Pareto Damaging Behaviors
Coauthor(s): Shachar Kariv, Daniel Markovits.
Adobe Acrobat PDF
This paper reports a rigorous experimental test of Pareto-damaging be-
haviors. We introduce a new graphical representation of dictator games
with step-shaped sets of feasible payo?s to persons self and other on
which strongly Pareto e? cient allocations involve substantial inequality.
The non-convexity and sharp nonlinearity of the Pareto frontier allow us
systematically to classify Pareto-damaging allocations: as self-damaging
or other-damaging and as inequality-increasing or inequality-decreasing.
We ?nd that self and other Pareto-damaging behaviors occur frequently
even in circumstances that do not implicate reciprocity or strategic inter-
action. We also ?nd patterns in this behavior, most notably that behavior
that Pareto damages self always reduces inequality whereas behavior that
Pareto damages other usually increases inequality.
Fisman, Raymond, Shachar Kariv, and Daniel Markovits. "Pareto Damaging Behaviors." Columbia Business School, May 2005.