Individual Preferences for Giving
Coauthor(s): Shachar Kariv, Daniel Markovits.
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This paper reports an experimental test of individual preferences for
giving. We use graphical representations of modified Dictator Games
that vary the price of giving. This generates a very rich data set wellsuited
to studying behavior at the level of the individual subject. We test
the data for consistency with preference maximization, and we recover
underlying preferences and forecast behavior using both nonparametric
and parametric methods. Our results emphasize that classical demand
theory can account very well for behaviors observed in the laboratory and
that individual preferences for giving are highly heterogeneous, ranging
from utilitarian to Rawlsian to perfectly selfish.
Fisman, Raymond, Shachar Kariv, and Daniel Markovits. "Individual Preferences for Giving." Columbia Business School, February 2005.