets, rather than just the ability of Big 6 firms to coordinate in a given market unrelated to their interaction elsewhere, we now introduce measures of collocation as independent variables. For each market, for the Big 6 firms present, we find the pairwise level of their collocation across all world markets then take the mean level across all present pairs. This gives a country level measure of the degree of worldwide interaction that the present firms have at the time. We interact this variable with the market share of the Big 6 firms. Columns 4 to 6 show that this interaction term is positive and significantly associated with EBITDA per ton, and that this association comes about through higher prices rather than lower costs. That is, markets where the Big 6 firms present are highly collocated globally are particularly likely to have higher cement prices.
As a robustness check, we also test whether greater market concentration in each market might be expected to lead to higher prices regardless of whether the firms with large market shares are local or multinational. We replace the independent variable measuring the Big 6 multinationals’ share of capacity with a measure of the capacity share of the 6 largest firms in each country, whether local or multinational, using Cembureau data. The final three columns of Table 6 indicate that this variable does not display a significant relationship with average price or average cost.

*Longitudinal analysis of relative cement price.* The analysis reported so far in this section is consistent with the evidence in the previous sections in support of the idea of agglomeration in pursuit of higher prices. There is, however, (at least) one additional objection to address. The Big 6 firms in general may simply have bought into existing local oligopolies that, in the long run, would have prices just as high had they been controlled by local interests. This claim is partially undermined by the results of the conditional logit analyses since it is not clear why worldwide collocation would be associated with the likelihood of further entry. Nonetheless we look for further evidence to try to rebut this point.

Given the impossibility of observing what would have happened if MNEs didn’t dominate the markets that they do, we look at the evolution of market-wide prices during windows associated with significant entry or expansion by MNEs. We have focused on six countries: Spain, Mexico, Venezuela, Colombia, the Philippines, and Canada. Data collected by central banks and national statistics agencies for the purpose of constructing price indices for cement and building materials in general was used to construct mar-

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17 Limitations of this cross sectional analysis include that the Barings report contains little information about the quality of their data, as well as the limited number of data sources. Annual reports corroborate some of the findings. For example, high prices and per ton margins in Mexico and Venezuela in the Barings data are mirrored in Cemex’s annual report of around the same time which reveals highest EBIDA margins in these countries, along with Colombia.

18 We narrowed our data search to those countries which had experienced at least three new Big 6 entries between 1988 and 2000; Canada, Spain, the Philippines, Turkey and Egypt. To these countries, we added the two countries with the highest cement price in the ING Barings data – Mexico and Venezuela - and added Colombia which we knew, as mentioned above, generated high margins for at least one of the Big 6 firms. We were unable to find price series data for cement and building materials for Egypt and Turkey which had 4 and 3 new entries between 1988 and 2000 respectively. However, the concentration data tells us that despite these entry moves the Big 6 firms had small market shares (30% and 35%) in these countries versus 97% in the Philippines.
ket-wide pricing indices.\footnote{We are grateful to Alberto Salvo for suggesting this type of price data source, as used in Salvo [2007].} We compare the cement price index with the building materials price index. In several cases, the Big 6 firms choose to enter the market in the midst of a local economic recession at low asset prices, especially in foreign currency terms. The price of cement may well rise post-recession irrespective of ownership changes. For this reason, the relative change in cement price provides more precise evidence of the effects of Big 6 ownership on cement price over time. The data that we were able to obtain are summarized in Table 7. We consider the six countries one by one since they provide somewhat different perspectives on the hypothesized performance effects of multimarket contact.

<<Table 7 about here>>

\textit{Spain.} The Spanish price for cement relative to building materials did not, according to Table 7, change much between 1992 when Cemex entered the market and 2002. Note, however, that according to Cemex, the major motive for its first big cross-border acquisition was the strategic one of countering Holcim, which had entered Mexico by acquisition in 1989 and had started to expand aggressively in the early 1990s. Cemex apparently had little appetite for a price war in Mexico to check Holcim – and Lafarge, which had also entered – because it stood more to lose in absolute terms due to its larger market share. Moreover, Holcim and Lafarge were much larger, very diversified geographically, and much better funded. Both had significant capacity in Spain, which also appeared to be an attractive target to Cemex because of several similarities to Mexico – a shared language, colonial links, relative maritime proximity (Cemex began by exporting to Spain before making its acquisitions) – as well as market-specific attributes such as a high demand growth rate compared to other developed countries. But the more important point for our purposes is that in entering Spain, Cemex’s management focused on multimarket price-raising (or price preserving) benefits in Mexico of a sort that would not show up in tests of changes in prices in the market entered.\footnote{For further analysis of Cemex’s internationalization strategy and its impact on that firm’s economics, see Chapter 3 of \textit{Redefining Global Strategy}, Ghemawat [2007].}
Mexico. Cemex’s home market saw foreign entry and expansion by Holcim and Lafarge, starting with Holcim’s acquisition of Apasco in 1989, as the country opened up to foreign investment. By 2000, these Big 3 firms controlled 85% of the Mexican market. The data in Table 7 suggest some real increases in Mexican cement prices in the wake of multinational entry and expansion. While these may partly reflect the removal of price controls at the start of the 1990s, there has been a steady price increase through the first half of the 1990s and Mexican cement prices have since stabilized at a high level. Annual reports reveal the very high profitability of Cemex’s and Holcim’s Mexican operations.

Venezuela. Cemex entered the Venezuelan market through acquisition in 1994 and over the next two years Holcim and Lafarge significantly expanded their existing toeholds, yielding an oligopoly in which these three firms, led by Cemex, held close to 100% of local capacity. The data in Table 7 suggest that while cement prices rose faster than building materials prices in Venezuela over the 1990s, the relative increase immediately predated this period of multinational entry/expansion. However, it is also worth noting that this period was one of unusually high inflation in Venezuela: the cement price index increased at an average annual rate of 67%, so that its level in 1997 was nearly eight times as high as in 1993. A deeper examination of the Venezuelan cement industry over this period by Dumez and Jeunemaitre [2000] provides more support for multinationalization raising prices. In their account, based on micro data on Venezuelan prices, a general economic slump at the beginning of the 1990s prompted a price war between the three dominant domestic producers, leading to large losses. However, after acquisitions by these three firms, Venezuelan cement prices rose significantly over the next few years while the general slump continued.

Colombia. Colombian cement prices were until recently also considered to be among the highest in the world although, unlike Mexico and Venezuela, the country was not included in the Barings sample dis-
discussed earlier in the section. The Colombian time series in Table 7 is particularly short but does suggest an increase in the relative price of cement starting around the time of Cemex’s entry in 1996.21

The Philippines. The Asian crisis of the late 1990s made cement assets in the Philippines particularly good value for Big 6 firms. The industry suffered from the fall off in demand from residential and general construction activity. At the same time, the country was flooded by low priced cement imports from Japan, Taiwan and Indonesia. Locally owned firms sought government assistance and considered filing dumping charges against importing firms. Between them, Holcim, Cemex, Lafarge and BCI invested $1.7 billion in 16 local companies over the two year period from 1997 to 1999. Holcim had had a presence in the Philippines since 1974 but in 1997, they were joined through acquisition by Cemex and in 1998 by Heidelberger, BCI and Lafarge. By the end of 1998, 97% of cement capacity was controlled by these five firms, all of which undertook substantial consolidation. Table 7 shows that while relative cement prices fell between 1996 and 1998, the price increase in percentage terms was faster than for other building materials between 1998 and 2001. In 1999, the cement price rose by 5% while the price of other building materials rose by 2%. In 2000, these numbers were 13% for cement versus 3%, and in 2001 the figures were 8% for cement versus 2% for other building materials.

Canada. By 2000, over 95% of Canada’s production capacity was controlled by one of the Big 6 firms. Lafarge and Holcim had a presence there prior to the time period of interest and Italcementi, Heidelberger and BCI took control of assets there in 1992, 1993, and 1997, respectively. In each year, from 1992 to 1998, cement prices rose by a greater percentage than construction materials prices.

Overall, the evidence in this section suggests a positive association between multinational presence and prices that seemed to reflect more than just MNEs purchasing into existing oligopolies. Together with the analyses in previous sections, it uncovers patterns that are hard to explain except in terms of the pursuit of positive multimarket pricing spillovers.

21 Colombia’s cement industry is actually more concentrated than multinationalized: slightly more than one-half of local capacity is accounted for by Argos, a syndicate of quasi-independent local firms that can coordinate on price, followed by Cemex and then Holcim, with the combined share of these big three approximating 90%.
6. Conclusions

The findings shown here suggest that strategic interaction worldwide among the Big 6 global firms plays a role in explaining successive market entry decisions in the cement industry. Specifically, firms with a low or high degree of market overlap elsewhere tend to enter markets to increase collocation. There is also a positive association between market choice and pre-existing multimarket contact with incumbent firms. Over time, market entry has led to significant non-random agglomeration of FDI in the industry. Cross-sectional analysis of a subset of markets reveals that markets where FDI is concentrated tend to have higher cement prices, but not lower production costs. Longitudinal analysis provides some evidence that foreign entry is associated with an increase in price level.

Theoretical models of multimarket contact allowing firms to sustain higher prices across all markets generate predictions that are consistent with these findings. We argue that entering new markets to increase the degree of multimarket contact is attractive to global firms in the cement industry since it reinforces the channels that lead to higher prices. Hence, MNE agglomeration is a natural result of a set of profit-maximizing strategies. It is reasonable to assume that in this industry, entry itself will not trigger multimarket retaliation in prices since entry tends to involve acquisition of local firms. Under the assumptions of multimarket contact models, incumbent global firms prefer to meet other global firms rather than local firms in as many markets as possible.

Empirically, we make several advances. First, we establish that ownership is agglomerated using an empirical method adapted from the analytical index given in Ellison and Glaeser [1997]. As in Alcacer [2006] we compare observed agglomeration to a simulated distribution of random agglomeration, but we control for market level effects by holding the number of plants/firms in each market fixed and simulating random ownership distributions. Second, we show that cross-market effects matter in entry decisions. In our first specification, we use a conditional logit framework that incorporates potential entrants’ worldwide collocation with Big 6 incumbents as the key independent variable. This specification allows us to control for the fact that some markets attract multinational entry due to natural endowments or within-
country spillovers. Our second specification shows that firms entering markets where other Big 6 firms are present are more likely to choose a market where their pre-existing contact with those incumbent firms is high. We also provide some limited evidence that entry moves are not simply mimetic by adapting the conditional logit framework to control for similarity in recent entry moves between the most recently arrived incumbent firm and all potential new entrants.

The results have implications for competition policy. While attempts at collusion by domestic producers are also common in cement, if MNEs are more able to raise prices when competing with each other, it raises the policy concern that at least in some cases multinationalization may lower welfare by reducing allocative efficiency. In the case of cement, buyers in at least a few relatively poor countries dominated by multinationals may have ended up paying more than twice the marginal cost of a product often described as “essential.”

In sum, the cement industry appears to present a puzzle since firm and market level characteristics cannot explain the observed level of FDI agglomeration worldwide. We find that cross-market interactions affect entry decisions in a way that serves to increase agglomeration. Price levels post-entry provide corroborating evidence that firms are able to maintain higher prices when they meet the same firms in many other markets. The cement industry is an appropriate context in which to test for FDI-enhanced market power. It is very feasible that the mechanisms set out here play a role in other industry settings.

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References


Table 1: Results of the Agglomeration Analysis

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Region</th>
<th>#Countries</th>
<th>#Plants</th>
<th>#Big 6 Plants</th>
<th>Observed Agglomeration</th>
<th>Mean Agglomeration under Null</th>
<th>Lower bound</th>
<th>Upper bound</th>
<th>Non-random Agglomeration?</th>
</tr>
</thead>
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<td>Plant-Level Analysis 2002, All plants.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Africa</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>145</td>
<td>58</td>
<td>0.048</td>
<td>0.010</td>
<td>0.004</td>
<td>0.016</td>
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<td>42</td>
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<td>0.006</td>
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<td>0.051</td>
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<td>0.000</td>
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<td></td>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
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</table>

Notes: Under the null hypothesis of random agglomeration, the share of Big 6-owned plants/firms in each country should equal the share of the region's plants/firms in each country, accounting for the discreteness of plants/firms. This test simulates random agglomeration under this null hypothesis and constructs an empirical distribution of expected agglomeration. It then compares the observed level of agglomeration of Big 6 ownership to this simulated null distribution. If the observed level of Big 6 ownership agglomeration exceeds 95% of the observations generated under the null distribution, we reject the hypothesis that ownership agglomeration is random.
Table 2: Summary Statistics for Sections 3, 4, and 5  

Panel A: Variables used in the conditional logit analysis in section 3, main specification.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>Number of Observations</th>
<th>Mean</th>
<th>Standard Deviation</th>
<th>Minimum</th>
<th>Maximum</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
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<td>1 Entry (0 or 1 if firm enters)</td>
<td>548</td>
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<td>0.408</td>
<td>0</td>
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<td>0.165</td>
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<td>3 Average Collocation above 30% Dummy</td>
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<td>0.502</td>
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<td>0.010</td>
<td>0.314</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7 Shared Language Dummy</td>
<td>452</td>
<td>0.190</td>
<td>0.392</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8 Distance to Home Country (miles)</td>
<td>1445</td>
<td>6442.371</td>
<td>43712.840</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>508258</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9 Cement usage per person, tons</td>
<td>13445</td>
<td>345.665</td>
<td>426.195</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2490</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Panel B: Variables used in the conditional logit analysis in section 3, additional specification.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>Number of Observations</th>
<th>Mean</th>
<th>Standard Deviation</th>
<th>Minimum</th>
<th>Maximum</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1 Entry (0 or 1 if firm enters)</td>
<td>15824</td>
<td>0.007</td>
<td>0.085</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 Average Collocation with Current Incumbents</td>
<td>4633</td>
<td>0.395</td>
<td>0.210</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3 Average Collocation above 30% Dummy</td>
<td>4633</td>
<td>0.623</td>
<td>0.485</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4 Average Collocation above 60% Dummy</td>
<td>4633</td>
<td>0.623</td>
<td>0.485</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5 Average Collocation above 50th Percentile</td>
<td>4633</td>
<td>0.501</td>
<td>0.500</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6 Average Collocation above 90th Percentile</td>
<td>4633</td>
<td>0.092</td>
<td>0.288</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7 Shared Language Dummy</td>
<td>12567</td>
<td>0.168</td>
<td>0.374</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8 Distance to Home Country (miles)</td>
<td>13445</td>
<td>6442.371</td>
<td>43712.840</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>508258</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9 Total cement usage in country, million tons</td>
<td>13445</td>
<td>345.665</td>
<td>426.195</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2490</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Panel C: Variables used in the conditional logit analysis in section 4.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>Number of Observations</th>
<th>Mean</th>
<th>Standard Deviation</th>
<th>Minimum</th>
<th>Maximum</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1 Similarity of Entry Moves with Most Recent Incumbent</td>
<td>127</td>
<td>0.212</td>
<td>0.358</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 Average Collocation with Current Incumbents</td>
<td>88</td>
<td>0.240</td>
<td>0.169</td>
<td>0.75</td>
<td>-0.05</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3 Collocation including Zeros for Pioneer Moves</td>
<td>168</td>
<td>0.126</td>
<td>0.171</td>
<td>0.75</td>
<td>-0.07</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4 Shared Language Dummy</td>
<td>148</td>
<td>0.179</td>
<td>0.384</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>-0.05</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5 Distance to Home Country (miles)</td>
<td>148</td>
<td>5483</td>
<td>4220</td>
<td>195</td>
<td>15761</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Panel D: Cross Sectional Price and Cost Analysis in Section 5

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>Number of Observations</th>
<th>Mean</th>
<th>Standard Deviation</th>
<th>Minimum</th>
<th>Maximum</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1 Price per ton ($)</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>59.52</td>
<td>15.35</td>
<td>38.00</td>
<td>96.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 Cost per ton ($)</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>36.96</td>
<td>7.69</td>
<td>23.00</td>
<td>51.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3 EBITDA ($), (=Price-Cost)</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>22.56</td>
<td>11.81</td>
<td>10.00</td>
<td>60.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4 Market Share of Big 6 Firms</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>0.48</td>
<td>0.32</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>4.99</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5 Market Share of 6 Largest Firms (local and Big 6)</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>0.82</td>
<td>0.22</td>
<td>0.38</td>
<td>1.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6 Average Collocation of Current Big 6 Incumbents</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>0.23</td>
<td>0.18</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>0.47</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7 Big 6 Capacity Share * Average Worldwide Collocation</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>0.14</td>
<td>0.13</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>0.78</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8 GDP per capita</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>95.00</td>
<td>1482</td>
<td>65</td>
<td>8790</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9 GDP per capita</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>10.98</td>
<td>10.18</td>
<td>0.43</td>
<td>32.49</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10 Share of Cement sold in Bags</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>0.52</td>
<td>0.51</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>1.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11 Share of Manufacturing Employment in Construction</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>7.30</td>
<td>1.97</td>
<td>8.88</td>
<td>11.80</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12 Construction GDP as a proportion of Manufacturing GDP</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>29.81</td>
<td>12.55</td>
<td>9.57</td>
<td>64.59</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note for Panel D: There are 22 countries for which the data set is complete. These are: Argentina, Brazil, Canada, Egypt, France, Germany, Greece, Indonesia Italy, Japan, Malaysia, The Philippines, Poland, Portugal, South Korea, Spain, Thailand, Turkey, United Kingdom, United States, Venezuela.
Table 3: Results of the conditional logit analysis testing whether the identity of the next entrant to a given market is associated with worldwide collocation with market incumbents.


<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Source</th>
<th>Shared language</th>
<th>Distance between market and home base</th>
<th>Number of observations</th>
<th>LR chi squared</th>
<th>Prob &gt; chi squared</th>
<th>Pseudo R squared</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>CEM</td>
<td>1.04</td>
<td>0.69</td>
<td>153</td>
<td>0.74</td>
<td>0.400</td>
<td>0.155</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HEI</td>
<td>0.90</td>
<td>0.66</td>
<td>149</td>
<td>0.26</td>
<td>0.611</td>
<td>0.339</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HOL</td>
<td>0.95</td>
<td>0.67</td>
<td>145</td>
<td>0.59</td>
<td>0.440</td>
<td>0.285</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ITC</td>
<td>0.93</td>
<td>0.65</td>
<td>146</td>
<td>0.58</td>
<td>0.450</td>
<td>0.298</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LFG</td>
<td>1.00</td>
<td>0.66</td>
<td>144</td>
<td>0.89</td>
<td>0.339</td>
<td>0.363</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes: Conditional logit regressions estimated by maximum likelihood. Standard errors given in parentheses. *** signification at 1% level, ** significant at 5% level; * significant at 10% level.

In table 3, one observation is dropped due to no variation within groups, that is there is only one possible entrant to a given market (Cemex entering the US in 2000 when all other Big 6 firms are already present). Distance and language data is available for 148 of the 163 observations.

Table 4: Results of the conditional logit analysis testing whether market choice is associated with increased collocation with incumbent firms, for a given entering firm in a given year.


<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Source</th>
<th>Shared language</th>
<th>Distance between market and home base</th>
<th>Number of observations</th>
<th>LR chi squared</th>
<th>Prob &gt; chi squared</th>
<th>Pseudo R squared</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>CEM</td>
<td>1.04</td>
<td>0.69</td>
<td>153</td>
<td>0.74</td>
<td>0.400</td>
<td>0.155</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HEI</td>
<td>0.90</td>
<td>0.66</td>
<td>149</td>
<td>0.26</td>
<td>0.611</td>
<td>0.339</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HOL</td>
<td>0.95</td>
<td>0.67</td>
<td>145</td>
<td>0.59</td>
<td>0.440</td>
<td>0.285</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ITC</td>
<td>0.93</td>
<td>0.65</td>
<td>146</td>
<td>0.58</td>
<td>0.450</td>
<td>0.298</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LFG</td>
<td>1.00</td>
<td>0.66</td>
<td>144</td>
<td>0.89</td>
<td>0.339</td>
<td>0.363</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes: Conditional logit regressions estimated by maximum likelihood. Standard errors given in parentheses. *** signification at 1% level, ** significant at 5% level; * significant at 10% level.

In table 4, there are a large number of observations in column 5 because all countries which contain zero incumbents are included in this specification. By definition, the collocation variable is missing for these observations.

Table 5: Results of the conditional logit analysis testing whether a particular firm is more likely to be the next entrant to a market if it tends to enter similar markets to the most recent previous entrant.

Source: Cemex, Cembureau.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Source</th>
<th>Shared language</th>
<th>Distance between market and home base</th>
<th>Number of observations</th>
<th>LR chi squared</th>
<th>Prob &gt; chi squared</th>
<th>Pseudo R squared</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>CEM</td>
<td>1.04</td>
<td>0.69</td>
<td>153</td>
<td>0.74</td>
<td>0.400</td>
<td>0.155</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HEI</td>
<td>0.90</td>
<td>0.66</td>
<td>149</td>
<td>0.26</td>
<td>0.611</td>
<td>0.339</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HOL</td>
<td>0.95</td>
<td>0.67</td>
<td>145</td>
<td>0.59</td>
<td>0.440</td>
<td>0.285</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ITC</td>
<td>0.93</td>
<td>0.65</td>
<td>146</td>
<td>0.58</td>
<td>0.450</td>
<td>0.298</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LFG</td>
<td>1.00</td>
<td>0.66</td>
<td>144</td>
<td>0.89</td>
<td>0.339</td>
<td>0.363</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes: Conditional logit regressions estimated by maximum likelihood. Standard errors given in parentheses. *** signification at 1% level, ** significant at 5% level; * significant at 10% level.

In table 5, columns 3 and 4 contain fewer events because there is missing distance and language data. Columns 5 and 6 are estimated using the set of observations for which collocation is non-missing.
Table 6: Regression of Big 6 Market share on EBITDA, price and cost per ton.


<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Independent variable</th>
<th>EBITDA per ton</th>
<th>Price per ton</th>
<th>Cost per ton</th>
<th>EBITDA per ton</th>
<th>Price per ton</th>
<th>Cost per ton</th>
<th>EBITDA per ton</th>
<th>Price per ton</th>
<th>Cost per ton</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Big 6 Share of Market Capacity</td>
<td>3.10 (10.82)**</td>
<td>6.95 (14.27)**</td>
<td>-6.20 (5.50)</td>
<td>-11.79 (9.15)</td>
<td>-5.59 (6.29)</td>
<td>-11.79 (9.15)</td>
<td>-5.59 (6.29)</td>
<td>-11.79 (9.15)</td>
<td>-5.59 (6.29)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Average Worldwide Collocation of Incumbent Big 6 firms</td>
<td>-39.11 (25.55)</td>
<td>-48.51 (33.78)</td>
<td>-9.40 (15.18)</td>
<td>-5.59 (6.29)</td>
<td>-11.79 (9.15)</td>
<td>-5.59 (6.29)</td>
<td>-11.79 (9.15)</td>
<td>-5.59 (6.29)</td>
<td>-11.79 (9.15)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Big 6 Capacity Share * Average Worldwide Collocation</td>
<td>139.56 (52.65)**</td>
<td>184.83 (89.43)**</td>
<td>45.27 (31.28)</td>
<td>139.56 (52.65)**</td>
<td>184.83 (89.43)**</td>
<td>45.27 (31.28)</td>
<td>139.56 (52.65)**</td>
<td>184.83 (89.43)**</td>
<td>45.27 (31.28)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Independent variable</th>
<th>EBITDA per ton</th>
<th>Price per ton</th>
<th>Cost per ton</th>
<th>EBITDA per ton</th>
<th>Price per ton</th>
<th>Cost per ton</th>
<th>EBITDA per ton</th>
<th>Price per ton</th>
<th>Cost per ton</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Excess capacity (capacity/production)*</td>
<td>-26.42 (20.43)</td>
<td>-31.54 (26.94)</td>
<td>-5.12 (10.39)</td>
<td>-27.66 (17.50)</td>
<td>-34.53 (23.14)</td>
<td>-8.86 (10.39)</td>
<td>-19.33 (19.33)</td>
<td>-23.50 (19.33)</td>
<td>-9.05 (9.05)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Share bagged (if &gt;50% of cement sold in bags)</td>
<td>4.75 (11.94)</td>
<td>8.04 (15.78)</td>
<td>3.29 (6.97)</td>
<td>1.63 (10.48)</td>
<td>3.63 (13.86)</td>
<td>2.00 (6.22)</td>
<td>9.38 (13.41)</td>
<td>13.62 (17.30)</td>
<td>4.24 (6.26)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GDP</td>
<td>0.00 (0.00)</td>
<td>0.00 (0.00)</td>
<td>0.00 (0.00)</td>
<td>0.00 (0.00)</td>
<td>0.00 (0.00)</td>
<td>0.00 (0.00)</td>
<td>0.00 (0.00)</td>
<td>0.00 (0.00)</td>
<td>0.00 (0.00)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GDP per capita</td>
<td>-0.37 (0.06)</td>
<td>0.38 (0.88)</td>
<td>0.75 (0.34)**</td>
<td>-0.72 (0.79)</td>
<td>-0.12 (0.36)</td>
<td>0.40 (0.34)**</td>
<td>0.07 (0.73)</td>
<td>0.97 (0.96)</td>
<td>-0.90 (0.34)**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>42.89 (22.76)*</td>
<td>72.98 (30.02)**</td>
<td>30.09 (11.57)**</td>
<td>56.90 (20.79)**</td>
<td>93.24 (27.49)**</td>
<td>36.35 (12.35)**</td>
<td>5.46 (27.26)</td>
<td>34.61 (35.97)</td>
<td>29.16 (12.77)**</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Adjusted R squared: 0.1576 0.1472 0.5024 0.3820 0.3707 0.5017 -0.0394 -0.0535 0.4794

Number of observations: 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22

*Significant at 5% level; **significant at 10% level
*Excess capacity measure of market demand instrumented using share of employment manufacturing in construction, and construction GDP as a proportion of manufacturing GDP.

Table 7: Cement Price and Building Materials Price Indexes

Source: Statistics Canada, Banco de Mexico, INE, Banco Central Venezuela, DANE, National Statistics Office, Republic of the Philippines; IMF statistics yearbook; BLS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1990</td>
<td>1.00</td>
<td>1.00</td>
<td>1.00</td>
<td>1.00</td>
<td>1.00</td>
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<td>1.00</td>
<td>1.00</td>
<td>1.00</td>
<td>1.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1991</td>
<td>0.98</td>
<td>1.00</td>
<td>1.15</td>
<td>1.16</td>
<td>1.41</td>
<td>1.24</td>
<td>1.00</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
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<td>1.30</td>
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<td>1.55</td>
<td>1.02</td>
<td>1.07</td>
<td>1.02</td>
<td>0.96</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>0.91</td>
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<td>1.46</td>
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<td>2.77</td>
<td>2.12</td>
<td>1.00</td>
<td>1.13</td>
<td>1.03</td>
<td>0.97</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1994</td>
<td>1.02</td>
<td>1.06</td>
<td>1.57</td>
<td>1.43</td>
<td>4.85</td>
<td>3.73</td>
<td>1.18</td>
<td>1.22</td>
<td>1.03</td>
<td>1.16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1995</td>
<td>1.05</td>
<td>1.11</td>
<td>2.56</td>
<td>2.13</td>
<td>6.72</td>
<td>5.45</td>
<td>1.18</td>
<td>1.21</td>
<td>1.11</td>
<td>1.02</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1996</td>
<td>1.06</td>
<td>1.12</td>
<td>3.63</td>
<td>2.64</td>
<td>14.38</td>
<td>12.24</td>
<td>1.00</td>
<td>1.22</td>
<td>1.22</td>
<td>1.24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1997</td>
<td>1.08</td>
<td>1.14</td>
<td>3.97</td>
<td>3.15</td>
<td>21.54</td>
<td>16.47</td>
<td>2.14</td>
<td>2.00</td>
<td>1.11</td>
<td>1.27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1998</td>
<td>1.08</td>
<td>1.16</td>
<td>4.94</td>
<td>3.74</td>
<td>24.96</td>
<td>19.94</td>
<td>2.66</td>
<td>2.34</td>
<td>1.01</td>
<td>1.30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1999</td>
<td>1.10</td>
<td>1.19</td>
<td>5.39</td>
<td>4.31</td>
<td>28.52</td>
<td>22.69</td>
<td>1.06</td>
<td>1.33</td>
<td>1.26</td>
<td>1.10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2000</td>
<td>1.08</td>
<td>1.21</td>
<td>5.93</td>
<td>4.61</td>
<td>33.82</td>
<td>26.10</td>
<td>1.20</td>
<td>1.37</td>
<td>1.29</td>
<td>1.16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2001</td>
<td>1.13</td>
<td>1.24</td>
<td>6.10</td>
<td>4.71</td>
<td>34.91</td>
<td>26.10</td>
<td>1.29</td>
<td>1.40</td>
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*Non-shaded years represent years when the Big 6 firms were present and controlled a large market share.