Andrew Ang

When Hedge Funds Block the Exits

Coauthor(s): Nicolas P. B. Bollen.


Adobe Acrobat PDF

The ability of hedge fund investors to exit a fund by exchanging ownership for cash at the prevailing NAV is often blocked by lockups and notice periods. We model the exit decision as a real option and incorporate lockups and notice periods as exercise restrictions. We compute the cost of these restrictions using a lattice that incorporates the possibility of fund failure. Using data through 2008, we estimate that a two-year lockup with a three-month notice period costs approximately 4% of the initial investment. The cost of illiquidity can easily exceed 5% per year if the hedge fund manager suspends withdrawals as was common in the months following the financial crisis.

Source: Working Paper
Exact Citation:
Ang, Andrew, and Nicolas P. B. Bollen. "When Hedge Funds Block the Exits." Working Paper, Columbia Business School, 2010.
Date: 2010